ANTONIO ARCONES is the director of Fundación Burke.
One of the curiosities of our globalizing world is that educated men
and women today know less and less about the lives of other nations.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. We are awash in information, and
a cosmopolitan elite—dubbed “Davos Man” by the late Samuel P.
Huntington—bestrides the globe to manage (and profit from) dramatic
economic transformations. But older habits of wide historical reading
and careful cultural study have faded—not least, among the journalists
whose task it is to make sense of the passing scene. As a result, when it
comes to the wide world “abroad,” we possess immense information,
but not much understanding.
Spain is an example. Any American who follows the news will know
that in March 2004, three days before Spain’s general elections, Islamic
terrorists bombed commuter trains in Madrid, killing nearly 200 people
and injuring hundreds more. Spaniards reacted by voting the Partido
Popular of José María Aznar out of power and ushering in a Socialist
(PSOE) government led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. One may
also have read, in recent years, of large-scale demonstrations in Spain
protesting the immaculately leftist family policies introduced by the
Zapatero government. The terrorist incident aside, all this would seem
to be nothing but the normal back-and-forth of democratic politics at
the dawn of the twenty-first century.
What is missing from this capsule summary is the deeper story
that situates these recent events in Spain’s history and in relation to
the fundamental social settlement that allowed for Spain’s transition
to democracy after the death of Franco. From this perspective, 2004
marks a turning point. For it appears that the Zapatero government
has self-consciously breached the social compact, aiming to “transform”
Spanish society and culture: that is, on the basis of a narrow electoral
majority but with all the coercive powers of the state, to shove Spain
permanently leftward. The unprecedented demonstrations against
Zapatero are therefore a response to an unprecedented situation.
The demonstrations are only the most visible expression of an
otherwise unremarked development: the awakening of a new generation
of Spanish conservatives. This new generation is blessedly free of any
association with dictatorship, and they are critical of the Partido Popular,
which has tended to identify itself with technocratic managerialism
and ceded cultural questions to the Left. Close to the heart of the new
Spanish conservatism is Fundación Burke (www.fundacionburke.org),
a think tank founded in 2006 to educate the rising generation.
What follows is a translation of a 2007 article by Antonio Arcones,
the president of Fundación Burke. The article articulates the new
generation’s understanding of their historical situation and outlines a
program for the new Spanish conservatism.
—MCH
To understand the political situation of
Spain today, we must begin our analysis
by returning to 1936 and the onset of
the Spanish Civil War.1 It was then that the
“Nationalists” emerged as an amalgam of
different political tendencies: traditionalist
Carlists, monarchists (Acción Española),
Christian Democrats (CEDA), Falangists,
and even members of the Catalan nationalist
party (La Lliga). The only real connection
between such disparate political elements
was opposition to the revolutionary
and totalitarian direction in which Spain’s
Second Republic was headed, as the [farleft]
government of the Republic threatened
to establish a socialist regime and put
an end to parliamentary democracy.
During the first half of the Franco regime
that followed the Civil War, a political
system was established that had a
strong ideological element. Just what were
the principles of the regime was difficult to
say, however, due to the regime’s intrinsic
political diversity, and because the interpretation
of the Civil War itself (as a fight
against Communism) was central to the
cohesion of the disparate elements within
it. Even when Franco’s “New State” in
the interwar years displayed totalitarian
impulses of its own, through its (often superfi
cial) mimicry of other European antiparliamentary
movements, it can nonetheless
be said that the weight of the regime’s
Catholic element was its defining feature.
This Catholic dimension was not part
of the original intention of the military
men who led the Nationalist uprising
against the Second Republic.2 However,
the leftward evolution of the Republican
government—and the mass murders and
religious persecutions it perpetrated—
necessarily placed religion at the center of
the new regime.
On the other hand, Franco’s regime was
profoundly statist. It took for granted that the
religious identity and ideological principles
on which it was founded were authentically
popular in Spanish society, and therefore
that its authoritarian features were in some
sense “democratically” legitimate. Consequently,
together with policies inspired by
the Catholic Church’s social doctrine, the
importance of the state in Spain grew enormously
after 1939, practically erasing the
principle of subsidiarity that was formally
proclaimed in Spain’s Fundamental Laws. It
was a curious early version of “big-government”
conservatism.
From 1957 onward, with the triumph
of technocratic managerialism and the
proclamation of the “twilight of ideologies,”
the evolution of Franco’s regime
was marked by an increasing desire to
gain public approval in Western countries.
This desire for approbation was articulated
through the depoliticization of
Spanish society and even the depoliticization
of the official institutions of Francoism.
This development, however, did not
affect the regime’s established statism, its
suspicion of free initiatives in civil society,
or its neglect of culture. As a result, leftist
principles, often Gramscian, gradually
permeated Spanish culture and society.
Universities were particularly symptomatic
of this trend: according to the regime,
for example, private Catholic universities
simply did not make sense, since the state
was already “conservative and Catholic.”
