The head of the greatest European royal house describes his principles.

The Divine Right of Minorities

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Otto von Habsburg was born in 1912, the eldest son of Charles I, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, and of Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma. After leaving Austria in 1919, he lived in Switzerland, Madeira, Spain, and Belgium, and received his doctorate in the social sciences from the University of Louvain. Besides his travels on the Continent, he is well acquainted with the Americas and has visited the Orient. He has given much time both to lecturing and writing. In 1951 he married Princess Regina of Saxe-Meiningen.

ONE IMPEDIMENT to the meeting of conservative minds from both sides of the Atlantic I have found illustrated, time and again, during lecture tours I have made in the United States in the past few years. It occurs in questions concerning the difference in traditional American and European political institutions. Many Americans, with whom I find myself agreeing on political principles and goals, are happily convinced that the American form of government is the one objective form of political wisdom and has a universal claim; and any European attempt to solve political problems in another way seems to them the result of either wrongheadedness or ignorance. To the objection that what is right under American conditions may not be expedient in other worlds, they answer that Europeans persist in defending outmoded forms because they are the victims of environment, the creatures of traditions that do not include the one of liberty. The European is a prisoner of his past, especially if he falls into that vague category called “royalty” or “nobility”. While the European “common man” may, given time and dollars enough, be won from his ignorance, the “upper classes” are forever set in their wrongheadedness, too steeped in notions of the divine ordainment of privilege ever to think for themselves or to conceive of valid systems outside of the ones in which they have been brought up.

It would be too easy to answer that the argument from environment cuts both ways, though it might be worth noting in passing that the European privileged classes of the last thirty-five troubled years have been neither noble nor royal. It would be too easy because the argument is not entirely an irrelevant one. Being faced with it, directly or implicitly, so often, I have tried to assess it objectively against the background of my own experience, and it seems to me to contain both truth and falsehood, as all “simple” explanations do.

Certainly tradition and family environment predispose one to particular activities and attitudes. In a relatively stable society, the ruling class is drawn from ruling families, and the United States illustrates this as much as any other country with sons of presidents, senators, and jus-
tices who have followed in the footsteps of their fathers. To choose only very prominent contemporary examples, there are the Lodges, the Roosevelts, the Tafts, and the Longs. Persons raised in a political atmosphere, and from their earliest years accustomed to hearing affairs of state talked over in the relaxed candidness of the family circle, naturally enough develop a taste and, if there is really such a thing as education, an aptitude for public service. If the Adamses could produce another Adams or the Pendergasts another Pendergast, the same process must have been at work among the European dynasties—with, all other things being equal, similarly various results. But I think we can suppose an even greater pressure in the European case, for the son of a long line of rulers has not only the political training of his parental house, but also his own awareness of the heritage of many centuries.

Is this training and awareness always ossifying? I know of no reason why it necessarily should be, nor of any instance in history that shows it: what monarch slavishly followed the policies of his father? An interest in politics is still a long way from an unconditional acceptance of the political doctrines of one's forebears, and the broad indication of human experience is that young men, whatever their education, tend to take a view opposite to their parents'. Youth's ambition is generally large enough to demand revolutionary changes so that it questions the wisdom of its elders, when it doesn't flatly declare their folly. Because it is in the young man's nature to be impatient with life and conditions as they meet him, Clemenceau's remark that a person who at twenty is not a socialist has no heart will, any particular political formulations aside, always remain true. And the fervor and enthusiasm it recognizes is not likely to be any less present in the descendant of a well-known political family, trained in some measure in public affairs, than in a child of the great anonymous masses, for whom politics must often seem merely to happen rather than to be made.

