Although he will not be remembered principally as an interpreter of Aristotle, Seth Benardete was much engaged with this philosopher throughout his life of teaching and writing. He taught seven graduate seminars on texts of Aristotle between 1968 and 1993, and published remarkable essays on *De Anima* and the *Metaphysics* in the 1970s. Benardete approached Aristotle as a true Socratic who philosophizes in a Platonic manner. The central problem of philosophy is the soul, inquiry about which opens the way to the nature of being. The way to the soul, however, must be through the realm of opinion, and that means above all the political phenomena of the arts, the laws, and the gods. The soul must be the central theme of philosophy because all efforts to grasp the nature of being directly fail, as Socrates relates in the autobiographical discussion of the “two sailings” in the *Phaedo*. Indeed the elements of first philosophy or wisdom seem to be incompatible. Even so, they strangely exist together in the soul of the being that seeks wisdom. Benardete saw that Aristotle employed his own version of the Socratic-Platonic procedure of dividing and collecting those elements. The first approach to them for Socrates is to posit them as separate ideas; their appearance of separateness, however, must be abandoned in further inquiry. Similarly Aristotle seems to found wholly separate sciences of distinct subject-matters, but on closer examination one sees that the treatises contain diverging accounts of the soul, nature, and being which demand to be put together. That the task of combination is not finished by Aristotle, and is perhaps not finishable, belies the traditional view that Aristotle understands himself as attaining wisdom, and as proposing a metaphysics and
cosmology which, “as distinguished from Plato’s, is unqualifiedly separable from the quest for the best political order.”

Metaphysics and the Soul

Benardete notes a peculiarity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics at the beginning of his essay “On Wisdom and Philosophy: The First Two Chapters of Aristotle’s Metaphysics A.” After presenting critiques of his predecessors in the first books of his Physics and De Anima, Aristotle offers in the second books his own definitions of nature and soul. The second book of the Metaphysics, however, “seems to be nothing but a series of questions” (396). The inquiries of metaphysics or first philosophy lack something self-evidently prior, such as soul. “Soul is even more self-evident than nature,” Benardete writes in his essay on De Anima. “Soul alone is in being first for us first by nature.” The immediate access of the soul to itself permits a high degree of accuracy in its investigation. Yet “for all that it admits of precision it still remains an object of wonder.” Nature and soul are there regardless of what anyone might say about them (Physics 193a3); but without perplexity there is nothing to metaphysics. Metaphysics seems to be the only science that in asking questions discovers all of its own field, and so, in completing philosophy, somehow returns philosophy to its origin in wonder (396). If the subject-matter of metaphysics is questioning, then the soul as questioning provides the access to its field. In a sense its subject is the soul as wondering. Accordingly, metaphysics as inquiry about the principles and causes of being has special regard for the being of the soul as wondering. A form of psychology centering on the being of wonder is the core of metaphysics.

In De Anima the soul studied with precision is not the soul as wondering, but the soul as knowing. Crucial to the account is phantasia, as the link between the noetic and the aesthetic as well as between thought and desire. But the discussion does not disclose what makes these linkages possible; De Anima lacks a causal account of the unity of the soul. The aporia of the Physics—how does the realm of unchanging form relate to nature as the realm of change?—is still its aporia. The precise account of soul cannot be
a causal account. It shows the “that” of the powers of the soul, but only incompletely the “why.” The focus of the account is on the “now”: what is, or can be, actual to the soul at any moment. *Phantasia* operates in the soul nearly always, even in dreams, but wonder is a passing condition. The path to being may be through wonder as the key to the unity of the soul, yet that key is strangely not a permanent feature of the soul, found in every “now.” There may be an important connection between *De Anima*’s abstraction from wonder and its abstraction from the question of causal unity. Both are central themes of the *Metaphysics*. *De Anima* comes to the threshold of first philosophy by treating the highest condition (self-thinking) of the highest part of the whole (the rational soul) but it does not pass over the threshold.

