Voegelin’s “Gnosticism”
Reconsidered

For good or ill, Eric Voegelin is probably best known, especially among many who have not actually read him, for his denunciations of something called “gnosticism.”1 Even some who have read him but remain skeptical about the value of his thought associate him with a virtually monomaniacal anti-gnostic polemic. Thomas J. J. Altizer, for example, said (with an exaggeration that illustrates my point) that “Professor Voegelin finds everything to be Gnostic.”2

On various occasions I have suggested that it is time to rethink what it was Voegelin meant by this term and perhaps to find other language for it that would be less polemical, more precise, and more in line with current historical scholarship. I would like to take this occasion to explain in more detail why I think the term “gnosticism” has become inappropriate for the analysis of the phenomena Voegelin was trying to elucidate. To do so, I will take up the problems of the term or analytic category itself, considered in the light of developments in historical scholarship that have taken place since the days when Voegelin began to use it, and I will also discuss what in his own thought Voegelin was trying to use this analytic category to illuminate. This will lead in turn to a consideration of the word’s ambiguity and occasional tendentiousness in Voegelin’s use, its tenuousness as a historical explanation of later movements, and the ways in which the use of a single term tended to obscure the variety of problems Voegelin was trying to address.

Of course I am not alone in raising some of these questions. Stephen A. McKnight has probably done more than any other scholar to show that the pattern of thought and symbolism known as hermeticism, which Voegelin and many others once lumped to-
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Together with other phenomena under the single heading of gnosticism, is actually very different from what that word has usually been used to mean. Michael Franz, in his Eric Voegelin and the Politics of Spiritual Revolt: The Roots of Modern Ideology has written extensively on some of the problems Voegelin used the idea of “gnosticism” to analyze and has suggested the term “pneumopathological consciousness” to replace it. This is probably a pretty good term for the meaning Franz focuses on, but I will be less concerned with finding new terms than with clarifying the variety of issues that make it clear that new language is called for.

I think there is good reason to believe that if Voegelin were still alive and carrying on his research today, he would himself be actively looking for new ways to talk about the issues at the intersection of spirituality, politics, and the culture of modernity he once used the term “gnosticism” to refer to. For one thing, he said at a conference on “Gnosticism and Modernity” at Vanderbilt University in 1978 that he would probably not use that term if he were starting over again because, besides what then went by that name, the ideas he was interested in using it to address included many other strands, such as apocalypticism, alchemy, magic, theurgy, and scientism. And for another, in his conversations with me when I was working on my book on him in the late 1970s, he often spoke of the great advances being made in historical scholarship and the importance of integrating them into his work. He spoke disdainfully of much of the current intellectual scene of that time, but for the work of historical scholarship he had great respect. In particular, I remember how when I urged him to publish more of the voluminous manuscript on the history of political thought which he had abandoned when he shifted his focus, in Order and History, to the history of experience and its symbolizations, he protested that to publish any part of it he would have to study the historical research that had since been done on the subject and bring his discussion up to date.

If anything, the state of historical scholarship since the 1970s on the ancient phenomena known collectively as gnosticism has probably progressed farther and changed more radically than it has regarding any of the topics and periods Voegelin took up in the
earlier manuscript. He was aware in 1978 that much was happening in that area of scholarship, but I think even then he had no idea how radically the picture was going to change in the next few decades. According to Geoffrey L. Price, in April of 1962 when Voegelin was invited by the Senate and Academic Council of the University of London to give the lecture, “Ancient Gnosis and Modern Politics,” he wrote them, “The finding of the Gnostic Library in 1945 has made it possible to formulate theoretically the problem of Gnosis with result of [sic] interesting parallels in modern political theory since Hobbes.” Evidently he thought the discovery of actual “Gnostic” texts would confirm and augment what he had been using the term to say. But in fact in 1962 hardly any of that material had yet been edited and translated, and the bulk of it was not generally available until 1977 with the publication of The Nag Hammadi Library in English, so Voegelin himself had probably seen little of the actual texts except the Gospel According to Thomas, which had been published, with a great deal of publicity, in 1959 but which had little bearing on any of the topics Voegelin had been concerned with in his own use of the term.

Voegelin’s understanding of ancient Gnosticism was based mainly on his reading of volume I of Hans Jonas’s Gnosis und Spätantiker Geist, published in 1934, which was largely reproduced in Jonas’s later The Gnostic Religion (1958), though in his New Science of Politics Voegelin also refers to works by Eugène de Faye (1925), Simone Pétrement (1947), and Hans Söderberg (1949), with the comment, “The exploration of gnosis is so rapidly advancing that only a study of the principal works of the last generation will mediate an understanding of its dimensions.”

Well, the picture has changed enormously since the generation Voegelin was referring to in those lectures of 1951, and it has changed even more since the Gnosticism and Modernity conference in 1978 and Voegelin’s own death in 1985. Let me try to sketch some of these changes, beginning with a brief account of Jonas’s conception of Gnosticism and then the new picture—if it can even really be called that, since what has happened primarily is more the breakdown of the old picture of something that was
called Gnosticism than the development of a unified new one.

Describing in 1957 his motivation in writing Gnosis und Spätantiker Geist, Jonas said that the generation investigating Gnosticism before him had bequeathed a “wealth of historical detail” but at the cost of an “atomization of the subject into motifs from separate traditions.” He felt himself, however, that beneath all the fragments he could discern an essence: “That there was such a gnostic spirit, and therefore an essence of Gnosticism as a whole, was the impression which struck me at my initial encounter with the evidence, and it deepened with increasing intimacy. To explore and interpret that essence became a matter, not only of historical interest, as it substantially adds to our understanding of a crucial period of Western mankind, but also of intrinsic philosophical interest, as it brings us face to face with one of the more radical answers of man to his predicament and with the insights which only that radical position could bring forth, and thereby adds to our human understanding in general.” In that earlier work (though not in The Gnostic Religion) Jonas also tried to extract from that essence “a metamorphized ‘gnostic principle’” which he applied to an analysis of later thinkers such as Origen and Plotinus—offering a model for Voegelin’s later effort to do the same with respect to modern movements such as Fascism and Communism and what he considered their medieval and early modern antecedents, such as the utopian movements stemming from Giacomo da Fiore and the radical wing of the Reformation.

