Political conversion stories are like religious conversion stories: intended to encourage more, yet not always what they...
Supplement and Corrections to “The Strauss-Voegelin Correspondence”
The present paper is meant to complete and revise Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934–1964, translated and edited by Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993). All page numbers below (marked “p. XX”) refer to this edition, unless otherwise indicated. The second edition (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004) includes the correspondence only, with unchanged pagination and text. The translation has been used without changes in the selection from Eric Voegelin’s letters to Leo Strauss in Selected Correspondence, 1950–1984, vol. 30, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, ed. Thomas A. Hollweck (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2007), which includes the letters dated January 2, 1950; April 18, 1950; April 22, 1951; June 10, 1953; pp. 41–42, 53–54, 75–83, 166–67.
Faith and Political Philosophy contains the remaining letters between Strauss and Voegelin, except for the following four letters and two sketches not located in the main correspondence files, but which have been filed together with the manuscripts to which they refer, or with other material: a sketch of Strauss’s letter dated 24.11.42 (handwritten in German, Leo Strauss Papers, Box 4, Folder 18); Voegelin to Strauss, 21 Dezember 1943 (typed in German, copy, Eric Voegelin Papers, Box 61, Folder 17) and December 22, 1943 (typed in English, copy, loc. cit.); Strauss to Voegelin, December 28, 1943 (typed in English, printed heading of Social Research, loc. cit.); Voegelin to Strauss, April 30, 1947 (typed in English, copy, ibid., Box 62, Folder 19); sketch dated 2. Juni 1951 of Strauss’s letter dated 5. Juni 1951 (handwritten in German, Leo Strauss Papers, Box 16, Folder 11). A document attached to Voegelin’s letter dated October 11, 1948 (Eric Voegelin Papers, Box 62, Folder 26), as well as a translation of Voegelin’s German review of Strauss’s On Tyranny (Eric Voegelin Papers, Box 62, Folder 29), have also been displayed. All the footnotes are the editor’s work.
3900 Greystone Av., New York City
Dear Dr. Vögelin,
I thank you cordially for the sending of your critique of Cairns’ book, which I have read at once with great interest and large agreement. One reads very rarely critics so detailed, thorough and going to the center. And the verve and clarity of the diction make reading a pleasure.
The essay interests me especially because one has to do here in America so to say constantly with the view represented by Cairns. I have often enough considered how one can attest this position in a way which is here understandable. As I believe, you have remarkably solved this problem.
It remains for me though a question which is not solved with the refutation of Cairns etc. Finally this position is only the latest remnant of the science founded by Plato and Aristotle: the ideal of the exact politics in Plato; Aristotle’s adhering to the ideal of exactness despite the abandonment of its applicability to human things; the higher ranking of physics, which holds at least unconditionally for Aristotle, vis-à-vis ethics and politics; the opinion holding for the whole tradition until the 19th century “that the question of generality does have a bearing on the legitimacy of (the) status (of a science)” (contrary to p. 561). It is clear to me that the Platonico-Aristotelian concept of science has been decisively modified in the 17th century (however under adherence to the indicated points), and that this modification led to a new problematic in the social science, which the German 19th century seeks to solve with the help of “history” and of the “individualized” method. But that means that Max Weber’s still so intelligently interpreted methodology presupposes e.g. the method of the modern science of nature, as it expands it to some extent. Not to say anything about that: that this methodology leads in Max Weber himself at least in a capitulation in view of the  “value” problem. I see that you do not considerably modify this Weberian thesis (p. 562)—you refer to the “objectivity” of the problem, which remains maintained in all the “subjectivity” of the answers; but this objectivity itself is not to be presupposed without difficulty: you speak of a “convergence towards standards . . .” I cannot admit this, or else as far as a convergence is to be noticed, it seems to me to result in this eclecticism. To express myself somewhat more concretely: I am not sure “that we can no longer build a science of social order . . . on the anthropologies of Plato or Aristotle” (563). The basis of your thesis is Christianity. The Christian belief? Thus we come to the old question, how far a science can be grounded on faith. The consequences of the fact that the Christian faith has formed Europe? But how far are these consequences viable in the long run, if faith itself loses its power? The great, not enough valued problem of Nietzsche.
21 December 1943
Dr. Leo Strauss
New School for Social Research
66 West 12th Street
New York City
Dear Doctor Strauss:
Early today I have let go off to you the review of Farber’s book. It has come about somewhat under pressure, because we close tomorrow for the vacations and the secretary is not at disposal until the New Year. As I consider now the thing more precisely, I noticed that the review has become somewhat longer than you had foreseen. In case you want to abridge, I would propose that you leave aside the whole first paragraph and begin only with the second. In this case, the beginning of the second paragraph should read:
Professor Farber’s Foundation of Phenomenology is the third in a series of publications of the International Phenomenological Society. The setting of the book has to be taken into account in its appraisal . . .
On p. 4, 1. 1, I further noticed an accumulation of the word “philosophy.” The line should better read:
December 22, 1943
Dr. Leo Strauss
New School for Social Research
66 West 12th Street
New York, New York
Dear Dr. Strauss,
Enclosed you will find the review of Farber’s book. I hope you will get it in time in spite of the inevitable delay in the holiday rush.
With all good wishes from us to you and Mrs. Strauss for the holidays, I am,
Very sincerely yours,
An International Quarterly of Political and Social Science
66 West 12 Street, New York City
Edited by the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School of Social Research
December 28, 1943
Professor Eric Voegelin
Department of Government
College of Arts & Sciences
Baton Rouge, La.
Dear Dr. Voegelin:
Many thanks for your excellent review of Farber’s book. I sincerely hope, in the interest of SOCIAL RESEARCH, that you will continue to contribute reviews to our periodical.
You needn’t be concerned about the length. It is perfectly all right as it is. One or two changes are necessary and they will be taken care of here. You will be given an opportunity to see the final version.
With repeated thanks and best wishes for the New Year, I remain,
dictated but not signed by L. S.