Perhaps wonder involves a special case of *phantasia*. In *De Anima* *phantasia* is the prime evidence for the peculiar double nature of the mind. Mind is receptive to the *noeton*, considered apart from the whole, but at the same time the mind is open to all beings, to the whole as such. In light of the mind’s universal openness it is hard to grasp how the mind can have any distinctive nature, or how it can be anything except pure possibility. But the mind must be capable of an active initiation of thought. Knowing is negativity, insofar the mind grasps the sensible particular not just as itself, but as an instance of noetic form, and hence as other to itself. Straightening chalk lines so they can be read as pure lines of geometry entails seeing the arbitrariness of the sensible. But if intellection is only the reception of the noetic, another power must come to its aid to carry out the transformation of the sensible. *Phantasia* does this by suspending the truth-claim of the sensible and converting “I see a man” into “It seems to be a man.” It allows the sensible image to be viewed just as image. This power enables the mind to be both turned toward itself and open to the whole of being. *Phantasia* can try to be complete in itself, since its dwelling on the appearance as appearance seems to free it from being, but its reading of being as only image presupposes the recognition of being. When it serves intellect, *phantasia* allows the intellect to find the noetic in the sensible, and its suspension of the given is only a step toward understanding.
Yet the two actions are inseparable, and thus the rational animal is characterized by a problematic freedom. This account of *phantasia* surely has an important connection with poetry, and in the *Metaphysics* poetry is related to wonder.

But *De Anima* makes none of these connections. Outside its purview lies a deeper negativity than that of seeing the image as image, and therewith also a deeper doubleness of the mind. Poetry and philosophy address these issues as rivals; it is only fitting that the problem of doubleness should have a twofold solution. By abstracting from such issues the account of *De Anima* proves to be, in more than one sense, less than poetic.

**Freedom and Necessity**

In chapter one of *Metaphysics* the examination of opinions about wisdom and knowledge substitutes for the lack of the self-evidently prior. The first phenomena of opinion are the delight in effortless acquisition of knowledge, and admiration of those manifestly superior to ourselves in knowing. Delight and admiration share selfless freedom from calculation. But the absence of calculation and ratiocination, which characterize the arts as knowledge of causes, is a deficiency in the natural desire to know. As emerges later, philosophic wonder includes both selfless delight and the self-regarding concern with cause, and thus wonder as complex comes to light through partial perspectives on it. (By contrast Heidegger’s exclusion of calculation from openness to being impoverishes the complexity of the origin of philosophy.) At first the choice of sight, as the most revelatory of the senses, and the reasoning of the arts seem wholly unrelated. Similarly the delight in seeing and knowing, which is always present and at work, is not the same as the desire to learn. “To love wisdom is not in the same sense natural” as this delight (397). The natural delight is indiscriminate, non-hierarchical, and satisfied by the noting of any differences, being only “the most satisfying filler of our idle moments.” It seems that humans are either idle or laboring, with these opposites seeming to form no natural unity.

Benardete quotes from the *Politics*: “Man is by nature the
Seth Benardete on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* 11

political animal.” Clearly this sense of the natural points away from the idle desire to know. Art and calculative reasoning are related to political life through their common conditions: speech and the division of labor. The introduction of the arts and therewith the city in the *Metaphysics* brings into view the soul as a needful being. Yet speech is dual, as both the articulation of the beings and as means of communication. It is doubtful that human communities came into being for the sharing of knowledge, even if they arose in a non-calculative way. Thus in the Socratic dialogues philosophic conversion is the rare coincidence of the two sides of speech. The duality of speech can be restated as the duality of the human as such: “As a kind (*anthropos*) man is political; as individual (*pantes anthropoi*) he desires to know” (397-98). The difference between the human as kind and the human as individual is reflected in the difference between genesis and telos in the city. Since speech is not accidentally related to knowledge, “perhaps knowledge as that which alone is truly sharable, is the ultimate ground for human society.” But ultimate end and temporal origin, or the eidetic and genetic orders of being, are not the same (although poetry seeks to identify them). “The city as an association of freemen could thus be a divination of the freedom that belongs preeminently to the highest kind of wisdom” (398). Modern criticisms of the Aristotelian account of the free life of *theoria* claim that it is a mere prejudice, rooted in the vanity of an aristocratic *nomos*. But this stance willfully denies the natural force of the difference between the free and the needful, and thus supposes that human incompleteness, being an accident of circumstances, can be remedied by human self-production. For Aristotle the duality is so basic that it is evident in sight itself, which is at once the most pleasant and the most useful of the senses. Sight more than other senses reveals wholes, and wholeness is the object of both eros and knowing. Sight as both “most needful and most delightful perhaps reflects the fact that form (*eidos*) too, is a cause” (398). The connection of sight with *eidos* may relate to its freedom, for in choosing sight most of all senses, we perfect natural desire. This account of sight runs contrary to the tragic wisdom of the poets, since the freedom of sight, our ability to turn it on or off at
will, relates to its power to put the greatest distance between ourselves and whatever it brings to light. Oedipus’s self-blinding seems to indicate the impossibility of such cognitive distance, as if the tragic hero always sees and so always intends to act. “To dream (horan) is also to see” (398). Even so, wisdom cannot be understood without art, and hence without poetry, for art is the index of the human difference. Some animals live solely by perception, and others need memory and instruction. But the human not only supplements the given with experience; it perfects experience with art. The greater admiration accorded to the expert over the experienced amateur—to the botanist over the gardener with a green thumb—attests to widespread intuition of art as the mark of human superiority. We esteem inventors more than their inventions, since utility is not the highest ground of esteem. Aristotle exaggerates the separation of experience and the arts in order to bring out the element of luxury in the arts. This exaggeration, it could be said, is reflecting the tendency of opinion to look away from possible connections between the beautiful or useless on the one hand and human neediness or incompleteness on the other. Although the arts may be a sign of human superiority, they would not exist without human incompleteness. “Man seems to be more incomplete than any other animal” (399).

