negotiated with, and were mostly duped by, the SS representatives of the Nacht und Nebel operation; and she has no sympathy for the German underground which, as she maintains, discovered anti-Hitlerism only after 1943 when defeat loomed large on the snowy steppes of Russia.

Miss Arendt ought to know that totalitarianism is not only a political-ideological apparatus but, for the enslaved millions, primarily a climate of terror and nightmare. Faced with an absolutely ruthless enemy, the twentieth-century citizen is absolutely paralyzed, to the point where his reflexes of self-defense are transformed into abject servility, into a desperate Kafkaesque desire to please the tormentor, to wrest from him an ever-so slight gesture of humanity. Resistance, under these conditions, can only come if the enslaved man's self-respect receives mighty doses of encouragement, doses which may only be administered from outside, from another world, from the land of the free.

In this respect the record of the democracies has been dismal. From 1937 to 1945 eighty million Germans were cast en bloc into the lowest pit of hatred, without discrimination, by the same Western democracies which had collaborated with Hitler for years. No serious attempts were made to exploit the "rift" between the Fuhrer and his Generals, between the Wehrmacht and the SS. What were the chances of the inner resistance while Hitler's Blitzkriegs cleared for him all of Europe, North Africa, White Russia and the Ukraine? Then, as now, the Western powers were conducting classical warfare in an age when ideologies divide nations and detach subjects from their leaders.

For Miss Arendt's thesis, so very confusedly presented and repeatedly trapped in side-issues, lengthy dissertations and laborious historical comparisons, is a warmed-up cliche seen every morning on the editorial page of our leading newspapers. Granted, it is not served up with the bland baby smile of Walter Lippmann, Max Lerner or James Warburg, who advertise daily for an urgently needed "new moral order" for our supposedly atom-stricken conscience. On the contrary, Miss Arendt's thesis meanders through the underground of genuine political philosophy, but when it surfaces it hits us between our unbelieving eyes. For example: "To sound off with a cheerful 'give me liberty or give me death' sort of argument in the face of the unprecedented and inconceivable potential of
destruction in nuclear warfare is not even hollow: it is downright ridiculous." (p. 3.)

Resigned, we may now approach the thesis. It is that the American Revolution, which had so much more to recommend it than its French counterpart, was nevertheless allowed to fall into oblivion so that today the nations of the world look at the Bolshevik Revolution (heirress to 1789) as the mold par excellence of their own aspirations. The author does not hide her indignation that after 1830, that is when the Founding Fathers were no longer living examples, Americans went on with their private business, taking their blessings for granted and neglecting to preserve the revolutionary tradition and the political awareness of the immensity of their forefathers' achievement.

Minus the indignation, Miss Arendt is right. But it seems to me that elsewhere in the book she gives very adequate reasons why this was bound to happen, why there could be no question of a continuing "revolutionary faith" in America. She writes (p. 154.) that "the most obvious and decisive distinction between the American and the French Revolutions was that the historical inheritance of the American Revolution was limited monarchy and that of the French Revolution an absolutism which apparently reached far back into the first centuries of our era." In other words, Miss Arendt is aware that the American Revolution was not a revolution, if by that term we mean an ideology-inspired social upheaval. In fact, she recognizes the importance of political and institutional continuity in the case of the American Revolution, something the French revolutionists vehemently and successfully fought. She writes (p. 164.): "What Madison proposed with respect to the American Constitution, namely, to derive its 'general authority . . . entirely from the subordinate authorities', repeated only on a national scale what had been done by the colonies themselves when they constituted their state governments. The delegates to the provincial congresses or popular conventions which drafted the constitutions for state governments had derived their authority from a number of subordinate, duly authorized bodies — districts, counties, townships; to preserve these bodies unimpaired in their power was to preserve the source of their own authority intact."

In contrast, there was not only no continuity in the French Revolution, but even the power of the new "sovereign," the people, was scorned. Very soon after they arrived at Versailles, the delegates of the Third Estate were already ridding the cahiers de doléances which contained the people's grievances and instructions. Furthermore, as Professor Louis Rougier remarks, while the American constitution set up a wise system of checks and balances among the three branches of government ("only power may check power," the Founding Fathers held), the Paris Constituent Assembly granted extraordinary and unchecked powers to the legislative branch. France still suffers from the error then committed "in the name of the people."

