Along with many others, I believe that American universities have degenerated, particularly since the late 1960s, and that they will continue to do so at an accelerating rate. It is also my view that political scientists, even "mainstream" political scientists, have contributed their fair share to this decline, if only by lending respectability to a constellation of related "forces"—e.g., neo-Marxism, the radical Left, extreme feminism, the counterculture—that, both on and off the campus, have spent considerable effort to undermine the university, the curriculum, as well as the traditional notions of what constitutes the mission of higher education, primarily in the humanities and social sciences.

That is a broad indictment, to be sure. Nevertheless, in what follows, I am not concerned to detail the contributions of the political science profession to these destructive forces. Nor, save toward the end, am I particularly concerned with its shortcomings as a discipline, and then only as they relate to my central points. Instead, by way of showing the foundations for this indictment, I want to deal with the dynamics and the nature of the profession, particularly in its development since World War II. In this endeavor, I want to identify those factors that have, by and large, rendered political science an ally—albeit, in some cases, an unwitting ally—of those movements that threaten our universities. This undertaking will also enable us to anticipate what its stance and role are likely to be in the crucial battles over the character and status of the university that loom on the horizon. This focus and my concern should become abundantly clear as I proceed.

We can fruitfully begin with one salient fact about the political science profession that cannot be gainsaid: the vast majority of its practitioners are very liberal, particularly those at our larger and more prestigious universities. The rumor that a member of Princeton's political science department voted for Reagan is probably just that, a rumor. The political spectrum of most political scientists, like that of their liberal brethren in the media, is highly skewed: liberals are viewed as "centrists"; conservatives, as "radical rightists" whose counterparts on the left are communists. Or, to view this from another angle, a sizable minority of the profession—perhaps, even a majority—is very sympathetic to the positions and goals that the general society associates with the "fringe" elements of the far left. A significant percentage would identify with the values and ends of the New Left, and most, probably a...
healthy majority, subscribe to the major “isms” of liberalism such as egalitarianism, secularism, and relativism.

These observations, evident to those familiar with the profession, point to an enigma, the resolution of which contributes to an understanding of perhaps the most important characteristic of the discipline today. That enigma can be put as follows: The prevailing liberal ideology in political science would certainly seem to render the discipline highly susceptible to the countercultural, New Left movements that have already gone a long way toward destroying the integrity of the humanities and social sciences in our universities. Yet, outwardly at least, political science has been less affected by these movements than other disciplines, notably, English, sociology, and history.1 Put another way, an undergraduate majoring in political science is less likely to encounter radical New Leftism in any form, than, say, an English major.

The relative immunity of political science from these influences, however, clearly cannot be attributed to the sensibilities of the profession that is almost as ideologically unbalanced as these other disciplines. The relative level-headedness of political science, that is, cannot be accounted for by the lack of commitment to the underlying propositions and beliefs that propel the radical counterculture and its various acolytes. Rather, the difference can be attributed to the fact that a majority of political scientists are deadly serious about acquiring “scientific” credentials; they want, above all, to be regarded as “scientists.” What constrains the bulk of political scientists from overtly joining their brethren in history and sociology, then, is their desire to cultivate the image of political science as a “real” science, a discipline as value free as possible.

Now I use the word “overtly” in describing the behavior of political scientists bent upon a value-free discipline because their “science” is both a shield and a tool: a shield to mask their ideology, to give their work the veneer of objectivity; a tool to validate or lend credence to, whenever possible, the tenets of their ideology. In this sense, political scientists are “sneakier” than their counterparts in other disciplines. But they are, for that reason, the more insidious.

Let me cast some light on the foregoing by turning to the matter of their determination to wrap the mantle of “science” around their work. I initially became aware of the strength of this motivation during the late 1960s and early 1970s when I was very active in the American Political Science Association, particularly in organizing panels at the national meetings. During this period the New Left (or the Caucus for a New Political Science, as they called themselves) engaged in outrageous behavior at the national meetings, using the business meetings of the Association for purposes it was never intended to serve (e.g., passing blatantly partisan motions to condemn individuals and policies), and on occasion, so I was told, even disrupting panels. In short, the Caucus was bent on politicizing the Association, the proximate cause for their effort in this direction being the war in Vietnam.