Notably absent from chapter one’s list of ways of knowing is prudence. Benardete observes that the unification of prudence with the other characteristics of wisdom, discussed in chapter two, remains a question. Prudence is neither art nor science, but it unmistakably arises out of the useful, such that the beauty and freedom of precise knowing are alien to it. All the same, it has a comprehensiveness of vision unavailable to any of the specialized arts. Prudence points to the central perplexity of wisdom: how to combine comprehensiveness with precision. If prudence is more closely allied to the useful than to the free, then comprehensiveness comes to light more readily from the standpoint of the useful. But the account of wisdom stresses the requirements that relate to free and precise knowing. Accordingly, it can be doubted whether wisdom thus described attains true comprehensiveness.
Art and History

Benardete follows Aristotle in taking up another aspect of the contrast between art and experience. Art grasps the universal and is therefore teachable; experience is always attached to the particular, and is deaf and dumb. Art discovers causes with universal insights which demote experience. “In its own eyes, art has no ‘history’” (399). With art the mind reaches a plane above the genetic series of perception, imagination, memory and experience. One recalls Aristotle’s account of the double sense of ousia as concrete whole and essence. Benardete notes that for experience’s particularism “Socrates is accidentally man” whereas for art’s universalism “Man is accidentally Socrates” (400). For Aristotle both are right and both are wrong. The Republic shows how the identification of justice with art in the exchange with Thrasymachus leads more directly to philosophy than the appeal to experience by Cephalus. Yet experience as “the cognitive counterpart to virtue” is closer to character. Philosophy acknowledges the claims of both art and experience, Aristotle could be saying, since in order to grasp the universal one must reason and live as a particular being, as Socrates or as Glaucon. If that is so, when art makes the turn to philosophy it can no longer ignore its own history. Aristotle introduces his account of the causes by relating the history of their discovery. Yet art and history never simply coincide, and no practitioner of an art can fully explain how he attained his insights. Even the highest science has conditions in incommunicable experiences.

Thus it is not surprising that even within the arts themselves this duality appears. The opinion that the arts more removed from need are closer to wisdom rendered mathematics and poetry supreme among the arts in early times. But apart from impracticality the two have little in common: mathematics is eminently teachable and poetry is held to be unteachable and impossible without inspiration. Both lack the knowledge of causes which originates in the useful arts. Thus the contrast of communicable art and incommunicable experience gets complicated by the other contrast of the free and the necessary. The contrasts do not coincide. The human delight in knowing can detach the universal from the origin of its discovery in
need. But the arts of leisure which thereby rise above the mechanical arts do not form a true whole. The disparity of mathematics and poetry indicates the illusion of supposing that wholeness is inherent in free activity, since freedom remains divided between the teachable and the unteachable, the precise and the allusive. The free delight in knowing still exhibits features of human incompleteness. To advance toward true wholeness, thinking must return to the level of causes, hence back to the needful. But for Aristotle there is no smooth sailing in such a return. Benardete observes: “Even if poetry were irrelevant for wisdom, a wisdom that just combined the theoretical character of mathematics with the knowledge of causes the arts contain seems to be something of an oxymoron.” Aristotle famously “denies the possibility of a mathematical physics” (401). That the kinds of knowledge found in mathematics, poetry, and the arts that discover causes may be uncombinable is special cause for wonder. Aristotle’s text provides an occasion for wonder and thus performs an action instantiating the theme of its argument.