My own concern with political matters was greatly sharpened during my years at Louvain. I speak here less of my formal studies in political and social science than of the atmosphere of fervid debate and discussion in which those of us who had an inclination for politics moved. My years at Louvain were those of the great economic crisis, when the outlook was bleak for student youth and the political life even of staid Belgium was agitated by violent undercurrents. At the University every view the diverse intellectual life of Europe retained or could newly throw up was held. In my time we had with us the man who would one day become the leader of the Belgian fascists and later the Quisling of his country: Léon Degrelle. A brilliant, erratic character, a poet of real talent, he stimulated all the discussions in which he joined without ever offering a profound view on anything. There were many others who went on into public life in every sort of office from parliamentarian to publisher; and it is a commentary on our Europe that more than one because of the views he held ended before a firing-squad or on the gallows. Drawn into the big debate that was going on all over Europe, I yet could ponder it in a kind of solitude, often enough a rainy one since this was Belgium, as I biked the fifteen miles to and the fifteen miles from Louvain. In this daily transit I could not only think over the views of such brilliant professors as Paul Van Zeeland, now Belgium's Foreign Minister, and A. E. Janssen, of League of Nations fame, but also devise ways to confront my teachers with the violent arguments of those who were my comrades as students.

The heart may dictate the political beliefs of youth; the head must make a later re-appraisal for any lasting conviction. It is one of the ironies of the human lot that we often see most clearly and come to our deepest belief in moments of adversity; our enemies are sometimes our best teachers.
In Europe the men of my generation—those around forty today—arrived at their time of decision in a world molded by the rise and numerous triumphs of totalitarianism. Whether or not we were directly engaged in politics, we could not escape the tremendous changes the new type of dictator had brought into our world: he was, after all, totalitarian. The idea of total war, which, spawned by the French Revolution, had germinated in the brain of that half-genius, half-madman, General Ludendorff, had begot on the civil plane the idea of total politics—something not less murderous or wicked than its monstrous military parent.

The choice each of us had to make was not so easy as hindsight may now pretend. There was a time, let us admit, when amongst totalitarianisms Hitler’s indeed looked like “the wave of the future”. Doubts stilled by his apparent miracles, British, French, and other statesmen made their now-forgotten pilgrimages to the false prophet of Berchtesgaden, and Lloyd George, the great Liberal leader and one of the architects of the Europe that had made Hitler’s rise to power possible, could return from a call on the Fuehrer in 1936 to announce that Hitler was “one of the greatest among the very great men I have known” and the Germans were “the happiest people on earth”. Forgotten, too, are the actions of those in London who encouraged Hitler’s lawless expansion and his invasion of Vienna, the first step of World War II. Covering up this historical record is a necessary step in creating the schizophrenic notion of the collective guilt of the German people. Similar journeys have been more recently undertaken, to make even greater offerings to naked power, to Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, but they are still fresh in most memories despite the efforts of the artificers of these latter-day Munich Agreements to have their deeds forgotten and, in some cases, to have history falsified. These things must be remembered in judging those who guessed wrong in choosing between powers and in comparing them with those who sat in court on them, and often still do.

For me the choice was made quickly enough. Hitler had several times tried to lure me over to his side, but his main effort came during a visit I made to Berlin in the first weeks of 1933 to work at the Agrarian Institute of Professor Sering to finish the thesis for my doctorate. While in the German capital, I called on a number of German statesmen, President von Hindenburg amongst them, and on members of the former ruling dynasty. Most of the Hohenzollerns were men of great integrity, but unfortunately one of the sons of William II, Prince August Wilhelm, had joined the National Socialist movement and even become a member of the Reichstag. When I called on him—something I intended solely as a courtesy—he delivered himself of a message from his Fuehrer, saying Hitler and Goering would like to have a private talk with me. He added that the talk would be of great advantage to the cause I represent, for Hitler, who was shortly to become Chancellor (this was in the last days of January; 1933), was willing to support me in Austria if I would outwardly accept the National Socialist tenets and rule in my country as a National Socialist ruler. To make the conversation more informal, August Wilhelm suggested that Goering, as Speaker of the Reichstag, should invite Hitler and me to dinner at the same time. It was not easy to convince him that I had no interest in such a political conversation since there was a fundamental disagreement between Hitler and myself, and that this disagreement followed directly on our agreement that there could be no peaceful co-existence of religion and totalitarianism—National Socialist or Communist. Then as now, the Christian faith was the great bulwark against totalitarianism’s promise of immediate success.