What was the essence of Gnosticism that Jonas thought he discerned? Gnosticism, he said, was born in the aftermath of Alexander the Great’s opening up of the eastern and western worlds to exchange of symbols and worldviews. Out of this came a syncretism into which were drawn traditional dualism, astrological fatalism, and traditional monotheism “yet with such a peculiarly new twist to them that in the present setting they subserved the representation of a novel spiritual principle”—i.e., the “gnostic principle.” At the core of this is a complex radical dualism:

The cardinal feature of gnostic thought is the radical dualism that governs the relation of God and world, and correspondingly that
of man and world. The deity is absolutely transmundane, its nature alien to that of the universe, which it neither created nor governs and to which it is the complete antithesis: to the divine realm of light, self-contained and remote, the cosmos is opposed as the realm of darkness. The world is the work of lowly powers which though they may mediately be descended from Him do not know the true God and obstruct the knowledge of Him in the cosmos over which they rule.”

These “lowly powers” are the Archons (or, if there is only one, the Demiurge); they “collectively rule over the world, and each individually in his sphere is a warder of the cosmic prison,” trying to keep humans from winning freedom to return to their true life beyond the cosmos: “Their tyrannical world-rule is called heimarmenei, universal Fate, a concept taken over from astrology but now tinged with the gnostic anti-cosmic spirit.”

These ideas are coupled in Gnosticism, for Jonas, with the idea that salvation is to be attained through some form of special revelatory knowledge, gnosis. This is not knowledge in the rational sense, but has to do with matters that are inherently existential and in principle unknowable to rational inquiry. “The ultimate ‘object’ of gnosis is God,” says Jonas, and “its event in the soul transforms the knower himself by making him a partaker in the divine existence....” Gnosis has the power to liberate the pneuma within the human individual, a divine element distinct from the human body and soul, which have been created by the Archons in order to keep the pneuma imprisoned in the cosmos. The moral law, in Jonas’s construction of Gnosticism, is just one more product of the Archons designed to keep humans in ignorance and thereby hold them captive. There have been both ascetic and libertine versions of Gnosticism, says Jonas, but the libertine is the form in which the essence of Gnosticism is more clearly expressed, because it “exhibits more forcefully than the ascetic version the nihilistic element contained in gnostic acosmism.”

Here we get to the bottom line of Jonas’s account of “Gnosticism”: it is an anti-cosmic nihilism that despair of the possibility that
life in this world could be good under any circumstances. It is, therefore, a movement of spiritual revolt against the conditions of reality under which human beings necessarily live. That is the “essence of Gnosticism” that Jonas intuited and looked for evidence of in the fragmentary materials assembled by the historians and philologists of the early twentieth century. He recognized himself how large was the role of intuition in his methodology, but defended it: “...this system has to be elicited as such from the mass of disparate materials, which yield it only under proper questioning, that is, to an interpretation already guided by an anticipatory knowledge of the underlying unity. A certain circularity in the proof thus obtained cannot be denied, nor can the subjective element involved in the intuitive anticipation of the goal toward which the interpretation is to move.” Jonas trusted the guess with which he started, and he was rewarded by the widespread acceptance won by his very vivid portrait of a purported ancient religion. (I remember being told in the mid-1980s by one prominent figure in the field of religious studies that Jonas’s was still his favorite Gnosticism despite what more recent scholars had uncovered in the confusing mix of material unearthed at Nag Hammadi.)

But as I said, Voegelin believed in scholarship, and if he were here now I am confident he would want to be open to even a radical revision both of Jonas’s Gnosticism and his own. Of course the change in our current knowledge of the ancient movements that have gone by the name of Gnosticism would not in itself necessarily invalidate the analytic category Voegelin constructed on the basis of an earlier generation’s ideas of them, since the purpose of Voegelin’s category was not primarily to describe ancient phenomena but to help us understand some modern ones for which the evidence is a great deal clearer. Even so, I think the category is of limited usefulness for the purpose to which he put it, as I will explain, and the fact that the idea of gnosticism as such has become so problematic and complex in recent years must at the very least undercut Voegelin’s effort to trace a historical line of descent from ancient sources to the modern phenomena he tried to use them to illuminate.

How has the idea of gnosticism become problematic now? To
begin with, we have to recognize something that Voegelin himself would have recognized as a major issue: that the whole idea of there being a Gnosticism, conceived as a movement with some kind of coherent core of beliefs is a modern construction. I remember hearing Voegelin say once at a lecture in 1976, when someone in the audience asked if he were an existentialist, “I am not an -ismist.” He went on to explain that the various models of thought known by names ending in “-ism” are mostly products of the eighteenth century, when there was a fashion for interpreting all sorts of patterns of thought or spirituality as though they were “philosophies,” in the Enlightenment conception of what that meant. Well, Gnosticism was itself exactly such a modern construction. As Michael Williams points out in his important Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category, “The term ‘gnosticism’ seems to have originated in the eighteenth century. On the other hand, the words ‘gnosis’ and ‘gnostic’ are Greek terms that are actually found in some of the ancient sources.... However, when used for the modern category ‘Gnosticism,’ ‘Gnosis,’ or ‘the Gnostic religion,’ none of these terms has an ancient equivalent. Antiquity quite literally had no word for the persons who are the subject of the present study—that is, no single word. The category is a modern construction.” Similarly, another prominent contemporary scholar in this field, Kurt Rudolph, has called the word “gnosticism” “a modern, deprecatory expression, a theologizing neologism.”