As a result, from the middle of the 1960s
onwards, the universities had already become
de facto strongly Marxist.
All of this demonstrates that no statist
shell—no matter how “conservative” the
official discourse or ideological packaging
might be—can replace the necessary
role that free institutions must play within
civil society. In the long term, real freedom
and prosperous and virtuous social
development can only be achieved with a
vigorous civil society.
Spanish conservatives realized this too
late. Instead of valiantly defending their
intellectual principles while acknowledging
that the specific political form they had
taken was strongly marked by the Civil
War and the peculiar role of Franco (an
atypical regime in an atypical country), the
conservative majority did just the opposite,
often abjuring or at least not declaring
their principles while doggedly defending
the specific political form of the authoritarian
regime. The consequence was the
intellectual demobilization of Spain’s conservatives,
as well as the discrediting of the
conservative intellectual tradition in the
eyes of average Spaniards. Under these circumstances,
as the transition to democracy
began to occur in 1975, the Right had no
model of its own to propose for the new
post-Franco democratic era.
Furthermore, instead of advancing conservative
proposals for architectonic political
reform after Franco’s death, the conservative
political class was instead beset by a
guilt complex for having collaborated with
Franco’s regime—even though they themselves
had brought down that regime from
within in order to usher in democracy. The
work of the UCD (Unión de Centro Democratico)
government—the first government
after the dictatorship—illustrates the point.
The UCD had been created under the
auspices of the Francoist movement, but
it at once set about to discredit not simply
the institutions of the dictatorship but
“the Right” more generally, contributing
massively to the country’s ideological
shift towards a Left that was still proposing
a political model based on the kind of socialism
responsible for the Gulag. The regime
change of 1975 brought about a pact
of coexistence with the Left in which the
political representatives of the Right—basically
the UCD, and even broad sections
of the Church—abandoned most of their
principles, yielding ever more substantial
concessions.
The need for change after Franco was
undeniable, but greater political standing
for conservatives and their principles
should have been demanded from the
early Center-Right governments of the
new democratic Spain. Yet once again,
the conservative abandonment of culture
and principles was absolute. The
organization of the new political system
left Spanish civil society completely defenseless
against the state. The situation
was, indeed, much worse than in other
Western democratic systems. Devolution
of power from Madrid to the regions,
the political parties’ enormous power and
their influence on the justice system, the
clout of ultra-statist trade unions, the lack
of a real separation of powers, an astonishingly
“stacked” electoral system: all
these features of the new Spain have now
proven a permanent source of social instability
and excessive statism.
The period since 1975 has had its fair
share of crises, especially those provoked by
terrorism. At times, Spain has had to deal
with harsh economic conditions, or with
serious political crises, or the slow-burning
PSOE (Socialist) debacle caused by
that party’s rampant internal corruption. In
spite of all this—and except for those first
few turbulent years of transition—Spanish
society as a whole has meekly trusted
the political process that began with the
change of regime. Yet during these same
years certain very serious and far-reaching
legislative and social changes have been
made that have transformed the way Spaniards
think and feel.
Why have Spanish conservatives contemplated
these changes with such surprising
docility and resignation? We believe
that several factors have made this timid
acquiescence possible:
- On the one hand, the regime change
turned on the implicit presumption that a
great deal had to be conceded to the Left
in order to achieve social cohesion and
peaceful coexistence. In one way or another,
it was just what had to be done. - Of particular significance is the fact that
Spanish Catholics (referring here only to
those for whom Catholic faith and culture
shape their worldview and in light
of which they consciously mould their
lives), most of whom are on the Right or
Center-Right, have also accepted certain
social changes that erode the Catholic
worldview. The tacit pact of the transition
from dictatorship to democracy made
many Catholics think that in the name of
pluralism they had to compromise even
on their most fundamental principles until
a stable situation was achieved in which
everyone would feel comfortable. - The political touchstones for these conservative
and Catholic citizens—the Center-
Right parties (UCD and the Partido
Popular [PP]) and, on many occasions,
large sections of the Church itself—have
consistently broadcast this message of
compromise and concession, leaving anyone
who wished to express serious doubts
about it in a very awkward position. To
question the statist means by which leftist
cultural agendas were advanced seemed
the same as questioning the very regime
of freedom established by a parliamentary
democratic system. - The cultural and social initiative has always
been taken by the Left. Spanish conservatives
did not have the fighting spirit
generated by the demands and mentality
of those under attack. Comfort fosters
neither initiative nor commitment. There
has been a tragic lack of a “culture war”
in Spain.
Now, however, for the first time in
thirty years, a large section of the Spanish
population has become aware that things
are not all well; it is starting to feel that
something deep down is splitting apart.
Forced optimism can no longer be maintained.
The terrorist attacks of 11 March
2004 and the subsequent electoral results
[the unexpected victory of the Socialists
under Zapatero] left the country in a state
of shock, with half the population feeling
aggrieved. The policies subsequently carried
out by the Socialist government have
confirmed their worst fears.