We know how many were deceived by that promise in the years leading up to World War II, and again in the “love-Russia” period of the War, when it often
looked as though the forces of totalitarianism might prevail. We still have no absolute assurance against the triumph of these forces, but we are now better armed to meeting them in seeing one reason for their past successes: the totalitarians have a clear program and they fight for a definite world order, while we who are their opponents lack a consistent approach and must fight them with piecemeal measures. That the anti-totalitarians needed some coherent program I began to see more and more clearly in the early 1930’s. After I had publicly come out against National Socialism, more than a thousand municipalities and towns in Austria in the period from 1933 to 1938 gave me their honorary citizenship, and in my letters of acceptance I addressed myself in each case to some particular complex of the moral, political, social, and economic questions that troubled the heart of Europe. Along with this occasion to study specific problems, went consultations with thousands of my countrymen and with the leaders of Western Europe. In pursuing the fight against the Hitlerite menace, I called frequently on the statesmen of France, Great Britain, Belgium, and Holland, and I kept in touch with those persons in Italy who condemned the course of Mussolini’s policy. The House of Savoy was especially a center of realism and the understanding that the Rome-Berlin Axis was a direct route to catastrophe. The experiences resulting from these meetings were sometimes encouraging, more often discouraging, but in all their complexity they seemed to reduce to the single lesson that if Europe was to be conserved, it could only be done by opposing a concrete program to the enemy.

Announcing a common dislike of the excesses of totalitarianism was not enough. The cure of our condition had to come from a knowledge of its causes. The tragic situation in which Europe has found itself since 1914—roughly for forty years now—has engaged many minds. Some, especially numerous outside of Europe, find our decadence absolute and see no hope of European resuscitation. Others find reason for hope in what has been called the dismal science, economics; the causes of Europe’s decay, they insist, are remediable economic ones—economic nationalism and the disparity of wealth. The first has prevented the development of Europe’s potential wealth and led to wars; the second has bred the resentment that gives rise to extremist movements, since given a fairly equitable distribution of wealth, people are always open to the persuasion of reason. Whatever truth there is in this—and I have no intention of saying that the economic organization of Europe has been ideal, technically or morally—it is still far from the whole explanation of recent European history. Without for a moment proposing that his existence was good, we can say that the German proletarian of the 1930’s, who as the voting records show supported Hitler, was better off in the terms of economic statistics than the peasants of the “backward” countries of Eastern Europe, where Communism imposed its rule only by force. Again, in the more advanced nations of the West such as France and Italy—where the benefits of industrialism, with all their really great inequality of distribution, are still greater than Russia can promise for generations—there has been an alarming growth of Communism. If the exclusively economic and social explanations, despite their being contradicted by reality, are maintained by too many people and too many publications, it is only because the abandonment of the materialist approach to our problems would mean facing up to facts that people would rather ignore.

If we look at these facts dispassionately, we shall have to admit that the present state of affairs has justified a man whose great mental ability must be recognized beyond his colossal political blunders: Charles Maurras. Maurras was the dean of that group of outstanding men—amongst them the Socialist Léon Blum, the Radical Herriot, the Right Winger Tardieu—who were at once intellectuals and practical
politicians and whose brilliance in political thinking in the years between the wars insured France's primacy in the field of political theory, even as it perhaps obscured the weakness of France's actual position. During the many long evenings in Paris when I had the chance to witness their Gallic agility in debate, Maurras would appear only rarely, for at night he wrote the editorials for his newspaper—an extraordinary journal in its combination of the highbrow and the vulgarly vituperative; but when he did appear, he would, despite his total deafness, dominate the scene through his depth of insight and precision of mind. Though he was a materialist and verged on atheism—an error that led him to the wrong side in World War II and brought discredit on his name—Maurras saw clearly what was at issue in the modern world. His phrase "politique d'abord" summed up his thought. Since "politique" was for him not day-to-day party policy but public service in the best sense, his meaning was to give primacy to the moral and juridical issues over the material and economic ones. He saw that there was no genuine progress on the shifting sands of expedience and improvisation, and that only a state based firmly on ethics and morals can advance toward the goal of its people's true happiness. A state whose one principle is survival through aggrandizement, at the expense of other people or its own, whose politics are not d'abord, may give—as Hitler's did—a momentary impression of prosperity and well-being, but in the end that state leads the nation to catastrophe. The statesman who would achieve for his people the comparatively obvious goals of economic and social justice must start from the moral ground in which grows the enduring strength of any social entity.