A further problem is that it is difficult to find evidence of anyone fitting the designation as commonly used actually using the word to describe himself. Says Williams, “...we apparently do not have direct evidence of a single so-called gnostic writer using the self-designation gnostikos!” Until the Nag Hammadi discovery in 1945 what we knew about people called “gnostics” was from Christian heresiologists. It was generally assumed that there were people who used that name with regard to themselves, even if there were no actual examples, but the discovery of the Nag Hammadi documents makes it seem less likely than ever. Now we have actual texts of a type that we had only heard about before at second hand, and though these exhibit many of the characteristic ideas traditionally associated with what has been...
called gnosticism on the basis of the denunciations of the heresiologists, these texts too offer not even a single instance of the word “gnostic” used as a self-designation. According to Williams, “Numerous other self-designations do appear in these writings, including Christians, pneumatics, seed, elect, race of Seth, race of the Perfect Human, immovable race...but not gnostikos.”25 Oddly enough, the only really well attested use of the term as a self-designation is found in the writings of Clement of Alexandria, who wrote about the ideal Christian gnōstikos, by which he seems to have meant something like what today we might call a “Christian intellectual,” not what we would now call a “gnostic.”

This introduces another problem: it is only by being selective about examples (such as leaving out Clement) that one was able, in the manner of Jonas, to put together a picture of a clear cut pattern of thinking represented by all the examples in the selection. In other words, the term seems to have been broad and vague even in the use of Christian heresiologists. The most influential of these has been Irenaeus of Lyons, who composed his five-volume “Exposure and Refutation of Knowledge [gnosis] Falsely So Called” around 180 AD. Irenaeus’s work may have been partially based on an earlier one by Justin Martyr in the mid-second century, but no copies of this have survived, and subsequent Christian heresiologists took Irenaeus’s catalogue as their starting point and even copied some of his descriptions. The principal heresiologists after Irenaeus were Hippolytus of Rome in the early third century and Epiphanius of Salamis in the late fourth century, but neither of these used the term “gnostic” as broadly as did Irenaeus and did not categorize as gnostics many of the figures or groups that Irenaeus had designated by that word. Another heresiologist, Pseudo-Tertullian (perhaps mid-third century) does not use the term “gnostic” at all. The modern use, on the other hand, generally encompasses under “gnostics” almost all of those so categorized by Irenaeus: the Valentinians (Valentinus, Ptolemy, Secundus, and Marcus), Simon of Samaria, Menander, Satornil, Basilides, Carpocrates, Marcellina, Cerinthus, the Nicolaitans, Cerdo, Barbelo-Gnostics, Ophites, and Cainites. The exceptions, included by Irenaeus but left out of most
modern lists, are the Ebionites, Marcion, and the Encratites, including Tatian, although Jonas does count Marcion as a gnostic on the basis of the distinction he made between the God revealed in the New Testament and that represented in the Old. Jonas, very influentially, interpreted Irenaeus, on the basis of his title, as intending to categorize as “gnostic” every heretic he even mentioned in his work. Williams, on the other hand, points out the fallacy in this:

Although Irenaeus’s catalog has served as the ultimate inspiration for the modern construction of “gnosticism” as a category, it was not itself really constructed for the purpose of grouping together examples of religious thought and practice on the basis of phenomenological similarity. Rather what all the items on Irenaeus’s list share in common is deficiency (in his judgment) with respect to Truth.

Williams goes on to offer a methodological critique that, although he is not aiming directly at Jonas, describes perfectly how Jonas came up with the essence he intuited:

This is not to deny that there are phenomenological similarities among some of the data cataloged by Irenaeus. It is only to emphasize how little we should depend on his catalog itself to do the grouping for us. That is, our methodological approach should not be to attempt to determine what “gnosticism is” by beginning with Irenaeus’s catalog, or a large portion of it, and from this abstracting “gnosticism’s” characteristic features. For Irenaeus is not really trying to show us what “gnosticism is,” but what heresy is.

Williams’s bottom line is that as Irenaeus used the term “gnostic,” it seems to have been mainly a catch-all term for heresy in general. But what about the word’s utility as a term for patterns of thought that might have enough phenomenological similarity to be worth finding some common term for? Can enough of that similarity be found among the usual suspects? Unfortunately, as Williams goes on to show in the remainder of his book, that is not the case—or at least what can be found in common among these figures is not something
that accords very closely with the set of characteristics Jonas intuited and so many later users of the term have accepted from him: a spirit of anti-cosmic revolt stemming from radical dualism and fatalism with respect to the tyrannical world-rule of Archons or Demiurges. Looking more closely at the texts from Nag Hammadi that show how some of the groups Irenaeus talked about, and others commonly classified as gnostic, really thought, Williams points out that there is actually a lot of diversity among Demiurges and dualisms—more than there is any point in trying to detail here.

Let me simply summarize Williams’s findings briefly. Some texts trace a dualism back to the roots of all being, before Demiurges. Some describe Demiurges who are evil from the start and produce all later evil, although no information is given about whether or not they themselves derive from evil principles. Some talk about Demiurges who fell away from an original monistic perfection or who began as good but later revolted. Some demiurgic myths are not anti-cosmic but treat the cosmos as having a proper place in the greater scheme. In some, the devolution of the Demiurges is part of a providential divine plan aimed at an ultimate good. Some talk about Demiurges who are not evil but good, or who grow into goodness. Some express hostility to the body, while others talk about the perfection of the human and speak favorably of the body. Some urge asceticism, and some are not ascetic, though Williams says there is no solid evidence for the libertinism Irenaeus attributed to some Gnostic groups. Although some texts do speak of some individuals as members of a spiritual race (“pneumatics”), there is no solid evidence that their authors really thought in terms of a deterministic elitism in which the pneumatics were predestined for salvation without the need for any striving and achievement; in fact, some even talk as though the potential to belong to the spiritual race is universal and open to development in everyone.