April 30, 1947
Dear Dr. Strauss:
Please, find enclosed, at long last, the review of Northrop’s Meeting of East and West.
I have to apologize for the long delay. It is due only in part to other work; the principal reason was a strong revulsion against the book. I have it toned down in the review; and I hope the irony is gentle enough so that most people will not even notice it.
With best regards,
Very sincerely yours,
§ 3. Absolute Space and Relativity
a. Relativity from Copernicus
b. Galilei’s Conflict with the Inquisition
c. Newton’s Assumption of Absolute Space
d. The Influence of Henry More
e. Berkeley’s Psychological Criticism
f. The Deadlock
h. . . . . . .
i. Science, Power and Magic
j. The Pathos of Science and the Spiritual Eunuchs
PS. For printing as an independent article I would suggest the title
If you have alternative suggestions, please let me know.
Moreover, the MS has been checked by an excellent theoretical physicist, by professor Georg Jaffé; the physical part is critically safe.
[written with a pencil below:] chapter of Book }
Leo Strauss,On Tyranny. An Interpretation of Xenophon’s Hiero. With a Foreword by Alvin Johnson. Political Science Classics, New York, 1948. XIII and 121 pp. Price?
The work by Professor Strauss “On Tyranny” has in its main content a careful, detailed analysis of the Xenophontic dialogue “Hiero.” Beyond that, especially in the introductory chapter, the author reflects on the problem of tyranny in Antiquity and Modern Age, on the difference between ancient and modern political science, and especially on the relationship between “Hiero” and Machiavelli’s “Prince”—the works in which the ancient and modern position to the problem of tyranny are in the closest contact.
The work is representative for the new methodical orientation of the history of ideas. The author does not hold for his task to establish which contribution the ancient author has provided to the problems, which as such appear in the conventional systematics of the modern political science; for such a version of the historiographical task would presuppose the assumption that our contemporary heading problems are critically supportable and systematically binding. Supportability and bindingness of the modern political theory are however put into question (for reasons into which we could not enter on the occasion of a review); and the study of the classical works of politics has the purpose to come again in contact with the original problematics of political thought. From this restorative task of the study of the history of ideas follows the hermeneutical principle: that the interpreter, in the most scrupulous submission to the state of the text, has brought out the intention of the thought of the author. Only in this way it is possible to go beyond the cliches in thought and to push forward to the experiences from which the problematics of the political thought arises, and for the intellectual accomplishment of which the political terminology has been created.
Measured by these methodical demands, Professor Strauss’s work is a masterpiece of interpretation in history of ideas. The wealth which lies in details in the nature of such a research cannot be spread here. As a whole, the analysis will hardly invalidate the judgment that Xenophon is not a deep thinker; however it shows Xenophon as a psychologist and dramatist of high rank. In the dialogue between Simonides and Hiero, the wise man dominates the situation from the beginning and urges Hiero in the role of the critic of tyranny; he pushes him up to the point where the tyrant sees only suicide as the way out of his humanly intolerable situation; and only then he refers to the possibility of exerting power without being envied or despised. This “exciting” action could have determined Professor Strauss to make precisely the “Hiero” the object of his research. We live today again in an age of tyranny; and again freedom of criticism has become a problem. The book is rich in details on the question of how the wise man can affirm his existence under tyranny, how he can perhaps even act moderately upon the tyrants without losing his life by the attempt in purposeless way.
The attempt at a comparison between ancient and modern positions on tyranny appears to us only in part successful. The remark on the relation between Xenophon and Machiavelli meets without doubt an essential point; and Professor Strauss’s detailed evidence for the recurrence of Xenophontic thought in the “Prince” are a worthwhile contribution to the understanding of Machiavelli. The author does not seem to us however to have enough considered that a series of experiences are dealt with in Machiavelli’s image of the prince, which are alien to Antiquity, as above all the idea of the political Paracletes. Joachim’s dux, Dante’s veltro, Rienzo’s tribunitian idea, form the background for the apocalypse of the political redeemer in the concluding chapter of the “Principe.” From the political Paracletes of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance to the mass leaders of our time, modern tyranny is tinted by the idea, rooted in Christianity, of the establishing of a final realm immanent to the world. This component of tyranny lacks in the classic-Hellenic period—with perhaps the exception of the idea of the royal ruler in Plato’s “Politicus.” Here seem to lie the limits of the comparison. A further study of the problem of tyranny would require analyses of the works of the Renaissance, with the same thoroughness accomplished as Strauss’s analysis of the “Hiero.”
CHICAGO 37 · ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
June 2, 1951
Dear Mr. Voegelin,
Thanks cordially for your detailed letter of April 22, to which I can answer only now, at the end of the semester. I congratulate you for the completion of your Walgreen Lectures, to the study of which I look forward with eagerness. It will probably be possible to me on the basis of these lectures to have a real dispute with you.
You misunderstand me, if you believe that I would not have meant seriously the request take me to task. Without λόγον δοῦναι τε καì δέξασθαι, I at least cannot live.
You have quite right to infer that a “psychological” interpretation of Revelation i.e. an atheistic one, is doomed to failure. It suffices to remember the example of Heidegger, of whom the interpretation of conscience was the last attempt in this direction to understand the call as call-to-oneself of the Dasein. But one must infer that something happened to man from God. But this event is not necessarily to understand as call or address—this is a possible interpretation—the assumption of this interpretation relies hence on faith and not on knowledge. I go further: it consists of a fundamental difference between God’s call itself and the human formulation of this call—what confronts us historically is only the latter (in case one does not assume verbal inspiration). Either the human formulation is radically problematic, then one ends in the desert of Kierkegaard’s subjectivism, in which the thought that one is entitled to believe only in God itself is quite thought to the end, and from which Kierkegaard can only save himself thereby that he makes understandable the content of faith, the mystery of incarnation, in a way as nobody has done this before.