Our plight was thus primarily due to the tragic betrayal of the moral principles on which Europe once stood. Without this, we should never have entered our present crisis. With our spiritual values intact, we should never have seen the rise of totalitarianism. Had we not failed in the moral field, had we not abandoned our ethical standards in the quest of an illusory economic prosperity, we should never have ended with concentration camps for people because of their ancestry, incendiary bombs for children because of their parents' error, and the life of slaves for those whose descendants are to escape the kingdom of necessity.

The truth of this was borne in on me in two conversations I had with Communists. The first was with Willy Muenzenberg, the celebrated and dreaded Comintern agent. Muenzenberg, despite his dark record, was an idealist whose heart was broken by the Hitler-Stalin pact—I am convinced that his subsequent suicide marked the despair of a man who had given his life to an idea and seen it fail. Our talk was soon after the pact. Muenzenberg did not criticize Russia, but suddenly, quite spontaneously, he burst out: "If only I could believe in God, many things would be different!" It was rather like a cry from the pit, not the one in which Muenzenberg was privately lost, but the one which was the ambience of a whole generation. The second conversation, a more recent one, was with a South American Communist leader whose name I do not mention because he is still a Party member in good standing. We met in a smoky restaurant of a Latin American seaside resort, and when at three in the morning we left to drive back to the big city, all our talk had got us nowhere. The road led along the sea and past an old Spanish fort, surrounded by palms, where we stopped for a short stroll to breathe the salty but balmy air. All at once, turning to the fort, the Communist said: "You know, we have been discussing long and hard. This much I admit: if you Christians would really be what you say, and if there were even a dim hope of returning to the glories of ancient Spain, I would gladly drop everything and follow your way. But, alas, I just can't believe it is possible!"

There was another occasion when, in even more dramatic circumstances, I heard
the same thought voiced, though this time its direction was hope rather than despair. It was said by a great friend of mine, George Mandel, in one of the most critical moments of his life. Mandel was France’s iron-willed Minister of the Interior in 1940, a Jew without formal religious ties, and a great French patriot who was to die for his country before a Nazi firing-squad. It was on the night Paul Reynaud’s cabinet fell. The French government had withdrawn in defeat to Bordeaux, the Battle of France was in its last hours. The Ministry of the Interior was lodged in the building of the Prefecture of the Department of Gironde, where, met with the flicker of a few weak candles, the failure of electric power betokened the gloom of a people expecting defeat. Mandel, though unbroken, knew that he was losing, and for several minutes of utter discouragement he told me of his realization of the rottenness of the Third Republic, which was beyond his worst fears. A world and a set of ideals he had served were falling down. Yet, he added, France had one last reserve: despite its atheism, regardless of its cynicism, the country could never fail to remain Christian, the eldest daughter of the Church. He was not, he explained, taking stand in a denominational way. He was speaking of the power of the Christian force emanating from the French soil. This moral force would be, some time in the far future, the reason why the country would come back into its own.

The same Christian character invests the whole of Europe, where almost every village has at its center a church, almost every city a cathedral. It is this Christian heritage, a capital that in each individual heart can be made to yield further riches, that makes talk of returning to principles more than a pleasant-sounding and lofty generalization. What Christianity enjoins us to in our daily lives is clear enough; the standards of right and wrong it lays down are not subject to essential debate. While these injunctions and standards plainly show how wide capitalism and socialism, democracy and dictatorship are of what is required of man, they admitted-ly do not provide us with any ready-program for immediate or future action. Such a program is the product of the human intelligence, of much thought and some trial and error, and the difficult task of making it falls squarely on the shoulders of an intellectual elite. We have no warrant to expect the appearance of a new St. Francis who will sway the mass of men into paths that those who have the talents to lead and instruct are too timorous or indolent to discover. Where social or economic justice can be at once redressed, it should be done—as the charity to which we are hidden shows—but we must be on guard against the error of supposing that a Christian economic and social policy can be erected on a political system that is not Christian in its orientation. Here again we have to accept Maurras’ “politique d’abord” and recognize a hierarchy of urgencies, with the prime urgency a fundamental change in the political structure.