Williams’s own conclusion regarding what these patterns of thought have in common is simply that they all tend to draw on Biblical imagery in some manner and that they all involve the idea that between what is really ultimate and us in our ordinary experience there is some higher but not ultimate level of beings who have
played some role in shaping the cosmos—hence his suggestion that the term “gnostic” would be better dropped in favor of “Biblical demiurgical.” But this would not, for Williams, be a more precise definition of what was previously called gnosticism; it would be a whole new category:

Biblical demiurgical myth would not be just another name for “gnosticism” because the intent of the new category would be precisely to cut free from baggage surrounding the old one. While it would be grouping most of the same myths together for study and comparison, it would not make the series of mistakes I have tried to argue in this study have been made with the category “gnosticism.” The definition of the category “biblical demiurgical” says nothing in itself about “anticosmism,” and assumes nothing, and therefore it allows for the range of attitudes about the cosmos and its creator(s) that are actually attested in the works.

So at the very least, the word “gnosticism” as used in the larger scholarly world has become highly problematic with regard to both its meaning and its usefulness as a description of the phenomenon called by that name in the history of religions—all of which lends support to Michael Franz’s suggestion that “one can do much more in the way of corroborating Voegelin’s basic thesis if the analysis is conducted at the level of patterns in consciousness than at the level of specific traditions and movements in history.”

Another problem with the word “gnosticism” should also be clear by now: all the evidence we have suggests the term has been deprecatory and inherently polemical from its earliest use. As noted above, for Irenaeus, the source of most later use of the term, it seems to have been virtually equivalent to “heretical” or simply “false.” Voegelin’s own use of the words “gnostic” and “gnosticism” was also polemical, and I have suggested on earlier occasions that those who wish to carry forward the valuable heritage of thought Voegelin has left us might do well to consider seriously the question of how much the polemical style that was an accident of Voegelin’s particular anti-Nazi and Cold War milieu still remains really useful. As I said at the international conference convened in Summer 1994 by the Voegelin
Centre of the University of Manchester, “If Voegelin is going to speak to the post-1989 world, which is torn less by universalist ideologies than by ethnic, religious, and nationalist particularisms, it will not be through his opposition to ideologies that have already lost most of their force but through his contributions to a positive conception of human universality.”

To explore what bearing Voegelin’s critique of what he called “gnosticism” may have on the fundamental issues of human universality, I would like to turn now to the variety of ways he talked about gnosticism in his writings over the years, sometimes with a political emphasis, sometimes with a philosophical one. It was when his focus was on the political that Voegelin tended to be most polemical—understandably, since some of the political phenomena that aroused him (Nazism and Soviet communism, in both their domestic and their imperial modes) really did deserve strong opposition, and the fact that they were abetted in European and American societies by people who refused to recognize their combination of folly and barbarism was all the more exacerbating to him. But underlying the rhetoric of political polemic there was always a serious philosophical foundation, which was an expression of profound existential and spiritual reflections. It is these reflections and that foundation that are the heart of Voegelin’s thought, and it is because I hope they will not be lost in a general dismissal of his thought as outdated or “conservative” that I raise the question of whether the language of a critique of “gnosticism” is really the most appropriate and effective for communicating what is really important in what Voegelin was trying to say.

Just to consider briefly Voegelin’s use of the idea of “gnosticism” in his more political writings, we might consider first the way he develops it in what are probably the two most polemical of his books, *The New Science of Politics* and *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*. In the latter he gives us a summary of what he says are the six characteristic features of gnosticism. These stated very concisely are:

1. dissatisfaction with one’s situation;
2. belief that the reason the situation is unsatisfactory is that the world is intrinsically poorly organized;
3. salvation from the evil of the world is possible
4. if the order of being is changed,
5. and this is possible in history
6. if one knows how. (Gnosis is the knowledge about how.)

Reading along through the six, they seem to flow logically enough that some readers may not have noticed how they elide from what in Voegelin’s own day was a standard, recognizable description of something quite different. The first three characteristics are in line with Jonas’s idea of the essence of ancient Gnosticism. The fourth begins to introduce an idea from Voegelin’s own system of thought, and the fifth and sixth depart from the standard use entirely in their emphasis on salvation within history through changes one is able to bring about in the world, whereas Jonas’s gnostics despaired of the world and its history and looked for salvation elsewhere. This would be less of a problem if Voegelin were simply trying to extend the meaning he found in Jonas, but by placing his emphasis on intramundane salvation through human action and reinterpreting gnostics as knowledge of how to perform that action he does not just extend it, but transforms it.

Then a few pages later, Voegelin puts the seal on this transformation by saying, “All gnostic movements are involved in the project of abolishing the constitution of being, with its origin in divine, transcendent being, and replacing it with a world-immanent order of being, the perfection of which lies in the realm of human action.”

He does not say “all modern” or “all immanentist” gnostic movements, but simply “all gnostic movements.” Nor does he intend it only to refer to modern movements, since where he says this he has just been talking about the twelfth century Christian figure, Joachim of Fiore, whom he also describes in The New Science of Politics as a “Gnostic prophet.”

There has already been a certain amount of controversy over whether Voegelin can legitimately trace a line of descent from ancient gnosticism through Joachim and his symbolism of the Third Kingdom of the Spirit to Thomas Münzer in the radical Reformation and thence to Karl Marx. In The New Science Voegelin asserts direct continuity between Joachim and ancient gnostics, but he offers no
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evidence: “The economy of this lecture does not allow a description to the gnosis of antiquity or of the history of its transmission into the Western Middle Ages; enough to say that at the time gnosis was a living religious culture on which men could fall back.” In reality, he had no concrete evidence to offer, although I am sure he thought there must be some (just as he expected the Nag Hammadi documents would justify his use of the word). I think that Voegelin is right that the Third Kingdom symbolism deriving from Joachim has been enormously influential on the medieval and modern imagination, but my point here is only that Voegelin begins with a definition of gnosticism that seems to be grounded historically in the ancient figures condemned as heretics by Irenaeus and taken as expressions of an essence by Jonas, and then he elides from that to later phenomena with a meaning that reverses what for Jonas and many others had been the key element in the mix: the rejection of this world in favor of something radically transcendent.