Or the human formulation is not radically problematic—i.e. there are criteria which allow to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate formulation. If I understand you rightly, this is your view. On the basis of this you accept the Christian dogma. But I do not know whether you do this in the Catholic sense. In case you do that, we can easily agree. For according to the Catholic teaching, the distinction objected by you between Revelation and human knowledge is thoroughly legitimate. But I do not believe that you accept the Catholic conception. Here a big difficulty could result therefrom that you urge the principle of tradition, in opposition to that of the “pure Scripture,” and Catholicism is the Western Christian conception agreeing mostly with this principle. (I do not believe also that the recourse to the Eastern Church on this decisive point would change decisively the situation.)
It is with a certain reluctance that I refer as a non-Christian to this intra-Christian problem. But I do this because I can only so make clear that that problem, and the whole problem area, is a Christian one, and in a corresponding enlargement, a Jewish one, but therefore not a “universally human” one. I.e., that it presupposes its meaning according to a specific faith, whereas philosophy as philosophy does not do that. Here, and here alone, lies, as it seems to me, the problem regarding the answer to which we diverge.
I have no objection whatsoever against your affirmation that what you characterize as “pregiven” is, as you say, acceptable. The question is only whether it is necessary. [verso]
To prove this necessity, it suffices in no way to present the insufficiency of Husserl e.g.—all your objections against Husserl meet Plato and Aristotle in no way, for whom there is no “problem of constitution,” because they were not “idealists.” As regards the Ancients themselves, they were φιλο σοφοι and know hence wholly clearly as Plato and presumably also Aristotle, to say nothing of Socrates, that with all human σοφια something is awkward—the problems with which they were concerned do not become pseudo-problems, that they lose their seriousness on the basis of faith, as distinguished from knowledge. I only remember which role the problem of the essence and immortality of soul has played and still plays de jure within Christianity. And is the demotion of the Platonic-Aristotelian problematic not bought by Augustine e.g. through his teaching on resurrection historically meant, which you replace silently by a modern conception of history (ascent from polytheism to monotheism etc.)?
I have once again looked through your presentations. You admit, as a matter of course, the distinction between the human knowledge which relies on Revelation and the “only human” knowledge. It seems to me it does not contribute to a greater clarity if one does not apply to this distinction the distinction of knowledge and faith.
Your explanations concerning the (Platonic) dialogue seem to me interesting and relevant at the highest degree. I have the following reservations: 1) You say the order of the soul is a social conversation working rightly. I must assume that you mean the right order of the soul is a social conversation working rightly—but is the right order of the soul or right order of the πολις a conversation in the sense of dialogue? Would it give in the πολιτεια the Socratic dialogue? I am not sure of that. You have right that the dialog becomes a weapon to restore the public order—with its restoration it would therefore stop.
2) You do not infer from what Plato, or his “characters,” i.e. above all Socrates, say about that, but from what results as Plato’s presumable intention in the light of Aeschylus and of the situation which has changed meanwhile (death of Socrates).
3) You speak of tragedy and not of comedy, whereas the dialogue, roughly spoken, is a “synthesis” of tragedy and comedy. In this connection I remark what I should have remarked ad 2), that the decline of the πολις from the point of view of the philosopher is not the worst: the sound πολις, which holds itself for eternal, has to conceal, through the decline, the true-eternal. Tragedy and πολις, so one could say in the sense of Plato’s well-known declarations, belong together, and accordingly the doubt at the πολις and the comedy.
3) You seem to presuppose that Socrates held for possible in principle to have a genuine conversation with anybody—this appearance is likely grounded (e.g. the Apology)—but I hope I could sometime show that it is only appearance: the genuine conversation presupposes the needful φύσις, and there is for Socrates-Plato no “ultimate” equality of all men, which, remarkably, is presupposed in every interpretation of Socrates known to me. Thus it matters in any case to establish which kind of conversation is the conversation—not each conversation follows the same intention—in particular each conversation does not follow the intention to awake the participant—furthermore: not each conversation is voluntary—there are compelled conversations. An explicit sign, however only that, is that in no Socratic dialogue (the Apology is not a typical dialogue) Socrates speaks with a plebeian, not even in those which today are held for not genuine. The slave in Meno is at first only a “means to an end.”
4) You have quite right, George has more understood Plato than the craft—but was it not a consequence thereof that he was not guided by biblical (or secularized biblical) concepts? Also the doubt at the existence of a teaching, as there is for instance a Leibnizian teaching. But one cannot however go so far as to see in an awakening to philosophical “Existence,” to a philosophizing quasi without object, the substance of the dialogue. Socrates knew that he knows nothing—that is “the Platonic teaching”—for: a) one cannot know that one does not know, if one does not know what one does not know, i.e. if one does not know what is then the true questions and their rank ordering—
b) Socrates knew that the ἕ ν ἀ ναγκαîον is the ζ ƞ τεîν = σκοπεîν. That is surely much less than a “system,” but however also considerably more than “clarification of existence” and “philosophical faith.” [II]
I do not say of course that someone who is guided by biblical concepts cannot understand Plato, if one, in the achievement of the study of Plato, thinks in biblical concepts. In this sense the historical question is separated from the philosophical one.
I am glad to see that you think better of the Theages than ο ἰ πολλοί. I see no reason to hold for not genuine this masterwork, which presents almost wholly the enigma of the δαιμονιον.
The silence of Thrasymachus is, I believe, meant more comically than you take it. Do not forget that he appears later a second time. The Phaedrus shows that Thrasymachus’ τεχνη was of a certain positive signification.
I would like to read your interpretation of the Νόμοι —but alas I must wade through my Walgreen lectures—they are already more than overdue, and no end yet in sight.
Let hear again from you soon.
These annotations have been entered in pencil and are most difficult to read. They are displayed below in their original language. Editorial comments appear in brackets.