For many people, the current unease is
thought to be merely accidental and can be
reduced to the bitter taste of defeat of the
Center-Right PP after its mishandling of
the Madrid bombings. However, for a signifi
cant portion of those on the Right, that
moment represents the crystallization of a
slower, much deeper process, the exhaustion
of a dogma that expounds “in spite of
all the problems I can see, the country as a
whole is getting better, even though I can’t
see how.”
This change in outlook can be explained
through several convergent causes:
- On the one hand, the consequences of
the moral and cultural principles that have
been gradually implemented in our country
in recent years can be seen more clearly
now. The delirious legislative initiatives of
Zapatero’s government [e.g. the zealous
promotion of homosexuality, including
homosexual adoption, the weakening of
the Church’s role in education] make this
more patent. - The acceptance of the so-called “peace
process” with the [Basque] terrorist organization
ETA by most Spaniards has forced
politicians in the PP to recognize that government
is not simply a matter of managing
income taxes or inflation. By failing
to offer a social and cultural model, the
Right has not arrested the destruction of
the family or the coarse materialism that
saps a society’s moral vitality. An atomistic,
materialistic society is an open field for the
rule of demagogy because it is an amorphous
heap of minuscule private interests.
The solidifying of such a society marks, for
the PP, political suicide—and PP politicians
are at last beginning to realize this. - For many Spaniards, the eight years during
which the PP was in power [1996 to
2004] and their abrupt departure from offi
ce have revealed several points:- The PP’s lack of a cultural agenda—
the fact that it did not permit
real freedom in education or in the
media, which would have breathed
new life into these arenas and opened
the door for genuine intellectual debate.
Instead, they maintained statist
policies and subsidies, perhaps
thinking that this would help them
win over the leftist intelligentsia. - From the position of a supposedly
“right-wing” government, the
PP further harassed and attacked the
family, with measures that paved the
way for the current Socialist government
to take further steps down the
same path. - Hence, the paradox of a “conservative”
party unaware that it is helping
to debilitate the natural structures
of civil society—structures
that, in the medium- and long-term,
would boost its electoral chances.
- The PP’s lack of a cultural agenda—
All of this also seems to indicate that
the Spanish Left now believes the transition
to democracy to be over. The Left
is trying once again to effect the political
and cultural rupture that they could not
achieve in 1975. Once again, the democratic
game with its established framework
is being used by the Left while attempting
to advance their position, but it increasingly
seems as though they are not willing
to tolerate another victory by a nonleftist
party. This has provoked, especially in the
last four years of [Zapatero’s] government,
a very hostile attitude toward the PP, moving
from the Left’s usual demagogy to truly
totalitarian and coercive episodes.3 By doing
so, the Left may have managed to mobilize
its own grassroots support, but it has
also opened many Spaniards’ eyes, pushing
them towards the Right, where they begin
to demand the same rights as the Left: the
right to express their opinions, to demonstrate,
and to dissent from the prevailing
official discourse.
This incipient change in outlook allows
us to nurture hope for the political
and social regeneration that Spain needs.
Yet nothing can be done if we do not first
acknowledge the tremendous weakness of
civil society in Spain and the guilt complex
that weighs so heavily on Spanish political
and intellectual “conservatives.”
The only question that remains is
whether we can expect anything serious
to emerge from the current opposition
party [the PP], or whether its immersion
in the political system of consensus, statism,
and easy public money render it incapable
of responding to the crisis in the
way that Spain needs. Until we can answer
this question, we as a conservative
think tank [Fundación Burke] must focus on
strengthening our principles, creating social
networks and institutions where there
can be a real debate about ideas, instilling
conservative principles in our finest young
minds, and contributing to public debate
through magazines and publications.
There is an urgent need for us to defend,
publicly and whenever we can, the conten-
tion that a conservative understanding of
society is the one most beneficial for everyone—
and especially for the economically
underprivileged; that there is no
freedom without economic freedom; and
that no society can be free unless it is also
a virtuous society. In short, we have to do
what is most painful to the current social
democratic consensus: we must try to become
a truly free society.
NOTES
- It is conventional to date the Spanish Civil War to
1936, with Franco’s decision to lead an armed resistance
against the Republican government. But already
in 1934 the Socialist Party had attempted violent revolution
from the Left—in Asturias—causing thousands
of deaths. - The Nationalist uprising commenced two
days after the murder of the conservative leader José
Calvo Sotelo by “out-of-control” policemen. It was in
the first instance politically motivated, not religiously
motivated. - “Totalitarian” and “coercive” may sound
like exaggerations, but they are accurate terms. The
Zapatero government has imposed mandatory sex
education curricula in all public and private schools
that expound upon the virtues of homosexuality and
celebrate “alternative models” of the family. The government
has used the police to spy on the CEO of
a company in the midst of merger talks in order to
advance its preferred corporate outcome. Zapatero
has also led a campaign against independent media in
Spain—especially the Catholic radio network—and
the government did not renew some station licenses,
thereby partially silencing its critics.