Voegelin departed still further from the standard model of thinking about gnosticism when he expanded his conception of it to include intellectual, emotional, and volitional varieties. These consist of “speculative penetrations of the mystery of creation and existence” (the intellectual variety), enthusiasm (the emotional variety), and “activist redemption of man and society, as in the instance of revolutionary activists like Comte, Marx, or Hitler” (the volitional variety). It was the enormous breadth of this expansion that made it possible for him to make such a statement as, “By gnostic movements we mean such movements as progressivism, positivism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, communism, fascism, and national socialism.” One can see where Altizer got his caricature of Voegelin as someone “who finds everything to be gnostic.” A term this broad, this dubious (with regard to actual historical continuity), and this polemical is hardly well suited to the more serious philosophical issues and universal human challenges he also tried to use it to address.

What were those? Let us start with a consideration of what he thought were the basic issues involved in the birth of the ancient movement. He said in The Ecumenic Age that the genetic context of
ancient gnosticism was “the interaction between expansion of empire and differentiation of consciousness.”⁴¹ The expansion of empire gave rise to dissatisfaction with the present situation (the first characteristic in his list of six that we saw above), but that dissatisfaction took a special form due to the fact that some people were already experiencing and trying to understand what Voegelin calls a “differentiation of consciousness,” one of the major themes of his thought. There are two distinct thrusts in Voegelin’s thought within the idea of differentiation of consciousness—what he called noetic (intellectual or rational) differentiation and pneumatic (spiritual).

The noetic differentiation was essentially the self-discovery and appropriation of the reasoning mind that took place among the classic philosophers, the realization that at least part of what we know, we know by engaging in the methodical procedures of inquiry, with attention to processes of interpretation and critical reflection. But there was also something else that could be known in a different way, and this was where spiritual experience, the pneumatic differentiation, and cognitio fidei (the knowledge that takes place by faith)⁴² came in. Voegelin also sometimes called this “existential consciousness” or “eschatological consciousness.” The key element in both the noetic and pneumatic differentiations was the realization of a difference, within our concrete, personal experience of existence, between an immanent pole (which we call “man” or “ourselves”) and a radically transcendent pole, which can go by various names such as “the Beyond” or “God” or “Being.” The human experience of existence then becomes that of what Voegelin called a “Between” (translating the Greek metaxy), that is, between the two poles. This is experienced as a condition of tension, especially of longing for what is Beyond or being pulled by it. So the philosopher experiences questioning as a seeking and being drawn by potentially knowable truth, and the mystic experiences the soul’s longing as a seeking and being drawn by the divine. The noetic and pneumatic differentiations, though they express themselves in different activities and represent themselves in different symbolisms, are closely related. As Voegelin put it in The Ecumenic Age, “...the structure of a theophanic experience reaches from a pneumatic
center to a noetic periphery.” In both differentiations it is the same Beyond, the same pole with its tension of seeking and being drawn. The difference is only in the way the philosopher or the mystic relates to the Beyond. One relates to it through questioning, the other through prayer.

Before these two differentiations, there was what Voegelin calls “the primary experience of the cosmos.” This was an earlier way of apprehending the field of human experience. Imaginatively, it was experienced as a cosmos full of gods; that is, the transcendent pole was experienced as present in the field but dispersed within it in such a way that it was identified with the variety of particular intracosmic forces. Hence there were gods of fertility, the weather, and so on. Both the immanent and transcendent poles of experience were present in this primary experience, but they were intermingled, and the structure of the field was unclear. Cognitively, the primary experience of the cosmos was known by a human mind embedded in its myths; the structure of reality was grasped imaginatively as the cosmos full of gods, and both cosmos and gods were known in the stories told about them. Classic philosophy was born in the process (the noetic differentiation) in which the human mind and imagination ceased to be simply embedded in their myths but developed a reflective distance that made it possible to think more carefully and critically about the contents of the field and its bipolar structure. The prophetic movement in Israel was motivated by the corresponding pneumatic differentiation of radical transcendence from the mythic imagery of a tribal god who came to be understood as the radially transcendent, monotheist God.

When differentiation of consciousness takes place, Voegelin said, it is both exciting and disturbing; it is also subtle, delicate, and very susceptible to distortion. It can give rise to the exuberant play of dialectics and also to feelings of a gulf between us and the Beyond (expressed in the symbolism of sin and fallenness) and the imperatives of the prophets to reorder our lives in accord with what a proper relation to transcendence demands of us. But it can also slip into hypostatizations of immanence and transcendence, their interpretation not as poles of our experience of existence but as “things”: thus
the Beyond becomes an individual entity named “God,” and we become entities called human beings, which exist separately from the being of that other entity called God. (Just as the noetic differentiation could slip into hypostatization of the dynamic operations of interpretation and critical reflection into faculties called “intellect” and “reason.”) As Voegelin put it in “Reason: The Classic Experience,” “If man exists in the metaxy, in the tension ‘between god and man,’ any construction of man as a world-immanent entity will destroy the meaning of existence, because it deprives man of his specific humanity. The poles of the tension must not be hypostatized into objects independent of the tension in which they are experienced as its poles.”

Both differentiations were susceptible to what Voegelin liked to call a “derailment” into gnostic forms. So, for example, he says with regard to the pneumatic differentiation’s implications for ancient Gnostics that “[t]he Gnostic imbalance of consciousness...causes a split to run through divine reality, separating the daimonic powers of the world from the pneumatic divinity of the Beyond” and that “[w]hile these early movements attempt to escape from the Metaxy by splitting its poles into the hypostases of this world and the Beyond, the modern apocalyptic-Gnostic movements attempt to abolish the Metaxy by transforming the Beyond into this world.” In this instance, Voegelin remains close to the usual meaning of the term “gnostic,” but in his general usage he extended it in such a way that it became a collective name for every possible way of immanentizing the transcendent pole—very far from its usual meaning.