Letter dated August 21, 1950:
[Written at the bottom of the page (the numbers refer to the pages from Voegelin’s essay on Marx—cf. Strauss’s letter dated 25.8.50, p. 71):]
. . . . . . . mere human rev knowledge
philosophari necesse est—Philosophie und Glaube
See particularly: 278 f. 280 293
282 n. 18—cf. JJ first disc., first part 5. Ab.
Letter dated February 21, 1950:
[Written below “myth” [Mythos] (cf. p. 77, par. 2, antepenultimate line):]
das Schlimmste ist die Lüge in der Seele, d.h. glauben zu wissen wenn man nicht weiss—
[Written below the end of the letter:]
Philosophie und Gesetz: Maimuni zwischen Philosophie und Gesetz—die Offenbarung löst das Problem, das die Philosophie nicht lösen kann.
Jetzt: bin ich mir darüber klarer, dass die Kluft zwischen Philosophie und Offenbarung viel radikaler ist—dass das Problem, das Philosophie und Offenbarung gewesen ist, viel tiefer liegt—dass die Philosophie es absolut ablehnt, eine Offenbarungs-Ergänzung zu bedürfen—dass die philosophische Haltung ihrer eigenen Form nach den Glauben ausschließt.
a) der Unterschied zwischen griechische und biblische Religion—die griechische Religion führt zur Philosophie.
die biblische Religion führt gar absolut
nicht zur Philosophie
b) kein griechische Wort für Religion—man muss das also ganz anders ausdrücken—
θεîος νόμος—und sein Problem— ό κατ ὰ φύσιν βίος: keine Begründung
Partikular durchgehen—Gegensatz zu bibl. Lösung
die Philosophen lehnen es absolut ab, in der Offenbarung die Ergänzung der Philosophie zu finden—die Grenze des Wissens aber heissen noch lange nicht Glauben—Zustimmung zu einer Möglichkeit unter vielen—
c) Platonischer Mythos— Teil des Dialogs—kann nur in diesem Zusammenhang begriffen werden—
allgemein kann nur man davon sagen, dass der Mythos sagt, was der λογος nicht sagen kann—aber was dieses „Nicht-sagen-können” bedeutet, bedarf in jedem besonderen Fall einer besonderen Antwort
der klarste Fall: Timaios—der Mythos bezieht sich auf die Welt des Werdens ≠ Ideen
die Ideen stehen höher als die Welt des Werdens—die Ideen sind nicht Gegenstand des Mythos—(im Phaidros handelt es sich nicht um die Ideen, sondern um die Seele—ihrer Begründung in den Ideen)
aber: hebt der Sophist nicht die Differenz zwischen Ideen und κινησις auf? Nein—siehe Νόμοι—
Zhg. mit Parmenides, der zweigeteilte Lehrgedicht—Parmenides, dem einzigen Philosophen, der im Titel eines Dialogs genannt wird.
die Gottesbeweise ≠ Erfahrung
der Mythos spricht über das Unvertrauten in vertrauter Sprache
der reflektierte λογος —-—-—-—-—-—-—in angemesser Sprache
Republic the other life this life, this world
seen from without—in the light of the αρχαι—
is there a non-mythical presentation of “this life in the light of αρχαι”? Cave—
Timaeus on the origin of this world
Letter dated April 22, 1951:
[Written on the top left of the first page (cf. Strauss’s letter dated June 4, 1951, p. 89):]
die Berufung auf Augustin—what about resurrection usw. usw.
Was ist ein Prinzip, das erlaubt, zwischen menschliche Interpretation und göttlichen Ruf zu unterscheiden
die traditionellen Kriterien (Vincenz usw.)?
Zwingen Sie Übernahme des gesamten christlichen Dogma.
[In the text of the letter, the word “Gott” has been underlined by hand (cf. p. 80, par. 3, penultimate line: “God”) and the following annotations have been written in the margin:]
ein zu Menschen sprechender Gott—
ein die Menschen hörender Gott—
[Written in the margin, next to the two last lines (p. 84, par. 3):]
What about the comedy?
[Written in the margin, next to p. 84, par. 4:1. 5:]
why not epic.
Letter dated April 20, 1953:
[Written at the top of the letter:]
Cropsey’s article Review of Politics
The editorial additions made in Faith and Political Philosophy appear below in oblique brackets. German terms are quoted (in square brackets) where the translation has been changed (in the handwritten letters, it is mostly due to different results in deciphering). The letters which are listed below, all of them typed, have been originally written in English (all the others have been written in German):
From Strauss to Voegelin: January 19, 1942; February 25, 1943; October 11, 1943; November 11, 1947; May 27, 1948; June 23, 1953; 11 February 1960; 22 February 1960.
From Voegelin to Strauss: September 26, 1943; June 12, 1948; October 11, 1948; February 15, 1960; September 7, 1964.
Letter dated 2.X.1934 (handwritten)
p. 4: Kitteredge Kittredge
Letter dated 24.11.1942 (handwritten):
p. 6, par. 2, 1. 2: Weber either Catlin or . . . [Catlin oder . . .]
p. 6, par. 2, 11. 16–19:
instead of: Based on countercriticism of the Cartesian tradition, and leaving other questions aside, we can no longer adopt [ . . . ];
read: To say nothing about the other <questions>: we can no longer accept [ . . . ] on the authority of the Cartesian tradition;
[Von anderen zu schweigen: wir können ( . . . ) nicht mehr auf die Autorität der Cartesischen Tradition hin übernehmen;]
p. 6, par. 2, 11. 19–20: more directly directly [direkt]
p. 6, n. 4 (Strauss’s footnote), 1. 2:understanding acknowledgment [Anerkennung]
p. 7, par. 1, 1. 1:
instead of: I consider the central question <of Plato and Aristotle versus Descartes> entirely open.
read: I consider the central question entirely open.