It was precisely the solidity of the American system which permitted the citizen to look after his own business, to become, as Tocqueville had predicted, apolitical, to consider politics as "dirty," good only for city bosses and county chairmen. With the author we may deplore it, but then we must deplore the entire course of American history which now finds itself, according to Miss Arendt, hopelessly by-passed by the twentieth-century revolution.

Here Miss Arendt's thesis surfaces again: "Fear of revolution has been the hidden leitmotif of post-war American foreign policy in its desperate attempts at stabilization of the status quo, with the result that American power and prestige were used and misused to support obsolete and corrupt political regimes that long since had become objects of hatred and contempt among their own citizens." (p. 219.) One remains baffled at such an irrational statement under the pen of such an intelligent woman. She knows that for more than a whole century Great Britain and France supported the "obsolete and corrupt political regime" of Ottoman Turkey, not because of any particular love for the Sultan, but because that country kept Russia away from the Middle East and Suez. They even fought the bloody Crimean war to contain Russia — with Cavour, fighting for a liberal and united Italy, joining in.

This manifest irrationality leads us to one conclusion. Miss Arendt, like the many little political writers on the side of the angels, wants the United States to get on the band wagon of the "revolution" and tells America that its merchandise is more genuine than the Russian export. With Justice William O. Douglas, that not exactly wise political thinker, she hopes that, as the Justice put it, "the youth of Asia and Africa will learn their 'revolutionary catechism' not from Marx and Lenin, but from the Declaration of Independence."

This will not do. The task of America is not to egg on the demagogues of the world to rush
into the kill and carve out as much as they can carry, but to preserve order and freedom. If Miss Arendt wishes to see a more fruitful resistance against the new Eichmanns, she will have to encourage the enslaved, not demoralize them by irresponsible talk of revolution.

Reviewed by Thomas Molnar

Baedeker to a Thicket


Professor Jewell has assembled seventeen articles dealing with current State conflicts about reapportionment of legislative and Congressional seats, as exemplified by the Tennessee case which climaxed in the Supreme Court's ruling on Baker v. Carr (1962: 369 U.S. 186). The result is an admittedly tentative but nonetheless informative state-by-state guide to what Justice Frankfurter (in Colegrove v. Green, 1946: 328 U.S. 549) rightly called a "political thicket" that courts "ought not to enter."

Although Jewell and several of his authors show a stronger belief in the virtue of pure representation by population and in the vice of "malapportionment," however contrived, than is shared by more skeptical observers of democratic politics, their essays are largely factual, providing graphic if not always impartial accounts of the confrontation of political forces in a number of States. Since most of the apportionment fights are still going on, a number of stories could not be told to completion. In the cases of the California Senate, the Florida reapportionment, and the new Michigan Constitution, the reader is left "with the cabin hanging on the edge of the cliff." Had the authors been permitted to add postscripts after the elections and referenda of November 8, 1962, rather than being forced to cut off their chronologies in late summer, the value of the book would have been considerably enhanced.

A feature of The Politics of Apportionment which greatly commends it is the intellectual modesty of the authors. While not hiding their personal opinions, neither Jewell nor any of his colleagues attempts to say "the last word" on legislative or Congressional redistricting. They have succeeded in their appointed task: to bring together facts needed for constructive thought on what has become, since Baker v. Carr, a national politico-judicial problem.

The most impressive single fact made clear by the book is the utter lack of uniformity in the power structures of the various states, a consequence of which is that there is no "one best" pattern of representation for all. In Florida, over-weighting of rural votes has led to dominance by a "pork chopper" machine with little to commend it; in North Carolina the result is a viable balance of power among three geographic regions. Conversely, there are States in which apportionment strictly by population, unmitigated by preventive gerrymandering, would lead to total domination by an urban machine: exactly the situation against which Madison sought to guard in No. 10 of The Federalist.

While most of the authors, including Professor Jewell, seem to agree in principle with the majority holding in Baker v. Carr, their essays provide solid support for the dissenting view of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan: that the question of legislative apportionment is in essence nonjusticiable. Law, in order to exist as law, must be procrustean. As that arch-democrat Jean-Jacques Rousseau (whose influence on the Warren Court is evident) once explained, "law considers subjects en masse and actions in the abstract, and never a particular person or action." Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion, admitted that justiciability of apportionment cases depended on "judicially manageable standards"—a concept to which Justice Douglas lent precision by writing (in a concurring opinion):

"More particularly, the question is the extent to which a State may weight one person's vote more heavily than it does another's..."

Analysis of the diversified interaction of regions, parties, factions, and interest groups in various States makes it clear that there can be no uniform standard distinguishing rational from