He sees the various forms of distortion as virtually inevitable companions to the pneumatic differentiation in the prophets of Israel and the early Christians, since it is so easy to slip from one to the other. In “The Gospel and Culture,” for example, he says, “The various problems transmitted to us through two thousand years have their center in the Movement in which man’s consciousness of existence emerges from the primary experience of the cosmos. Consciousness becomes luminous to itself as the site of the revelatory process, of the seeking and being drawn. The experience of a
cosmos full of gods has to yield to the experience of eminent divine presence in the movement of the soul in the *metaxy*," and "the area of existential consciousness, though eminent of rank, is only one area of reality. If it is overemphasized, the cosmos and its gods will become the ‘alien earth’ of the Gnostics and life in the despised world will hardly be worth living. The tendency toward this imbalance is certainly present in the gospel movement."

In fact, the pneumatic differentiation is so elusive and therefore so inherently fragile, that in the early Christian experiences, which Voegelin thought reached the historical high point of pneumatic differentiation, it was particularly susceptible to derailment. As he put it in *The Ecumenic Age*, "Considering the history of Gnosticism, with the great bulk of its manifestations belonging to, or deriving from, the Christian orbit, I am inclined to recognize in the epiphany of Christ the great catalyst that made eschatological consciousness an historical force, both in forming and deforming humanity." Spiritual hopes can easily become immanentized by the imagination as hopes for a super-terrestrial paradise with virtually terrestrial palm trees and fountains, and just as easily they can slide into becoming hopes for a terrestrial paradise in which each will give according to his ability and take only according to his need. Or the authentic *cognitio fidei* that knows God as the Beyond of the Between can be immanentized into the belief that God is a god, dragging, as it were, the Beyond into a world that is no longer a Between: “Unless the Unknown God is the undifferentiated divine presence in the background of the specific intracosmic gods, he is indeed a god unknown to the primary experience of the cosmos. In that case, however, there is no process of revelation in history, nor a millennial Movement culminating in the epiphany of the Son of God, but only the irruption of an extra-cosmic god into a cosmos to whose mankind he hitherto had been hidden.”

In the case of the noetic differentiation, the derailment that Voegelin called “gnostic” took the forms of either or both of: (1) overlooking and trying to bypass the necessary demands of rational inquiry through claims to non-rational intuitive knowledge or to feeling as a higher form of knowledge, or (2) as in the case just
described, the attempt to “immanentize” the Beyond, that is, to treat it as though it were an intramundane entity. In the latter case, God does not become a god, but is reduced to an ultimate knowable, a kind of supreme idea that has finally become thoroughly understood. Voegelin’s classic case of this is G.W.F. Hegel’s “attempt to reduce the Logos of revelation to the logos of philosophy, and the logos of philosophy to the dialectics of consciousness. Philosophy (Liebe zum Wissen) was supposed to advance toward Gnosis (wirkliches Wissen)—and that could be done only through anaesthetizing the philosopher’s sensitiveness to the borderline between the knowable and the unknowable, for the point at which the knowable truth of order is rooted in the Eros of the transcendent Sophon” (that is, the Beyond as the transcendent pole of noetic seeking that makes possible the reflective distance that keeps one from identifying any one interpretation of experience with truth as such).49 Referring to both Hegel and Friedrich Engels in *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, Voegelin states this issue in the words, “The fallacy of gnosis consists in the immanentization of transcendental truth.”50 Extending this idea further to refer to all efforts to reduce the totality of the knowable to what can only be known by way of the methods of the natural sciences, Voegelin says, “Scientism has remained to this day one of the strongest Gnostic movements in Western society...” and goes on to speak of “the immanentist pride in science.”51

The immanentizing negations of both the noetic and the pneumatic differentiations of consciousness easily issue into the types of political utopianism or “realized eschatology” that Voegelin called political gnosticism. So, for example, he says of Karl Marx, “The Marxian gnosis expresses itself in the conviction that the movement of the intellect in the consciousness of the empirical self is the ultimate source of knowledge for the understanding of the universe. Faith and the life of the spirit are expressly excluded as an independent source of order in the soul.”52 The political expression of this is the attempt to immanentize the transcendent as the perfection of worldly existence. As such—and this is a point that I think Voegelin’s use of the language of “gnosticism” did help to emphasize—political
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utopianism has a religious dimension, even when, as in Marx’s case, it denies the value of traditional religion; its goal is radical transcendence realized as radical immanence. So, Voegelin speaks of Marx’s “gnosticism” as “parousiastic,” referring to the religious hope for the transformation of the world through divine action into a true paradise: “The aim of parousiastic gnosticism is to destroy the order of being, which is experienced as defective and unjust, and through man’s creative power to replace it with a perfect and just order.”53 This effort tries to reverse or suppress the insight of the pneumatic differentiation regarding the radical distinctness of the transcendent pole of the experiential field. The pneumatic differentiation “dedivinized” the world by bringing forward that distinctness; parousiastic gnosticism “redivinizes” it.54 But this does not have the effect of restoring the primary experience of the cosmos, which had itself involved a healthy appreciation of what lies beyond us, even if its symbolism blurred the distinction between the Beyond and its finite participations. As Voegelin explains it, “Modern re-divinization has its origins rather in Christianity itself, deriving from components that were suppressed as heretical by the universal church”—that is, from ancient Gnosticism.55

Here again we see Voegelin eliding from the conventional picture of ancient Gnostic world-rejection to modern efforts to build a perfect world that would exclude any real transcendence. But in this Voegelin is nevertheless making an important point: that there can be forms of modern world-affirmation that imply deep hostility toward transcendence and thereby deform the order of our existential structure, or, as Voegelin also puts it, they close us off against the transcendent pole of consciousness.56 To do this requires force and entails hostility; hence the angry atheism that animates attempts to build a new heaven on earth: “And taking control of being further requires that the transcendent origin of being be obliterated: it requires the decapitation of being—the murder of God.”57