p. 7, par. 4, 1. 1: Benno Bruno
Letter dated December 9, 1942 (typed):
p. 8, par. 1, 1. 6:fundamental experiences fundamental experiences
p. 8, par. 2, 1. 12:LawsStatesman [Politikos]
p. 8, par. 2, 1. 13: nonmythicalnonmythical [nicht-mythischen]
p. 8, par. 3, 1. 1: somewhat essentially [wesentlich]
p. 8, antepenultimate line: of states of the state [des Staates]
p. 9, 11. 6–7: of states of the ideas of the ideal state [Idealstaates]
Letter dated 20.12.1942 (handwritten):
p. 11, 1. 1–2:, and not universalizable <, and not universalizable>
Letter dated 13.2.43 (handwritten):
p. 12, 1. 6: have have yet [noch ( . . . ) haben]
p. 12, 1. 12–13:
instead of: concentrated on itself, even when in opposition to
read: constituted in itself through the opposition against [durch die Opposition gegen ( . . . ) in sich selbst konstituiert]
p. 12, 11. 15–16:
instead of: —and it points to the beginning, or to the social sciences.
read: , which leads to the beginning— but in the social sciences? [, der zum Anfang führt—aber in den Sozialwissenschaften?]
p. 12, par. 2, 1. 1: Your essay Your essays [Ihre Aufsätze]
p. 12, par. 2, 1. 2: from it from them [aus ihnen]
Letter dated 9 May 1943 (handwritten):
(date): 9 May 9 March [9 März]
p. 16, par. 2, 1. 4: religion and mysticism “religion” and “mysticism”
p. 16, par. 2, 1. 6: Keiler Otto, Heilige
p. 16, par. 2, 1. 6:, para. 5, 7. You . Ad ch. 5 § 7: you [. Ad ch. 5 § 7: Sie]
p. 16, par. 2, 1. 12: 1936; 1936, 1 ff.;
p. 16, par. 2, 1. 15: background “background”
p. 16, note 17: Strauss most likely referred to the article he was to publish, “The Law of Reason in the Kuzari,” in the Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 13 (1943), 47–96 (cf. Letter 12, p. 36). It can be regarded in a way as clarifying Marsilius’s background (Strauss did not mention an article on Marsilius, as interpreted in the editorial note), i.e. the medieval, Islamic, and Jewish origin of the “quasi conventionalist” interpretation of natural right. The name of Marsilius appears at the beginning of Strauss’s article, in relation to Averroes: op. cit., 47–48.
p. 17, par. 2, 1. 3: p. 11 of sc. with [sc. mit]
p. 18, 1. 9: level, and not worth considering. level.
Letter dated October 14, 1943 (typed in English):
p. 35, par. 2, 1. 6: important thread important fundamental thread
p. 35, par. 2, 1. 8: owing due
p. 35, par. 2, 1. 12: namely viz.
p. 35, par. 2, 1. 13: 5ff. 4ff.
p. 36, at the end of the letter, below the name of Leo Strauss, the following mention should appear: Assistant editor
Letter dated June 7, 1944 (handwritten):
p. 36, par. 2, 1. 1: say nothing say naturally nothing [natürlich nichts sagen]
p. 36, par. 2, 1. 4 from the bottom: of Johnson of Jehuda [Jehudas]
Letter dated November 11, 1947 (handwritten):
p. 38, par. 2, 1. 5:
instead of: about which I am not so
read: which are perhaps not completely [die davon sind vielleicht nicht ganz]
Letter dated March 18, 1948 (typed):
p. 40, par. 1, 1. 2: Highly Even more [Umso]
Letter dated May 27, 1948 (typed in English):
p. 41, par. 2, 1. 4: phenomena phenomenon
Voegelin’s review, p. 46, 1. 18: dreamy dreary
Letter dated June 12, 1943 (typed in English):
p. 42, date: 1943 1948
p. 42, par. 3, last line: advice advices
Letter dated January 14, 1949 (handwritten):
p. 44, par. 2, 1. 2: relations coherence [Zusammenhang]
Letter dated 21.1.49 (handwritten):
p. 57, par. 1, 1. 3:
instead of: ideas from a reading of the publication and not only from
read: ideas only from the reading of this writing and not from [Ideen nur aus der Lektüre dieser Schrift, und nicht aus]
p. 57, par. 1, 1. 6: and a certain sympathy and sympathy [und Sympathie]
p. 57, at bottom: the last sentence should appear as the first of the following paragraph, p. 58.
p. 58,1. 2: assume assert [behaupte]
p. 58, the following lines should appear at the end of this letter:
We move on the 27 of this month. My address is: Dept of Pol. Sc., The University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
Letter dated March 12, 1949 (typed):
p. 58, par. 1, 1. 11: would wants to [will]
p. 58, par. 1, 1. 12: would has understood [verstanden hat]
p. 58, par. 1, 1. 1: work, works [Arbeiten]
Letter dated 17.3.49 (handwritten):
p. 59, par. 2, 1. 3: publication on presentation of [Darstellung der]
p. 59, par. 2, 1. 4: publication presentation [Darstellung]
Letter dated March 22, 1949 (typed):
p. 60, par. 1, 1. 4: consider struggle with [mit ( . . . ) schlage ( . . . ) herum]
p. 60, par. 1, 11. 4–5: esoteric in Spinoza esotericism of Spinoza [Esoterik Spinozas]
p. 60, par. 1, 1. 5: And As [Wie]
p. 60, par. 2, 1. 10: spiritual fatigue fatigue of the spirit
p. 60, par. 2, 1. 11 (first instance): a the [die]
p. 60, par. 2, 1. 12: pseudo-aesthetic aestheticizing [ästhetisierend]
Letter dated April 15, 1949 (handwritten):
p. 61, par. 2, 1. 4: intertheological intra-theological [intra-theologische]
p. 61, par. 2, 1. 9: point out the coherence of present systematically [zusammenhängend darlegen]
p. 61, par. 1, 1. 7: Alexander Alexandre
p. 62, par. 1, 1. 3: d’Inégalitéde l’inégalité
p. 62, par. 1, 1. 3: political most radical [radikalsten]
p. 62, par. 1, 1. 5: all approximately all [ungefähr alles]
p. 62, par. 2, 1. 5:
instead of: with other fashions or trends
read: in modern materialism [im modernen Materialismus]
p. 62, par. 2, last line: Graius Graius
Letter dated 17.12.49 (handwritten):
p. 62, par. 1, 11. 6–7:
instead of: you first of all interpret in the obvious way nostra res and therefore <believe> the reason
read: the interpretation obvious at first today nostrae rei and therewith of the reason [die heute zunächst naheliegende Interpretation nostrae rei und damit des Grundes]
p. 63, par. 1, 1. 8: tries to find the way achieves the way
[geht ( . . . ) den Weg zu Ende]
p. 63, par. 1, 1. 12: philosophounte philosophountes
p. 63, par. 1, 1. 13–end:
instead of: The passion for knowledge that moves the Platonic dialogue, this highest mania, cannot be understood within Kierkegaard’s concept of “existence,” and <the attempt to do so> must be discarded as a radical illusion. This mania, from which Faust himself turns away, <is> in opposition to the creature in paradise, on the Isles of the Blessed, or to the painstaking searches of Goethe himself.