Benardete points to the political counterpart of this aporia. Political life makes possible the transformation of universal natural curiosity into the arts of leisure. Leisure is the political equivalent of the free play of the senses. But there would be no leisure without the productive arts that satisfy primary needs, and it is from the knowing of these arts that causes were first understood. The knowing for which the city exists, its telos in arts of leisure, is not the knowing that brings the city into being. Final cause and efficient cause are disjunct. Benardete remarks “the nature of the knower and the nature of knowledge seem not quite aligned with each other” (401). It is appropriate here to think of the two great achievements of modernity, mathematical natural science and liberal democracy, each of which claims to overcome that misalignment through uniting the free and the productive, or the useless and the causal. Aristotle is the skeptic, not Descartes nor Kant, about whether the nature of the knower and the nature of knowledge can be brought into accord. The modern solutions rest on the claim that the object of knowledge must conform to conditions set by the knower or, very crudely put,
that we know only what we make. The hope is that the mind as productive can overcome its internal divisions. By contrast Aristotle “separates the insight, to which the arts give access, of what knowledge is, from the way in which the arts apparently make over the natural to serve human needs” (401). Aristotle presses to the point of paradox the view that “the productive arts are not primarily directed to production.” Thus the edifying Aristotelian claim that “art is not the conquest of nature but rather its imitation or completion” leaves unresolved the relation between origin and telos. The perfection or completion of which human nature is capable must rest on uncertainty about that relation. Here is the deeper version of the problem of *phantasia*—the relation of the noetic to the aesthetic—emerging on the level of the arts and politics, which level involves the confrontation with human neediness.

**The Requirements of Wisdom**

The second chapter of *Metaphysics A* takes up the diverse opinions about the wise man and compresses them into three pairs of oppositions. Benardete claims that the incoherence of these characteristics, “or at best their lack of mutual implication,” preserves the truth that “no known science can satisfy all that opinion demands of wisdom” (401-2). The science fulfilling those demands would be the most comprehensive science and the most difficult science, the most precise science and the science uncovering the highest causes, the science sought for its own sake and the science of the good. All these characteristics except the concerns with causes and the good point to mathematics. Mathematics among the sciences most exemplifies the natural desire for knowledge while not indicating the content of wisdom, since mathematics does not reflect on the whole as such. Its kinship with play, as witnessed in the myth of its origin in Palamedes’s games, brings forth the tension between play and seriousness (403). The beautiful of mathematics is not the good. These elements are found together in the souls of some seekers of wisdom, like Socrates, but no actual science brings them together. The nature of first philosophy can be approached only
through the nature of the knower, or rather through the diverse natures of knowers, whose characteristics are seldom found together in one knower. Questioning whether a science of first philosophy is possible, Benardete notes that if realized, such a science would have all its principles present to itself, and be without potentiality (403). It would possess certainty that there are four causes and no others. If Aristotle had such a science, why would he need the history of thinking about causes to establish that there are only four and that he has not overlooked a fifth? Furthermore, can knowledge of the subordinate kinds of being have the precision and completeness of the knowledge of the highest genera? Benardete asserts that “the principles of knowledge cannot but must be the same as the principles of being. Aristotle’s use of *ousia* for both ‘beingness’ and a being places this perplexity in being itself” (404).

Knowing at the highest level would bring together contemplative knowing for its own sake and causal knowing of the good. This would be the self-knowing that knows why knowledge for its own sake is good, and that grasps the reason for the desire to know. Benardete notes that this highest knowing is foreshadowed in wonder, which oddly was not introduced at the start of *Metaphysics*, although it is the condition for the pursuit of wisdom. The reason for this postponed entrance, Benardete suggests, is that wonder is linked to poetry, which conveys a false conception of wonder. Therefore Aristotle first offers essentially true opinions about wisdom that allow him to separate philosophic from poetic wonder. I offer a related suggestion. Aristotle first discloses the problem of the conflicting requirements of philosophic wisdom before turning to poetic wisdom, which claims to have a unified account of the whole. He thereby plants the seeds of doubt about any claims to possess such wisdom, prior to bringing poetry’s claim on the scene. The doubt about the poetic claims will then apply just as well to the poetic view of wonder.