I wondered then why the “intellectual” leadership of the Association—the leaders of the so-called “behavioral revolution” who enjoyed status, prestige, and even official positions within the Association—did not forcefully speak up to condemn the activities or “methods” of the New Left when there was every opportunity to do so in the heated exchanges that ensued over these concerns in the official quarterly organ of the Association. In retrospect, the basic reason for this silence seems clear enough: there was no fundamental disagreement between this leadership and the New Left.
on the relevant "political" issues. And this being the case, why should the leadership issue a repudiation that could easily be misinterpreted as a veiled attack upon the political values of the New Left, rather than simply a condemnation of their tactics? Moreover, and perhaps more important, any criticism would have created needless division among those whose hearts, ideologically speaking, beat as one. Any such division, let me note in passing, would have also created enormous complications for the leadership in handling the internal affairs and politics of the association.

Even so, the question arises, given their ideological affinity with the New Left, why then didn't the leadership do the "manly" thing, i.e., join the Caucus and lend their support to its efforts to politicize the Association? This would have skirted the potential difficulties associated with any condemnation. The answer would clearly appear to be that the leadership regarded the behavior of the New Left as unbecoming "scientists." The antics of the Caucus, as well as its arguments and appeals, to say the very least, lacked the reserve, sobriety, objectivity, and detachment associated with "scientific" endeavors. Consequently, for the leadership to have joined the Caucus would have seriously, if not fatally, damaged their credentials as scientists.

There is more than impressionistic evidence to support this view. The leadership did manage to support the Caucus position on the salient issue at this point in time, American involvement in Vietnam, but it was careful to do so with all the trappings of science it could reasonably muster. The president of the American Political Science Association was joined by all seven of his immediate predecessors in sending a telegram to President Nixon in May 1970 which read in part: "Acting in our individual capacities as political scientists who are devoting their lives to the study of politics we are impelled by the present crisis to offer our considered professional advice for the quickest, most effective way of saving lives in Indochina and reducing strife at home" (emphasis added). The explanatory preface to the telegram as it appeared in the American Political Science Review, indicating the claim of expertise and special knowledge of the signers, is even more pronounced: "Those signing the telegram feel that as professional students of political science their special knowledge permits them to offer sound and objective advice for easing this crisis" (emphasis added). 2 In sum, blatantly partisan positions could be advanced so long as they were couched in appropriate terms to make clear that their foundations rested on a "special knowledge" which would render them "sound" and "objective," that is, as "value free" as possible.

In fact, the ground had already been cleared for this telegram by Professor David Easton's presidential address to the Association in September 1969 — an address that is commonly regarded as marking the beginning of the "post-behavioral" era in political science. According to Easton, behaviorists had been painstakingly diligent in cultivating the tools and techniques for the accumulation of reliable empirical data that would form the basis for the scientific study of politics. But, because of their preoccupation with "scales, indices, specialized techniques for collecting and analyzing data and the like" — "the building blocks of the edifice in which more reliable understanding occurs" — they had, he contended, overlooked "the practical, obvious problems of the day." Moreover, as Easton put it, their commitment led them to exclude "value specification as beyond the competence science."

Easton believed it imperative that behaviorists change their ways. Citing the possibilities of atomic warfare, "mounting internal cleavages in the United States
in which civil war and authoritarian rule have become frightening possibilities," along with "an undeclared war in Vietnam that violates the moral conscience of the world," he cautioned that the behaviorists were no longer entitled to conduct their research in the splendid isolation they had heretofore enjoyed. Now, so his message ran, confronted with these grave problems, the behaviorists were obliged to bring their vast knowledge and expertise to bear in order to find solutions, even if this meant drastic reorientation in their research. Nor, in his view, should they wait until they possessed definitive answers to problems that could only come with "slow-moving basic research"; they should strive to make "immediate use" of their knowledge, tentative though it might be. "For increasing numbers of us," he observed, "it is no longer practical or morally tolerable to stand on the political sidelines when our expertise alerts us to disaster."