read: The passion for knowledge that moves the dialogues of Plato, this highest mania, cannot be understood in the horizon of the concept of “existence,” or else must be discarded as a radical illusion. This mania, from which Faust turned away: in opposition to the creatures in Paradise, in the Isle of the Blessed, or to Goethe himself who investigated nature.
[Die Platons Dialoge bewegende Leidenschaft des Erkennens, diese höchste μανία, kann im Horizont des “Existenz”-Begriffs nicht verstanden werden bzw. muss als eine radikale Illusion verworfen werden. Diese μανία, von der Faust sich abwendete: im Gegensatz zu den Wesen im Paradies, auf der Insel der Seligen, oder dem natur-erforschenden Goethe selber.]
p. 63, par. 2, 1. 1: ontological most urgent [vordringlichste]
p. 63, par. 2, 1. 4: permit permitted [erlaubte]
p. 63, par. 2, 1. 4: brief critical [kritische]
Letter dated January 2, 1950 (typed):
p. 64, par. 2, 1. 12: spiritual psychic [seelisch]
p. 64, par. 2, 1. 12: function of understanding function of knowledge [Erkenntnisfunktion]
p. 64, par. 3, 1. 2: history of dogmas “history of dogmas”
p. 64, par. 3, 1. 5: process processes [Prozesse]
p. 64, par. 3, 1. 8: perception knowledge [Erkenntnis]
Letter dated 14.3.50 (handwritten)
p. 65, par. 2, 11. 4–5: recognition knowledge [Erkenntnis]
p. 65, par. 2, 1. 14: view sight [Blick]
p. 65, par. 2, 1. 15: again won recovered [wiedergewonnen]
p. 65, par. 2, penultimate line: deliberately through guilt [durch Schuld]
ibid.: not again won recovered again [wieder wiedergewonnen]
p. 65, par. 3, 1. 4: intellectuals “intellectuals”
p. 65, par. 4, 1. 4:
instead of: of the praxis of the practical
read: of the primacy of the practical [des Primats des Praktischen]
Letter dated 10.4.50 (handwritten):
p. 66, par. 1, 11. 2–3: “extratheoretical” presupposition “extratheoretical” presupposition
p. 66, par. 1, 1. 4: human human
p. 66, par. 1, penultimate line:
instead of: nonetheless, that we are in more fundamental agreement
read: henceforth, that we agree however much extensively [nunmehr, dass wir doch viel weitergehend übereinstimmen]
p. 66, par. 2, 1. 1: Popper. Popper?
p. 67, 1. 1: positivism trying positivism which is trying
Letter dated April 18, 1950 (typed):
p. 69, par. 2, last line: identified stimulated [beregten]
Letter dated 8.8.50 (handwritten):
p. 69, par. 1, 1. 4: probable possible [etwaige]
p. 69, par. 2, 1. 7: “Restatement” anti-critique [Antikritik]
p. 69, par. 2, 1. 10: “Restatement” “Afterword” [“Nachworts”]
Letter dated August 21, 1950 (typed):
p. 70, par. 2, 1. 2:
instead of: —one of the few good things that has been written today has not become lost.
read: —the few good things that have been written to day do not indeed get lost. [—die wenigen guten Sa chen, die heute geschrieben werden, gehen ja doch nicht verloren.]
p. 70, par. 2, 1. 6: “Restatement” anti-critique [Antikritik]
p. 70, par. 2, 1. 11: proposal project [Projekt]
p. 70, par. 2, 1. 12: “Restatement” anti-critique [Antikritik]
Letter dated 25.8.50 (handwritten):
p. 71, par. 1, 1. 6: homo universalis uomo universale
p. 71, par. 1, 1. 7: 386 286
p. 71, par. 1, 1. 8: Genevan German
p. 71, par. 2, 1. 3: “Restatement” anti-critique [Antikritik]
Letter dated December 4, 1950 (typed):
p. 73, 1. 11: approach start [Ansatz]
p. 73, 1. 11: fact fate [Fatum]
p. 73, 11. 12–13: the approach of the Middle Ages this medieval start [diesem mittelalterlichen Ansatz]
p. 73, 1. 13: modern “modern”
p. 73, 1. 15:
instead of: Philosophy <deformed into> the system
read: The “system”-philosophy [Die “System”-Philosophie]
p. 73, 1. 18: cosmos whole [Alls]
p. 73, 1. 13: seems seems to me [scheint mir]
p. 73, 11. 6–8 from the bottom:
instead of: Calvin flirts with the problem in the Institutes, where his concern for the certitudo salutis through the unequivocal “call” is
read: Calvin’s concern for the certitudo salutis through the unequivocal “call” is, in spite of the hesitation waltzes he executes around the problem in the Institutes,
[Calvin’s Besorgnis um die certitudosalutis durch den eindeutigen “Ruf” ist, trotz der Eiertänze, die er um das Problem in den Institutionen aufführt,]
Letter dated 10.12.50 (handwritten):
p. 74, par. 2, penultimate line: and that —but [—( . . . ) aber]
p. 74, par. 2, penultimate line: demonstrates puts forward [vortut]
p. 75, 1. 18: history “history”
p. 75, 1. 19: history “history”
p. 75, 1. 21: question— questions—[Fragen—]
p. 75, 1. 27: a the [die]
p. 76, par. 1, 1. 1: proto-Hegelian pre-Hegelian [vor-Hegelsche]
ibid.: at first not not yet [noch nicht]
p. 76, par. 1, 1. 2: think I said believe to have shown [gezeigt zu haben glaube]
p. 76, par. 2, antepenultimate line: the closing parenthesis should appear at the end of the last sentence of this paragraph.