**Philosophy and Poetry**

Aristotle is now ready to expose the two elements of wonder: it is
a selfless condition related to the natural desire to know and a “certain kind of conscious neediness (aporia)” related to the causal thinking of the arts. The desire to know “is an indiscriminate greediness to transform the opaque into the plain (information); but wonder is the recognition of the opaque in the plain. The wonderful is that which shows the hiddenness of the unhidden. It is every ‘that’ which seems to be in itself a ‘why?’ when seeing is not believing, and the given is a question. The wonderful is a beautiful perplexity” (404). Philosophic wonder turns toward that which is closest to us and thus most “plain,” namely, the soul, but discovers an opacity in it which then colors everything given. In its erotic pursuit of this perplexity, philosophy is a paradoxical combination of the self-regarding and the self-forgetting. But the ordinary desire to know is turned away from the perplexity of the soul, since it delights only in what can be made transparent. Poets, however are not wholly unlike philosophers. They wonder also at the given, but they wonder even more at what they make. Wonder is more the result than the starting-point of the poet’s activity. Mythic or poetic wisdom is “the enigmatic solution to the enigmatic” (405). Poets are in error in thinking that the wonders of poetic making exceed the natural wonders of experience and thought. Perhaps the poets are liars only because they cover over a truth at the basis of their activity. If the greatest wonder is the soul itself, then surely the poets wonder at the soul, but their manner of wondering tends to obscure what is wonderful about it. Since poets do not toil they exhibit the freedom of wisdom, but poetry as a productive art serves the city as the “community of the arts of the necessary” (405). Their freedom obscures the foundation of their art in need and so obscures the nature of knowledge more than other productive arts. But even in this problematic unity of freedom and necessity, poetry is more comprehensive than other arts. Poets address the character of the whole, but they think that making is the ground of the whole, and so they conceive the gods as efficient causes. But a whole grounded in making is unintelligible, since production presupposes incompleteness and the existence of some sort of whole is a condition for incompleteness. That the
poets think of the gods as needy is apparent from their claim that the gods are jealous of human seekers of wisdom. The poets therefore do not admit, or perhaps do not care, that the beings they portray as both whole and needy are contradictory.

But again, poetic wisdom is not baseless. The togetherness of freedom and necessity in the state of wonder is not simply a natural state, but a special condition of the soul. This observation could lead to the poetic conclusion that the soul is not naturally a unity. It is hard to claim that the poets are altogether wrong in this. Aristotle subtly indicates that the unity of soul described in *De Anima* is not the soul as such, but an abstraction. Poetry corrects that abstraction by calling to mind how rare are the high experiences which assuage the soul’s normal condition of incompleteness and longing. But the poets are too impressed by their temporary triumphs and do not reflect sufficiently on the enduring causes of the soul’s disunity, or what Aristotle calls the natural enslavement of human nature. Philosophy strangely finds great satisfaction in dwelling on the causes of perplexity and in resisting every alluring prospect of a solution that would gratify without altering the underlying causes. Every elevation of the human condition presupposes that we remain only human, and otherwise has no meaning. Thus for the philosophers no poetic solution of human problems can possibly be more wonderful than the enduring forces in human nature that resist poetic solutions.

The poets believe that they, or the gods as poets, make the world into a home for the soul. Poetry is the house of being. By contrast, philosophic wonder is permanently homeless. Benardete says it “induces homelessness without nostalgia” (405)—a formula that evokes how the soul as thinking is both near to and distant from what it thinks about, and so exposes the connection between *phantasia* and wonder. Benardete calls *phantasia* the power of virtual distancing: the *noeton* is made just distant enough so as to be seen as part of a larger whole. Thus the distance of wonder is grounded in familiarity with things, not in flight into abstraction. Poetry, too, rests on virtual distancing, but also annuls the distance of things by anthropomorphizing the whole. It reveals a kind of
phantasia essential to being human, even so, for it allows the human to appear as a kind of whole amidst other things in the whole. It creates a larger setting for the human in which, admittedly, everything revolves around human concerns. It is easy to see why the poets regard their making as so important, since this power of imaginative self-distancing is in most human beings too artless to be very effective. Art transcends ordinary nature in order to fulfill it. Poetic invention is therefore not one of the ever-present powers of the soul in De Anima.