Perhaps the most significant portion of Easton's address, from the standpoint of understanding the current tensions within political science, relate to his speculations concerning why behaviorists did not anticipate these problems and his vision of their future role in the profession. In explaining why behaviorists were, so to speak, caught "off guard," he accuses them of not being sufficiently introspective about their own "normative presumptions." They must, he believes, "break out of the bonds imposed on basic research itself by ongoing value frameworks." How is this to be done? Through a "moral self-scrutiny," an awareness of normative presumptions, and by "returning to an older tradition in a thoroughly modern way." This new, "thoroughly modern way" would involve constructing "new and often radically different conceptions of future possible kinds of political relationships" that would enable political scientists "to understand . . . the deficiencies of our political systems and to explore adequate avenues of change that are so desperately needed." In this fashion, according to Easton, there could be a marriage of "theory" and "science"; "philosophers" and "scientists" alike could work as one in restructuring "value frameworks" and testing "them by creatively contemplating new kinds of political systems that might better meet the need of a post-industrial, cybernetic society." "A new set of ethical perspectives woven around this theme," he continued, "might sensitize us to a whole range of new kinds of basic political problems worth investigating."

Easton's proposals amounted to little more than an invitation to the New Left to come back into the establishment as full-fledged members. His concern about "normative presumptions," the need for refashioning value structures, the contemplation of new, even "radical," political orders, and the like, all fit in very nicely with the New Left enterprise. At the same time, however, he made it abundantly clear that not all political theorists would be welcome to participate in this new and improved political science. On the contrary, he declared, "Those philosophies that seek to revive classical natural law and that reject the possibility of a science of man have thereby forfeited their opportunity and put in question their fitness to undertake this creative task of theory." What is required, he insisted, is "boldly speculative theorizing that is prepared to build upon rather than to reject the findings of contemporary behavioral science itself and that is prepared to contemplate the implications of these findings for political life, in the light of alternative, articulate value frameworks." Clearly Easton meant to read out of political science the likes of Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, and other—particularly Roman Catholic thinkers—who had challenged the philosophical foundations of behavioralism. Viewed from another perspective,
Easton's address really provided the terms of a long overdue synthesis between the ideological activists of the counterculture and the behaviorists. The dominance of the left in the profession, which rendered it so susceptible to behavioralism in the first place, began to show in the early 1940s and was complete by the middle 1950s. The behavioral movement, by most accounts, began in full swing after World War II and claimed total victory in the early 1960s. But rather than moving hand-in-hand towards ascendance during this period, behaviorists began to move off in earnest on a tangent, the development of a truly scientific political science. Instructive in this regard is V. O. Key's presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1958. Key, certainly one of the most productive and sensible leaders of the behavioral movement, hailed the profession's turn to the study of "political behavior" and away from "the unique qualities of constitutions, charters, or practices." That genuine progress had been made in the profession he did not for moment question. Behavioralism had served to provide a unity which, in turn, served to "facilitate communication among workers in all branches of the discipline, stimulate new interpretations of old data, and increase the changes of getting ahead by bringing, in effect, more manpower to bear on the same problem."

Greater unity along these lines, he felt, would vastly increase the "opportunity for building a base for broad and perhaps rapid advance." At the same time, he lamented that there were still too many descriptive studies, too many works dealing with "history and law" that served as reminders of the rather parochial origins of the profession. Moreover, he contended, the political scientist, no matter what his capacity — public servant, teacher, consultant, or advisor — could not "rise far above the body of knowledge" available to political scientists. Thus, he stressed the urgent need for the "enlargement, improvement, and refinement of that body of knowledge." This meant improving the "techniques of observation and description" and closing "the gap between theoretical and empirical work" that would render theory "less naïve empirically" and empirical work "less irrelevant theoretically."

Enough has been said to indicate Key's orientation; that is, he was almost solely concerned with how to make the study of politics more scientific. Yet, an important ingredient missing from his address is any pronouncement, comparable to Easton's, concerning the purpose to which this knowledge should be put. True enough, he speaks of the awe with which political scientists in various capacities face the "unsolved questions" confronting them, but he is remiss in identifying these problems. Like Easton, however, Key sees the profession progressing, slowly but surely. To those who think otherwise, he recommends "a careful perusal of a few volumes of the American Political Science Review as it appeared around 1920."