But it must be remembered that there is no Christian political orthodoxy. If past ages erred in too closely identifying Church and state, the great error of our time is to identify Christian policy with this or that political party and try to force an all-embracing idea into the strait jacket of a short-lived and necessarily faulty human construction. This applies both to Christian Conservative and Christian Democratic parties. Christianity can never be the province of a party, for a party, as the name indicates, is factional, a part, while Christianity, whose claims are universal, cannot accept such limitation. It is obvious that in different contexts religiously inspired politics will take different expressions, but what will be unchanged in any Christian policy is the public service of the natural law and the striving for the practical application in the life of the community of the eternal principles laid down by God in the soul of every man.

The concern of Christian politics is with the human person, and the criterion of
whether or not a state is Christian, that is to say moral, is its attitude toward human rights. Everybody in free countries from time to time makes his libations to human rights, but by and large he assumes them as much as the air he breathes. Though I had long realized that the end of government was to insure man the maximum freedom for the working out of his own happiness, I did not see human rights as the paramount issue of our times until those evil days of March, 1938, when the Nazis occupied Austria and my best and closest friends were sent to concentration camps. Those with whom I had worked day in and day out were now at the mercy of professional evil-doers, and each time news of them came it told of savagery and death. There can be few things more terrible to hear than that the men one has known are no longer being treated as men. Only a few years later, the same bestiality came again, on what may have been even a greater scale, to the Danube Valley with the advance of the Red Army. The dead and tortured are witnesses to the importance of this issue.

Yet even here our times are confused. Attempts at the codification of human rights cannot succeed without a basic philosophy of human freedom. I would even go a step further and say that without admitting the existence of God, there can be no admission of human rights, since any right has to derive from a higher source. It would be destructive of society to say that human rights have their final origin in the individual, for the source of the rights could not then be subjected to any higher authority, and we should end in anarchy. And we end in mass rather than in atomistic anarchy if, following the theory of Rousseau's social contract, we make human rights the gift of a collective will, since an accidental plurality could in all logic take away what a previous majority had given. As soon as we admit that human rights are dependent on a majority decision, that very moment we deny their existence.

If, on the other hand, we recognize that human rights have their exclusive source in God, then it is our duty to defend them against any force. The admission of God-given human rights means the primacy of the individual and his natural collectivities—family, religious community, and even professional group—over the state. The existence of inalienable human rights denies unlimited power to the state or to any other collectivity. We are under an obligation, both practical and moral, to refuse the state, whether led by a majority or by a dictator, the right to violate the basic freedoms of man. And the corollary of this is recognizing a hierarchy of freedoms, rights, and even privileges that belong to certain groups and cannot be interfered with. Once this is seen, it is evident enough that the test of a truly Christian freedom-loving state is not the rule of the majority, but the defense that state gives to the rights of minorities. It is much more important for us as individuals that these rights be safeguarded than that the will of the majority be carried out, just as it is more difficult for the state to do the first than the second. When Hitler exterminated the Jews and the Gypsies, he did so in the name of the majority, as did the Big Three when they decided to deport the German minorities from Eastern Europe. In neither case was the right with the majority, but with the abused minority, and it is a shameful commentary on our recent history that almost nobody stood up against either Hitler at the right time or against the signers of Yalta and Potsdam until their immoral acts proved a mistake in the game of power politics.

In most cases it is not the majority that needs protection; it is the minorities. And since the role of the state is to insure order, the rule of law that protects the individual against the arbitrary and the unjust, the state's structure must in the first place be designed to protect the rights of minorities. Shocking as this may sound to the believer in unqualified majority rule, he will find on reflection that he, like all of us, is a...
member of a minority in one function of his life or another, and that most often one where his deepest interests are involved. Man as such, as an individual, is a minority compared to the community, and the good community is one designed to allow him to lead a full life in his minority status.

When we consider in this light the functions of the state, we find that safeguarding fundamental rights and the moral order is primarily the duty of the Judiciary Power. Both the Legislative and, in most instances, the Executive are servants of the majority. Despite the checks and balances that, in theory, are intended to keep the three powers evenly matched, in practice a state of balance is unfortunately rare. It can be achieved only under very favorable circumstances and is easily upset in times of crisis. Looking at the European republics, we see in general the supremacy of the Legislative, and in France, an outstanding example of government by assembly, the country has been deprived of its stability. Where the Executive is supreme, we have dictatorship, and both the popular will and law are told what they shall be. As for the Judiciary, its supremacy is only secured—astounding as this may be to many—in the few remaining Continental monarchies.