p. 76, par. 2, 1. 7: that on Socinus—a fact that [auf Socinus—eine Tatsache, die]
p. 76, par. 3, 1. 4: some any [irgendeinen]
Letter dated 25.2.51 (handwritten):
p. 78, par. 2, 1. 7: natural human [menschliches]
p. 78, par. 2, 1. 9: For me But [Aber]
p. 78, par. 2, 1. 11: demonstrated assert [behaupten]
p. 78, par. 2, antepenultimate line:
instead of: postulating of the tertium from there <i.e., from the classics and the Bible>
read: denial of the tertium non datur [Verleugnung des Tertium non datur]
p. 78, par 3, 1. 8: attained have taken [haben ( . . . ) hergenommen]
p. 78, par. 3, 1. 8: proof proofs [Beweise]
p. 78, par. 3, 11. 8–9: and customs of gods [von Göttern]
p. 78, par. 4, 1. 1: theioi nomoi theios nomos
Letter dated April 22, 1951 (typed):
p. 80, par. 2, 1. 2: either additionally [nebenbei]
p. 80, par. 2, 1. 2: or and [und]
p. 80, par. 2, 1. 6: to call you to account “to call you to account”
p. 80, par. 3, 1. 3: “scriptures” “Scripture” [Schrift]
p. 81, par. 2, 1. 4: befalls “befalls”
p. 81, par. 2, 11. 5–6: pseudopsychologically psychologically [psychologisierend]
p. 81, par. 3, 1. 1: seems seems to me [scheint mir]
p. 81, par. 3, 1. 11: transcendental transcendent [transzendenten]
p. 81, par. 3, last line: addressed “addressed”
p. 82, par. 2, 1. 17: frequently at any time [alle Augenblicke]
p. 82, par. 2, 1. 23 end: appears appears to me [scheint mir]
p. 82, par. 2, 1. 25: known as named [genannten]
p. 82, par. 2, last line: truth confidence [Vertrauens]
p. 83, par. 1, 1. 3: perception cognition [Erkenntnis]
p. 83, par. 2, 1. 3: perception cognition [Erkenntnis]
p. 83, par. 2, 1. 6: noetics noeses [Noesen]
p. 83, par. 2, antepenultimate line: perception cognition [Erkenntnis]
p. 83, par. 2, last line: perception cognition [Erkenntnis]
p. 83, par. 3, antepenultimate line: recognition cognizability [Erkennbarkeit]
p. 83, par. 3, last line: recognition cognizability [Erkennbarkeit]
p. 83, par. 4, 1. 1: appears appears to me [scheint mir]
p. 84, par. 1, 1. 3: appears appears to me [scheint mir]
p. 84, par. 2, 1. 1: dialogue dialogues [Dialoge]
p. 84, par. 3, 1. 3: desire desires [Triebe]
p. 84, par. 3, 11. 12–14:
instead of: This cult loses its parenthetical meaning when the public is corrupt; the decisive symptom of corruption occurs when the representative of Dike, Socrates, is killed.
read: This cult loses its parenetical meaning when the public is corrupt and, the decisive symptom of corruption, kills Socrates, the representative of Dike.
[Dieser Kult verliert seine paränetische Bedeutung, wenn das Publikum verrottet und, das entscheidende Symptom der Verrottung, den Repräsentanten der Dike, Sokrates, umbringt.]
p. 84, par. 3, 1. 17: seems seems to me [scheint mir]
p. 84, par. 4, penultimate line: vices voices [Stimmen]
p. 84, par. 4, last line: tryanny tyranny
p. 85, par. 1, 1. 4: seems seems to me [scheint mir]
p. 85, par. 4, 1. 1:These weapons This weapon [Dieses Kampfmittel]
p. 85, par. 4, penultimate line:
of all Platonic myths of judgment of the Platonic myth [des Platonischen Mythus]
p. 85, par. 5, the two last lines:
instead of: in doubt regarding the questions that they did not want to accept: in the future they would be posed as he posed them,
read: any doubt that the questions they did not want to accept as he posed them, will be furthermore posed [nicht im Zweifel darüber, dass die Fragen, auf die sie eingehen wollten als er sie stellte, weiterhin ( . . . ) gestellt werden.]
p. 86, par. 3, 1. 14: less-known less considered [wenig beachtet]
p. 86, par. 2, penultimate line: resultless “resultless”
p. 86, par. 2, last line: seems seems to me [scheint mir]
p. 86, par. 3, 1. 1: seems seems to me [scheint mir]
p. 86, par. 3, 1. 5: to the periagoge of the periagoge to [die periagoge zum]
p. 86, par. 3, 11. 14–18:
instead of: From the myth of Atlantis is derived the Socratic knowledge of order, from which is derived the authoritative worth of the conversation with the “young ones” in the Republic. The Socratic knowledge of order is, then, the ultimate implication of the mythical dialogue that extends through the spiritual history of the cosmos up to the gods.
read: Through the myth of Atlantis and its derivation, the Socratic knowledge of order, which in the Republic comes to worth authoritatively in the conversation with the “young ones,” is interpreted as the last offshoot of the mythical dialogue, which reaches through the ensouled history of the cosmos up to the gods.