What of the profession today? How had the synthesis suggested by Easton worked out? What seems clear is that, since the late 1970s, the quest for scientific status has again eclipsed ideological concerns. Evidence to this effect, though impressionistic, abounds. To begin with, courses devoted to "public policy" — which began to spring up in abundance, so it would seem, as a direct outgrowth of the New Left's concern that political scientists deal with the "hot" issues — never really seem to have caught hold in the curricula. There has been a growth in the number of degree-granting public policy institutes loosely attached to political science departments. Yet, the commitment to "scientific" methodology, coupled with concerns to identify alter-
natives to existing policies, to place policies into historical context, to show trends and discontinuities, etc., have dampened the ideological orientation of the courses offered and studies issued by these institutes—a fact which the New Left understandably decries. Moreover, recent decades have not provided a friendly environment for policy studies directed at solving social problems in a manner prescribed by liberal ideology. The 1970s, for instance, were marked a growing awareness, even among the rank and file liberals in the profession, of the failure of the “Great Society” programs in the “war against poverty.” We must assume that the collapse of communism in the 1980s will have a similar chilling effect, particularly on those in the profession inclined to advance the agenda of the New Left through long-range policy programs.

But there is evidence more compelling that science is again eclipsing ideology. By 1980, in his presidential address to the Association, Professor Warren Miller—one of the leading lights in voting studies and opinion research, an area with all the trappings of a real science—could bemoan the fact that in the preceding two decades no “large social science centers . . . the equivalent of the astronomer’s observatories or the physicist’s accelerators” had “come into being.” In this vein, he noted that “too few political scientists” receive adequate training for “the tasks of designing research and collecting data”; that “too few political scientists have first-hand experience in designing research that will faithfully reflect the real political world.”

Miller’s concern with the development of political science as a science is apparent from his remarks about the need for additional training and funding. For instance, he is critical of the grant policies of private foundations primarily because they tie their grants to the promotion of policy ends that have little, if any, bearing to the overall needs of the profession. “Only on rare occasions,” he remarks, “can a private foundation be persuaded to support a research project” that does not fall within the “‘do-good’ tradition of philanthropy.” What is more, he continues, “foundations that are interested in significant political problems are most likely to support the writing of a solution-promoting book.” On this score, he notes that the federal government is scarcely any better: While “mission-oriented agencies” do supply funds for political scientists, “the emphasis upon application is pervasive.”

Further evidence that the quest for the development of a science has overshadowed ideology comes to us in the form of intramural debates over methodology that raise in new form the critical question of whether there is, in fact, any central core to the discipline. These debates center on the internal “forces” or movements within the discipline that seem to fragment it, thereby undermining the unity of purpose and focus that characterize a truly scientific profession. Gabriel Almond puts this concern in forceful terms. At the very time we find Soviet communists “turning to empirical western-style political science”—what he astonishingly regards as “the vindication of the Western political science tradition”—he finds the discipline deeply divided, in a disarrayed state. “If we look inside our departments,” he writes, “we see a loose aggregation of special interests, held together by shared avarice in maintaining or increasing the departmental share of resources, tenure-track billets, salary increases, reductions in teaching loads, liberal leave policies, and the like.” And, as he goes on to argue, it could scarcely be otherwise: “Straussian political theorists share no professional values with their behavioral colleagues. Public choice theorists have come into the discipline largely through lateral immigration from economics. . . . Critical
and Marxist theorists evaluate their positivist brethren according to the religious criteria of sin and error." "Common interest in rewards and benefits," he concludes, provides the only basis for common action since departments "in which these schools and sects have taken roots cannot decide professional issues on the basis of principle" simply because "they have no principles on which they agree."

Almond holds out prospects of unity through placing political theory (i.e., "theory" in the sense employed in the "hard" sciences) at the core of the discipline; a political theory that would "face toward the discipline, interact closely with its various parts, and relate them to one another." But this solution rests upon the presumption that there can be such a "unifying" theory, a highly dubious presumption given the high degree of fragmentation within the political theory field itself. As Ian Shapiro observes in direct response to Almond's solution, "the specialization that has been characteristic of many social sciences over the last few decades has afflicted political theory as well as—perhaps more than—other subdisciplines of political science. Historians of ideas of various partisan stripes, moral theorists in the stamp of John Rawls, game theorists and public choice theorists, anti-theorists who subscribe to a family of related 'postisms,' and a variety of others all lay claim to the mantle of political theory." Moreover, Shapiro contends, the "infiltration of moral philosophy and the method of microeconomics into political theory in the past two decades" has not served the discipline well: "Their internal complexity, preoccupation with counterfactual analysis, and relative disregard for problems of implementation have fueled an already prevalent tendency among political theorists to write primarily for one another."