The reason for this is not difficult to discover if we look at what monarchy has been in historical fact. The mediaeval king stood at the summit of a system of interactive rights and duties, with his own powers quite sharply limited by customary usage and written law; he ruled “by the grace of God”, not in the absurd sense of his being someone essentially better than his fellow nationals, but in virtue of his and his subjects’ acknowledging God as the ultimate source of authority and in their understanding that his powers were circumscribed by the rights and liberties God had given to each individual and each natural group. The respect accorded the king’s person was not different in kind from the respect that requires everyone in an American courtroom to stand when the lowest magistrate enters. Once a Supreme Being and His commands to justice are recognized, each legitimate authority in the state is seen to exist by His grace, which secures the humblest citizen equally in his freedom and in his share of the majesty in the name of which he is governed. The notion of the ruler himself as the source of right is entirely un-Christian, and the theory of the all-powerful king, the absolute ruler, that became current in Europe with the Renaissance was derived from Roman ideas of the emperor’s divinity. Great as was the damage done by the absolute monarchies of the seventeenth century to the concept of Christian kingship, in plain fact none of them was absolute, and the enduringly Christian fabric of society always stood in the way of their absolute rule, so that the unlimited and arbitrary ruler has only become a reality in our own day, when self-appointed or elected dictators repeatedly violate God’s law in the name of the popular will.

The highest function of the monarch is judicial, and the judge does not create the law, he administers it. The theory of hereditary monarchy is that the person who occupies the highest position in the state and succeeds to it, so to speak, in the natural course of events, is likely above all others to have the disinterestedness, and enjoy the freedom from pressure, necessary in the Chief Justice. His unique position enables him to be independent of parties and factions, to stand outside of any groups of special interest, and to turn down all short-term measures that merely cater to popularity. At the same time, disinterest is not remoteness from common concerns; the king is not the cold oracle of the law, but is there to see that particular laws are made for men as they are; and this part of his role is expressed in the simple answer that the Emperor Francis Joseph gave to Theodore Roosevelt when the American asked him how he saw his place in modern times: “To protect my people from their government.” I well re-
member that my father never permitted anyone in his house to make derogatory remarks about religious communities, political parties, or social groups. If someone said something of the kind in the presence of us children, my father, usually a very mild man, would energetically reprimand him, thus teaching us by example that a king has no right to personal preferences or dislikes. For him everybody must be truly equal. The king is there to represent the people in his own person and character. The people's elected delegates have a similar task in any modern monarchy, and the task of each is highly necessary in today's complex societies, but the elected legislator represents party or region, either of which is sometimes identical with social group, and his office cannot have the same judiciary and dedicated nature as the king's.

Some of the import of this dedication was perhaps conveyed to me in my earliest childhood, when I saw the coronation of my father in Budapest. I was only four at the time, and the scene is of course now dim in my mind, but I still recall the solemnity of the occasion, the earnestness of my father, and the emotion of those who took part in the rite. During the ceremonies, I sat by the side of old King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, a brilliant man much learned in history, who tried to explain to the child I was the profound significance of the day. I cannot say that I remember much more than his effort to do this, but to the colorful fragments that remain in memory I have since been able to attach the deeper meaning of coronation, that sacramental which, as the Church tells us, puts on the ruler the "duty to protect the weak, the widow, and the orphan" and calls on him to give his oath to defend the liberties that derive not from the shifting will of an individual or an assembly but from the Transcendental Power that, by the principle of its own eternity, can never change.

I am aware that in making this argument I may seem to open myself to the charge of coupling a nostalgia for the past with personal ambition. Neither particular, I think, is justified. If ours is an era largely governed by republics and dictatorships, that does not mean the monarchical form is irrelevant to it, any more than health is irrelevant to a sick man: I have tried to show how monarchy might meet some of our most pressing needs. History shows monarchies and republics alternating in fairly regular cycles, and dictatorship as an aberration endemic throughout. Of these cycles, the monarchical one in almost every case is the longer and takes place in a more mature society. To say that some institutions remain entirely viable today is hardly to express an impossible wish to return to the past, for there can be no human progress unless what is good in the past can be revived or prolonged.