It is possible, however, to make this kind of point and analyze its implications without falling back on the language of “gnosticism.” Let me mention one place where Voegelin does so, in a manner that could serve as an example for those who would like to carry forward
his tradition effectively. In his 1974 essay, “Reason: the Classic Experience,” Voegelin talks about the positive insights into the structure of human existence among the philosophers of classical Greece, and he also talks about what can go wrong when people of lesser insight or perverse people will defy that structure, but he does so without the use of the words “gnostic” or “gnosticism.” He talks about the Hellenic differentiation of “nous,” about Plato’s awareness of “tension toward the ground of existence,” and about how his way of speaking about it “left consciousness open to the future of theophany, to the pneumatic revelations of the Judaeo-Christian type as well as to the later differentiations of mysticism and of tolerance in doctrinal matters.”

He also talks about how “the phenomena of existential disorder through closure toward the ground of reality” had been observed and analyzed from the time of Heraclitus. He talks about how “the shattering experiences of ecumenic imperialism and, in its wake, existential disorientation as a mass phenomenon” both stimulated the philosophers to develop a language with which to bring their insights to “conceptual fixation” and gave rise to the “agnoia ptioides” (fearful ignorance) and anxietas that stimulated aspernatio rationis (rejection of reason) and would eventually produce the parallel modern closure of the soul that Heimito von Doderer in the twentieth century called Apperzeptionsverweigerung (refusal to apperceive). Voegelin offers an analysis that effectively takes account of the hostility in this to transcendence and the order of being, “the decapitation of being” or “murder of God” referred to above. Drawing on Plato’s language, Voegelin discusses this as “eristics,” the negative, death-seeking, counterpart to the open, life-seeking, exercise of reason called “dialectics.” “The differentiation of Life and Death as the moving forces behind Reason and the passions,” says Voegelin, is worked out in Plato’s symbolism of reason as open exploration of the Between:

To move within the metaxy, exploring it in all directions and orienting himself in the perspective granted to man by his position in reality, is the proper task of the philosopher. To denote this movement of thought or discussion (logos) within the metaxy,
Plato uses the term *dialectics* ([Philebus] 17a). Since, however, man’s consciousness is also conscious of participating in the poles of the metaletic tension (*i.e.*, in the Apeiron [the Boundless] and Nous), and the desire to know is apt to reach beyond the limits of participatory knowledge, there will be thinkers—“those who are considered wise among men these days”—who are inclined to let the In-Between reality (*ta mesa*) escape (*ekpheugein*) them in their libidinous rush toward cognitive mastery over the *hen* [the One] or the *apeiron*. To denote this type of speculative thought Plato uses the term *eristics* (17a).63

Here we see, I think, a clear analysis of the issues Voegelin often used the word “gnosticism” to designate, but in this essay he manages to offer it without once falling back on that word (and dragging in with it all its manifold relevant or irrelevant connotations).

I hope that by this time the reader can see both that Voegelin’s use of the language of “gnosticism” involves some serious problems and that he was nevertheless trying to use it to address important issues regarding the fundamental order of human existence and the ways it can fall into disorder. To sum up briefly, the problems with Voegelin’s use of that language are:

1. It begins by claiming to draw out the implications of historical research on the ancient gnostics but does so in ways that conflict confusingly with the meanings given the word by the leading scholars in that field of research in his own time.

2. Even if his use of the term had been in line with that of the scholars of his time, the state of scholarship has advanced considerably in the last half century, in directions that call into question even the most widely accepted scholarship Voegelin drew on.

3. Even if the ancient Gnosticism he appealed to as the source of what he called modern “gnosticism” had not been so clearly disinclined to seek salvation in worldly fulfillment, the historical links Voegelin asserted between that and the modern immanentizing patterns of thought he talked about do not exist in the evidence available, and his assertions of those links did not meet the usual standards of scholarly carefulness that he believed in.
4. When the word “gnosticism” appears in the writings of Voegelin and Voegelinians, it brings with it a host of associations that are likely to confuse the issues its use is intended to clarify, or at least put out a bone of contention that is likely to distract many readers from the serious problems Voegelinian research tries to bring to their attention.

5. Voegelin’s own use of the term, though richly meaningful when one goes into it in depth and sets aside all the side issues it tends to arouse, covers so many distinct problems that its very richness makes it seem overly general and imprecise—a problem Voegelin seems to have recognized himself when he said in 1978, as I mentioned earlier, that besides what was then usually called by that name, the ideas he was interested in using it to address included many other strands, such as apocalypticism, alchemy, magic, theurgy, and scientism.

Voegelin’s analyses of the universal structure of human existence and the symbolisms that have developed to express the insights into that structure that have emerged in the course of history were stated in terms specific to the many facets of those matters he addressed. He did not try to use some single term to cover them all. But the manifold forms that can be taken by all the various ways of misunderstanding and distorting those insights, philosophical, theological, spiritual, political, psychological, literary, and so on, Voegelin often tried to cover with what we can now see was a single, very problematic term, “gnosticism,” that is likely to confuse more than to clarify. Also, I hope I may be permitted to add, that term’s polemical associations pose the danger that what tries to operate as objective analysis may easily come to sound merely partisan in the ears of many in the potential audience for further Voegelinian research—and those same associations may tempt some who would carry forward that research to lapse into a kind of lazy polemicism that does not want to take the trouble to find more precise language for its analyses or to explore particular cases in the greater depth that more precise language might make possible. As Michael Franz rightly said, “...there is a very real danger that less cautious polemists will invoke Voegelin’s categories without troubling themselves
over the difficulties involved in establishing the presence of spiritual
disease in the objects of their ridicule." These are issues that those
who would honor Voegelin’s achievement and seek to extend it in
the future in their own research would do well to consider carefully.