While these and similar observations give the impression of an unhealthy pluralism in the profession hindering progress towards a firmly grounded science of politics, they must be placed in context. They do indicate that "mainstream" political science—those of the behavioral persuasion—are annoyed with the more politically conservative elements in the profession, e.g., the Straussian school and the public choice school. In addition, they show a certain frustration that traditional political theory still retains a foothold in the profession some thirty years after the behavioral revolution; that it has not been, as Easton enjoined, read out of the profession. A new, but similar, concern—"new" in the sense that it has emerged since the behavioral revolution—is that certain approaches, such as those found in the public choice school, might supplant the traditional methodologies and approaches of behavioralism. But the analyses of both Almond and Shapiro also point to the fact that there is a pluralism in the profession; that the self-proclaimed victory of the behaviorists has not been total. This pluralism is evident at the national conventions where numerous organizations of political scientists with different views and interests offer program panels that compete quite successfully with the "official" panels. Nevertheless, for all of this, the behaviorists remain the dominant force in the discipline, as a cursory reading of almost any issue of the American Political Science Review will attest.

Now there are a number of ways to view this behavioral domination. That its practitioners are grimly determined to fashion a "science" of politics has a direct bearing on the role the profession will assume in the broader contexts of university and national politics. To begin with, as Easton intimates, their determination serves to focus their concerns, away from the politically sensitive issues, to questions of methodological procedures, the formulation of hypotheses, and the like. Consequently, much like
children absorbed with their new toys at Christmas, the political scientists’ preoccupation with the canons of science should tend to render them somewhat oblivious of their surroundings. More importantly, as noted above, behaviorists are not likely to put their scientific credentials on the line by actively engaging in controversial political causes which makes them poor candidates for membership in the political crusades of their New Left brethren. Finally, as also noted above, their methods—particularly in the policy study areas—tend to moderate or temper ideological commitment and passions. That is, most serious behaviorists, to borrow the words of Samuel Huntington, eventually come to some awareness of the “limits of political engineering.”

This is not to say that the behaviorists have abandoned their ideology for the pursuit of science; only that science will serve to divert and mask it, thereby rendering it less obvious to the casual observer. Ideology, to put this differently, will find its way into the behaviorist enterprise in subtle and indirect fashions under the rubric of scientific inquiry. For instance, Charles Lindbloom’s 1981 presidential address to the Association offers up the view that notions accepted by most political scientists (the “conventional theory”) about the nature of decision making in liberal democracies are highly vulnerable to attack from neo-Marxist radicals. Lindbloom acknowledges that there are “serious shortcomings in much radical writing”: sometimes it “begs observable reality,” or it can be “insular and insulting, sometimes humorlessly incapable of self-criticism.” All of this and more, however, does not deter him from bestowing respectability upon it. From his vantage point, the embarrassing deficiencies in “conventional theory” mean that “it greatly needs to call more heavily on radical thought.” The “radical hypotheses,” he tells us, “are meaty” and “sophisticated” in their insights into what “induces acquiescent likemindedness”; they obviously constitute “an advance over” the absence of any hypotheses from the “mainstream study of socialization.”

In his effort to legitimize the neo-Marxist critique of existing liberal democracies, Lindbloom at the outset focuses on the status of liberal democracy, a variant of a technique that enormously facilitates the introduction of ideology into what would outwardly appear to be “scientific” commentary. Concerns about liberal democracy—its nature, well being, operations, institutions, etc.—are the principal preoccupation of the discipline in large part, of course, because most political scientists live in regimes that are commonly regarded to be democratic; they tend to focus on matters that are, so to speak, close to home, part of their political environment. But what is also clear is the enormous leeway this provides for liberal ideologists to promote their agenda through critiques of political institutions and procedures, policies, and even the existing social and economic structures by reference to the presumed goals and ideals of liberal democracy. It would be highly interesting, though beyond our immediate purpose, to canvass thoroughly the various conceptions of democracy that have been used by political scientists over the decades and demonstrate the relationship of these conceptions to the political agenda of the radical left. What seems clear is that, taken as a whole, the vast majority of political scientists would find John Rawls’s notion of liberal democracy with its extreme egalitarianism quite acceptable.