The Emperor Joseph is said once to have remarked: "Mon métier à moi c'est d'être royaliste"; and the assumption continues today that the member of a once-reigning family will be a professional monarchist. Yet a little reflection should show that nothing offers less opportunity for a personal career than the role "pretender", even where there is the greatest likelihood of a restoration. The machinery of political action in the modern world is almost exclusively the party and, except where dictatorship prevails, the idea of majority rule has ironically led to an increase of factionalism; but the claimant to kingship, as I have said, must above all remain outside of parties. It should be obvious that thepretender's role, in direct proportion to his interest in politics, is personally thwarting. I doubt very much that pride in and a sense of obligation to the family name alone are enough to make a man persevere in such a course. The service of a particular dynasty is not the substance of the monarchical idea, however much the notion of loyalty that is bound up with it is also bound up with monarchy. A country is not the property of a family: history reveals changes of dynasty in every state, and the claims of the institution in this
case have precedence over those of its representatives. The hereditary accession of kings is not intended to magnify a single family, but to insure the stability in which all families of a nation can best flourish, and the wholehearted advocate of legitimist monarchy is far less working in the service of a family than he is making an act of faith in a determined political program. If at the same time he makes his own claims to kingship, he does this in the knowledge that success will be had at the expense of personal preferences and by binding himself over without reservations to the community that he must serve not for applause but after the demands of conscience and law.

The moral basis laid, what is to be the superstructure, the house in which the people of Europe will dwell? From a continent that was a fair unity before World War I, in which people could travel without passports and trade with few if any restrictions, Europe has been transformed in the last thirty-five years into a maze of small states, surrounded by tariff and currency barriers like walled mediaeval towns. Behind these bulwarks, as each state has tried more and more to form itself on a common megalopolitan-industrial pattern, there has been a coincident growth of nationalism, for it is one of the peculiarities of the modern world that the harder borders are to cross, the less aware we are of having crossed them. In this stifling atmosphere have occurred the suicidal outbreaks that have decimated our peoples.

Among younger persons, the benefits to be had from large areas not fragmented by customs lines are known only to those who have had the opportunity of travelling outside of Europe. My own travels in the United States—where by the end of 1942 I had visited all forty-eight states—have convinced me that America’s openness not only explains its extraordinary prosperity, but also much of the American character, whose generousness, hospitality, and entire absence of suspicion seems to me a reflection of the country’s broadness. It is this last quality of the American that gives him the easy assumption of intimacy that some Europeans find disconcerting. Though in the past twenty years there has been a considerable tendency toward governmental centralization in the United States, the foundations of America’s wealth were laid in the days when the states exercised a high degree of local autonomy; and even today the American system remains essentially a federal one, with many differences in the administration of the different states. However, dreams of American superabundance mustn’t make us forget that any unity Europe attains will have to allow for a far greater diversity: there are borders that can be reduced in importance but not forgotten; historic facts that cannot be undone; and, while there plainly exists a common European culture recognizable from Lisbon to Warsaw, from Istanbul to Brussels, there are a difference of languages and a wide divergence in ways of life we must respect.

The economic unification of Europe is so obvious a need of the hour that no one dares to take a public stand against it, and the selfish interests that oppose it have to do so by devious means. Whatever immediate measures can be taken to strengthen the economic position of Western Europe and to satisfy the legitimate demands of our people for a higher living standard should be entered on without delay; but there is no use in overlooking the fact that the European economy was ruined at Yalta when one hundred and twenty-one million producers and consumers were removed from it. The nature of the injury is very clearly illustrated in the fact that the annual sums of Marshall Aid almost exactly corresponded to the yearly volume of trade between Eastern and Western Europe before the partition. If Western Europe, with a population greater than either the U. S. S. R. or the U. S. A., stands trembling before one and begging help from the other, that is because it finds itself in the plight in which the United States would be were the Middle West handed
over to some non-American power for exploitation. The European plight begins not so much with economics as with politics, and if Europeans are to realize the economic potential of their continent, in which diffusion of skill will make use of variety of natural resources, they will at the same time have to recover their political genius and put it to the work of making a European unity whose embrace is not fatal to Europe's diversity.