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NOTES
1. The term is usually capitalized when referring to the (sup-
posed) ancient religion of Gnosticism, and I will capitalize it when
referring primarily to that. I will leave it uncapitalized when refer-
ring, as here, to a more general phenomenon—although I should
state from the start that the real existence of a general phenomenon
sufficiently unified to be designated by such a name seems more
questionable now, as I shall explain, than it did a few decades ago.
That there was a sufficiently consistent pattern of thinking among
many ancient figures traditionally called “Gnostics” to allow us to
speak of an ancient religion of Gnosticism has also become highly
questionable. (Voegelin’s own publications follow no consistent
pattern regarding capitalization of the word.)

2. In a conversation reported by John William Corrington in
“Order and History: The Breaking of the Program,” Denver Quar-
terly, no. 3 (Autumn, 1975): 122.

3. See especially his Sacralizing the Secular: the Renaissance
Origins of Modernity (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1989) and The Modern Age and the Recovery of Ancient
Wisdom: A Reconsideration of Historical Consciousness, 1450-

4. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press,

5. See my Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History (Seattle and

6. VOEGELIN—RESEARCH NEWS Volume III, No. 1 (Feb-
ruary 1997), archived at http://vax2.concordia.ca/~vorenews/

7. Leiden: E.J. Brill; San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977. French translations appeared in 1978. Before this, scholars were pretty much restricted to working with facsimile copies of the Coptic texts as they were made available. For an indignant account of the slowness with which the Nag Hammadi documents were made available, see Hans Jonas’s supplement to the second edition of The Gnostic Religion; The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), pp. 290-291.


9. Voegelin was also acquainted with the descriptions and summaries of some of the Nag Hammadi material in Jean Doresse’s, The Secret books of the Egyptian Gnostics: An Introduction to the Gnostic Coptic Manuscripts Discovered at Chenoboskion, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Hollis & Carter, 1960), probably in its 1958 French original.

10. Jonas published a second volume in 1954 and was working on a third but never finished it.


13. Hans Jonas told me in 1987 that Voegelin had not understood his conception of Gnosticism. My own impression was that Voegelin understood quite well what Jonas said about Gnosticism but modified the idea for his own purposes, as I will explain below.


15. Ibid., p. 42.

16. Ibid., p. 43.

17. Ibid., p. 35.

18. Ibid., p. 46.

19. This may be why Jonas thought Voegelin did not understand
what he meant by Gnosticism (see note 13, above). Jonas's own application of the category to modern phenomena was to what he called nihilism (which included, for him, Sartrean existentialism) rather than, as in Voegelin, to unrealistic utopian movements, which were trying to bring about changes that were hoped to offer the promise of a better life in this world. See The Gnostic Religion, ch. 13, “Epilogue: Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism,” pp. 320-340.

21. The title of the lecture was “Modern Dogmatism,” delivered at the University of Washington in March, 1976.
24. Rethinking “Gnosticism,” p. 32.
25. Ibid. Ellipsis in original.
26. Jonas also includes the Poimander of Hermes Trismegistus, which is not in Irenaeus. Stephen A. McKnight, in the works cited above, has shown the inappropriateness of this, given the essence of Gnosticism that Jonas was trying to assimilate this to.
27. Williams, p. 45.
28. Ibid., pp. 51-52, 265.
29. Ibid., p. 265.


33. A note on Voegelin’s supposed “conservatism”: Voegelin often expressed his wariness of political parties both of the left and of the right. One of the few figures involved in politics (though not himself a politician) whom Voegelin expressed unqualified admiration for was John R. Commons, an economist at the University of Wisconsin who was a major voice for political reform movements in the early twentieth century. Commons favored redistribution of wealth for the sake of greater equality, a minimum wage, unionization of labor, and limitations on the hours of labor that employers could demand. Legislation drafted in Wisconsin by John R. Commons and his students served as models for measures enacted in the New Deal, including social security. See Robert William Fogel, The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 117, 129. See also Lafayette G. Harter, Jr., John R. Commons: His Assault on Laissez-Faire (Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University Press, 1962). Cf. also Michael Franz, op. cit., p. 14 on how Voegelin’s more conservative admirers do not give sufficient attention to Voegelin’s appreciative critique of some features of Marx in From Enlightenment to Revolution. Thomas J.J. Altizer wrote that “Voegelin, like Ricoeur, is radical and reactionary at once and altogether, thus baffling all who attempt to employ him either for political or theological ends.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 43 (1975): 758.

34. Science, Politics, and Gnosticism: Two Essays (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1968), pp. 86-88. This title will subsequently be abbreviated as SPG.

35. SPG, pp. 99-100.

36. The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 112. This title will subsequently be abbreviated as NSP.
37. NSP, p. 124.
39. Ibid.
40. SPG, p. 83.
42. This is not to be misunderstood as simply an end run around ordinary processes of rational knowing. The *cognitio fidei* is not a cognitive grasp of a transcendent object; it is more like a sense of what one is drawn toward ultimately, a sense of the ultimate goal of love. And if one thinks about that in any kind of objective terms these are only analogical, because what the Beyond ultimately is in reality is better to be understood as Subject, not object.
43. OH, 4: 244.
47. OH, 4: 20.
49. Order and History, vol. 2: The World of the Polis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), p. 17. See also SPG, p. 40, where Voegelin quotes the passage from the Phenomenology of Mind in which Hegel speaks of philosophy casting off the name of “love of knowledge” and replacing it with “real knowledge,” and also Hegel’s statement, “The true form in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of it.”
51. NSP, p. 127.
52. FER, p. 273.
53. SPG, p. 53.
54. NSP, p. 107.
55. Ibid.
56. Cf. NSP, p. 165.
57. SPG, p. 54.
58. Collected Works, 12: 266.
59. Ibid., p. 274.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., pp. 275-276.
62. Ibid., p. 278.
63. Ibid., p. 283.