From what has been said, it should come as no surprise that philosophically speaking—save for the fact that traditional theory seems to have withstood the behavioral onslaught—the profes-
sion is as "sick" today as it was when the behaviorists proclaimed victory in the early 1960s. While the infirmities of the discipline have been thoroughly and eloquently documented elsewhere, their characteristics merit recounting. To begin with, its focus is narrow; its secularism has excluded from its purview man's relation to the transcendent. This lack of openness to the whole of man's experience prevents the behaviorist from comprehending man's place in the order of being. This cloture, to go no further, precludes mainstream political scientists from even being fully scientific. It means as well that they will lack the orientation to determine what is truly relevant. And lacking this, their studies, in the main, are bound to be trivial.

In part, because of its blinders, mainstream political science is also, by and large, "shallow"; concerned with the immediate and possessing little sense of history, of continuity and change over time. This shallowness helps to account for the fact that, despite all of their scientific pretensions, political scientists rival economists as notoriously poor predictors. How many, for instance, even with the wealth of resources, theories, paradigms, models, and the like predicted the disintegration of the Soviet empire? Even in the area of public opinion and voting, the scientific "queen" of the subfields, how many political scientists could have predicted the turn in American politics that came with the election of Ronald Reagan? Wasn't it common knowledge — proven by Goldwater's crushing defeat — that candidates "right" of "center" were sure losers?

The mainstream of the discipline in its quest for a "value free" political science is also "truncated"; for it, there can be no hierarchy of values because all values are equal. At least, its commitment, built on the foundations of positivism, offers no basis for asserting one value to be higher or superior to another. This relativism — again a result of the discipline's clutch to the whole of man's experience and his place in the order of being — has deplorable consequences that reach far beyond the profession itself to the broader society. In Leo Strauss's words, "By teaching the equality of all values, by denying that there are things which are intrinsically high and other which are intrinsically low as well as by denying that there is an essential difference between men and brutes, it unwittingly contributes to the victory of the gutter." 12

Mainstream political science has contributed to the victory of the gutter over the last fifty years, and it will continue to do so for the indefinite future. It has, more concretely, done its part to hasten the decline of higher education in the United States. But it has done so not by leading the charge of the New Leftists, counterculturists, and other fringe elements who assault the core values of Western civilization. Rather it does so more insidiously by its support and rationalizations. In other words, political science will not be a prime mover in the battles taking place in our universities, but it will, soon or late, lend its wholehearted support to the radicals. And, be assured that when it does so, that support will be couched in the language of "science."

1 My estimate in this respect accords with that given by Stephen Balch, president of the National Association of Scholars and a professor of political science, at a meeting sponsored by the Heritage Foundation. There are other, relatively objective measures that support my judgment: the panels of the regional and national associations at their meetings, course offerings and curriculum changes, and the nature of the articles published by the regional and national reviews. 2 "Communications," American Political Science Review 64 (June 1970), 589. 3 "The New Revolution in Political Science," American Political Science Review, 63 (December 1969), 1054, 1053, 1060, 1058. 4 I had the occasion to ask Willmoore Kendall, Francis Wilson, and Charles Hyneman, collectively, when the leftward
ascendance in the profession began, or whether the profession had always been liberal. During the 1930s and much of the 1940s, all three, to varying degrees, were bona fide members of the Left. They had no difficulty in fixing on 1940 as the approximate date of a definite move to the left within the ranks of the profession. I recall being surprised at this because when I began my career in the early 1960s liberal dominance in the profession was complete. 5"The State of the Discipline," American Political Science Review, 51 (December 1958), 965, 964, 963, 968, 969. 6"The Role of Research in the Unification of a Discipline," American Political Science Review, 75 (March 1981), 13, 12, 13. 7"The Nature of Contemporary Political Science: A Roundtable Discussion," P. S., 23 (March 1990), 35, 37, 38. 8"One Soul at a Time: Political Science and Political Reform," American Political Science Review, 82 (March 1988), 9. 9"Another State of Mind," American Political Science Review, 76 (March 1982), 20, 19. 10In this regard, he writes that the conventionalists "observe forms of behavior" within the political system one way, the neo-Marxists another. "A principal task of a scientific political science," he remarks, "might be to research the issue." Short of this the "conventionalists" would seem to have no basis for dismissing the contentions or framework of the "radicals," 13. 11See, for instance, Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, ed. Herbert J. Storing (New York, N.Y., 1962). Leo Strauss's epilogue in this volume constitutes the classic indictment of the "new political science." For an excellent critique of the profession's preoccupation with behavioral "science" from a Voegelinean perspective see Ellis Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics Beyond Behavioralism," in The Post-Behavioral Era. 13Essays on . . ., 326.