The worst enemies of European unity outside of the U. S. S. R. are the professional Europeans who make their living, politically and economically, from the European idea. Most of them are politicians who were swept into power in 1945 on the coattails of the advancing Allied forces and now, turned out of their jobs by their own people, are found at every congress and signing every manifesto in the hopes of creating a Europe in their own image in which they can once more find a place for themselves. Though the survival of Europe and America is only to be had by their both standing together, the requisite of this is not an uninspired remaking of Europe on the American pattern: indeed, saving Europe in this fashion, supposing it really were possible, would mean the loss of anything that Europe still has to offer to the world. Equally, there can be no world in which the emergent influence of America is not granted, for it is that influence which secures such of the world as remains free. Any approach to a universal rule of law and order (and, of course, so long as the world endures we shall be making the approach rather than enjoying the accomplishment) that meets the rational condition of dealing with what actually is will have to proceed with a truly liberal spirit. This will mean recognizing the lessons of Europe's past history, which point, beyond the individual, to naturally grown communities, each of which has its inalienable rights. Their rightful demands require a decentralized structure, within which each national community can exercise its autonomy. Common interests and
geographical proximity can then be the motives for regional federations that are the final divisions of the larger European unity. The attempt to create a unified Europe by a sort of fiat authority that makes no allowance for the ponderable and imponderable elements of the European complex will carry with it the danger of a lack of balance that must result in conflicts. Men fight not only for markets and at the behest of aggressive ideologies, but also out of the wish to conserve for the future what they feel the long lives of their communities have made them, and this is a just and valid wish that no planning from above has the right to deny. In politics impatience is one of the most frequent and one of the most fatal of errors. History is full of good intentions made bad through haste and the reformer’s blind insistence on violating human nature.

This haste is the great weakness of present-day politics. We have no time. The West in its dealings with the East is handicapped because it must produce results before the next election. We are forced to short-term projects that will mature in a single legislative session. Anything that cannot promise immediate results is by that token not worth undertaking. And with our eyes directed toward tomorrow’s results, we too often overlook how similar manoeuvres in the past had no results at all, or bad ones. But this is not alone a matter of our political habits and structures; it is the symptom of something deeper. It is characteristic of a generation that has lost its sense of historical perspective and become so self-centered that it no longer sees the continuity of which it is a part. In rejecting its past, it has renounced its future, and sometimes its erratic and futile measures in the present convince one that these are the desperate activities of those who truly anticipate annihilation. The perspective of history has been lost because history gives up its meaning only in the perspective of eternity. All that can be worked toward on earth in the span of a single human life takes on meaning and value only when seen under the aspect of eternity, man’s participation in which sets the final seal on all his actions. Against the assurances that eternity holds, man discovers his own dimensions and is guarded against making the over- or under-estimation of himself that leads to destruction in the world. Those who think they have but one life to live can do little good that will outlast it. Man is distinguished from the animal by his reason, and the distinction of man’s reasoning is that it can discover and work toward goals that are beyond the brief extent of his own animal life.

The perception of this is not everywhere lost. I came upon an example of it during the Spanish Civil War. The various military units in Spain were recruiting volunteers with posters. One of these was put up by the Requetes, those traditionalists who might be called the Jacobites of Spain. The poster offered no pleasures of travel, no bonuses, no benefits of an incidental education. It simply showed a dead Requete hanging on barbed wire, and over him glowed a star under which was written: “Remember—before God there is no unknown soldier.” Death here was not a sentimental symbol with no reference to what dying in battle is really like, for in a civil war like the Spanish no one escapes a close knowledge of death; yet the Requetes continued to volunteer, knowing that for many of them worse deaths awaited than a clean shot on the barbed wire. Even those who will argue that their deaths were Quixotic (and I am not one who would) cannot deny that these men entered into the decisive moment of their existence certain their lives had not been in vain: their sacrifice would be acknowledged in eternity. Let us hope that the future will not make the same demand on any of us; but whatever coming years may hold in store for us we must recover the understanding that what we do is done in God’s sight. It will be the source of our courage and our assurance that our works, so far as men’s can, will endure.