The human need for self-distancing points back, again, to human incompleteness. It is human for individuals to want their projects to have some necessary place in the whole of things, and for them to endow the particular and contingent with the aura of the universal and the necessary. This is the dark side of the beautiful of poetry, which receives no acknowledgment in the natural delight in seeing and knowing. One could call it the original negativity, the primordial difference between genesis and telos which the poets believe their making can overcome. It is the negativity that marks the human as political animal, and Aristotle shows that it is the permanent rift underlying the inquiries of first philosophy. Yet philosophic wonder is not animated by Angst. Benardete notes “it is neither painful nor pleasant. It neither compels nor entices. There is nothing in it to be feared from which one runs away or which roots one to the spot (like awe), nor does it have the natural attractiveness of seeing” (405). Philosophy can be seen as good, akin to the divine, and even as such immune to divine jealousy, if “the highest beings are causes only as final cause, and their causality is compatible with their being for their own sake” (406). Philosophic wonder is content with “the separation between the being of the highest beings and their being as cause.” The same separation allows Aristotle to affirm that the origin of philosophy is only “accidentally at a certain stage of ‘history.’” The fortunes of political life and the discoveries of philosophy cannot be identical, or even causally related in a philosophy of history. They are necessarily linked, all the same. “The cause of philosophy is the effect of the good.”
Epilogue

The problem of being cannot be articulated by turning directly to being. Aristotle follows the Socratic turning to logoi by uncovering the elements of first philosophy in the phenomena of human opinions about experience, arts, states of soul, and their relations to wisdom. No science seems capable of meeting the demand revealed by this examination: to encompass the free and the necessary, the precise and the comprehensive, the eidetic and the genetic. Yet somehow the togetherness of these components is adumbrated in the soul as wondering. The soul’s nature contains a perplexity that can seem ugly or beautiful: a certain lack of alignment between the nature of the knower and the nature of knowledge. The perplexity of soul is, however, the perplexity of being itself: the separation between the being of intelligibility and the being of causality, or between the beautiful and the good. The soul brings these together through its activity. In striving to understand the relation of eidos—beingness or essence as known precisely—to the coming into being of beings, the soul is the bond of being. “To figure out an insight might well be the epistemic equivalent of the union of causality and beingness” (397). The misalignment, arising first for us in political life, is not even seen by the natural pleasure in noting differences and is deeply experienced but not healed by poetry. Philosophy’s careful articulation of it discloses its benefit to the soul. The philosopher understands that the rift in being exercises causality as final, not efficient, by making possible the best human life, that of inquiry. The case is not unlike that of the geometer who grasps the cause (aitia) of the incommensurability of the square’s diagonal: he would wonder at nothing as much as if the diagonal were to become measurable (Metaphysics 983a15-21).

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NOTES

1. In its original form this essay was a paper delivered at “The Philosophy of Seth Benardete,” a conference at the New School University, December 2002.

2. Leo Strauss, *The City and Man*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964, 21. Benardete’s writing on Aristotle poses a challenge to Strauss’s claim that “Aristotelian philosophizing has no longer to the same degree and in the same way as Socratic philosophizing the character of ascent.” On Benardete’s reading, Aristotle’s presentation of his thought in treatise-form is a new mask under which the Socratic dialectic proceeds. For more remarks on this see the author’s “Prelude to First Philosophy: Seth Benardete on De Anima,” *Epôche*, vol. 7, no. 2 (spring, 2003), 189-198.


4. “Aristotle De Anima III.3-5,” *Review of Metaphysics* 28, no. 4 (June 1975), 621. For more discussion of this essay see the author’s article cited in note 2 above.

5. Benardete cites here Plato, *Symposium* 203d11. The dual nature of *Eros* in Socrates’s speech (as the child of *Poros* and *Penia*) calls for comparison with Aristotle’s account of the dual nature of wonder. Both presuppose human incompleteness.