[Durch den Mythos von Atlantis und seine Derivation wird das Sokratische Ordnungswissen, das in der Politeia authoritativ im Gespräch mit den “Jungen” zur Geltung kommt, als der letzte Ausläufer des mythischen Dialogs gedeutet, der durch die beseelte Geschichte des Kosmos bis zu den Göttern hinaufreicht.]
p. 87, par. 2, 1. 2: had been revealed would have been revealed [offenbart würde]
p. 87, par. 2, 1. 11: seems seems to me [scheint mir]
p. 87, par. 2, 1. 14: are seem to me [scheinen mir]
p. 87, par. 3, 1. 1: provoked “provoked”
Letter dated June 4, 1951 (handwritten):
p. 88, par. 4, 1. 4: “calling” calling
p. 88, par. 5, 1. 2: between between
p. 89, par. 1, penultimate line: getting rid of urging [urgieren]
p. 89, par. 2, 11. 2–3:
instead of: But I can do so precisely because I can make it plain to myself
read: But I must do so, because I can make it plain only there
[Aber ich muss es darum tun, weil ich nur da klar machen kann]
p. 89, par. 4, 1. 3: “ideologues” “idealists” [Idealisten]
p. 89, par. 4, 1. 4: knowledge constitution [Konstitution]
p. 89, par. 4, 1. 5: philosophoi philosophoi
p. 89, par. 4, 1. 6: understanding undertaking [Unternehmen]
p. 89, par. 4, 1. 8: pseudoproblems pseudoproblems
p. 89, par. 4, 11. 11–15:
instead of: Certainly the demotion of the Platonic-Aristotelian problem area through Augustine, for example, was not bought at the price of his teaching on the cosmos, which was still meant to be historical, and which [ . . . ]. Now,
read: And is the demotion of the Platonic-Aristotelian problematics through Augustine not bought for example at the price of his teaching on resurrection, historically meant, which [ . . . ]? And
[Und ist die demotion der Platonisch-Aristotelischen Problematik durch Augustin nicht z. B. um den Preis seiner historisch gemeinten Urstands-Lehre erkauft, die ( . . . )? Und]
p. 89, par. 4, 1. 16:teaching on the cosmos teaching on resurrection [Urstands-Lehre]
p. 90, par. 2, 1. 5: Laws Republic [Staat]
p. 90, par. 2, 1. 8: sense State [Staat]
p. 90, par. 2, 11. 10–11: does the dialogue belong [ . . . ]? the dialogue belongs [ . . . ].
p. 90, par. 3, penultimate line: whole healthy [gesunde]
p. 90, par. 5, 1. 4 (first instance): is was [hatte]
p. 90, par. 5, 1. 7: philosopher philosophizing [Philosophieren]
p. 90, par. 5, penultimate line: dêloun zêtein
p. 90, par. 5, last line:
instead of: “maintenance of existence” and “divine faith.”
read: “elucidation of existence” and “philosophical faith.” [“Existenzerhellung” und “philosophischer Glaube.”]
p. 91, par. 2, last line: biblical historical [historische]
p. 91, par. 3, 1. 1: Thrasymachus Theages
Letter dated August 5, 1952 (typed):
p. 91, par. 1, last line: need goal [Zweck]
Letter dated April 20, 1953 (typed):
p. 92, par. 3, 1. 6: natural law natural right [Naturrecht]
p. 92, par. 4, 1. 2: natural law natural right [Naturrecht]
p. 93, par. 2, 1. 3 (second instance): the a [eines]
p. 93, par. 2, 11. 5–6: is this case [ . . . ] philosophers? this case is [ . . . ] philosophers.
p. 93, par. 2, 1. 10: might appear might still appear [noch ( . . . ) erscheinen mag]
Letter dated April 15, 1953 (typed):
(date): April 15 April 13
p. 94, par. 4, 1. 1: thoughts reservations [Bedenken]
p. 95, par. 2, 1. 2: 380 480
p. 95, par. 1, 1. 9: separation separation
p. 95, par. 2, 1. 7: attempts starting points [Ansätze]
p. 96, par. 3, 1. 17: Pengouins Pingouins
p. 96, par. 4, 1. 6: seems seems to me [scheint mir]
p. 96, last line: . Perhaps ; whether [; ob]
p. 97,1. 1: ; Locke was one , one [, eine]
Letter dated April 29, 1953 (handwritten):
p. 97, par. 1, 1. 3: know hear [höre]
p. 97, par. 1, last line: taught. taught (“constitutionalism”).
p. 97, par. 2, 1. 7: allow bring out [zur Geltung bringen]
p. 97, par. 2, 1. 9: Rousseau, Kant and Hegel Rousseau and Kant-Hegel
p. 97, par. 2, penultimate line: synthesis “synthesis”
p. 97, par. 2, penultimate line: virtue virtus
p. 97, par. 4, last line—p. 98, 1. 1: philosophy philosophers [Philosophen]
p. 98, 1. 2: philosophy philosophers [Philosophen]
Letter dated May 22, 1953 (handwritten):
p. 98, par. 1, 1. 3: nonphilosophy of nonphilosophy, of
p. 98, par. 1, 1. 3: use confusion [Verwechslung]
p. 98, par. 1, 1. 4: instead of with [mit]
p. 99, par. 1, 1. 2: model necessary for set of institutions most favourable to
Letter dated June 10, 1953 (typed):
p. 100, par. 3, 1. 4: usually always [immer]
p. 100, par. 4, last line: the Crusades idea of the Crusades [Kreuzzugsidee]
Letter dated June 23, 1953 (typed in English):
p. 101, par. 4, 11. 3–4:
instead of: I think perhaps the utopian plan would be to
read: I have the perhaps Utopian plan to
p. 102, par. 1, 1. 1: As you can see As you <can> see
Letter dated June 3, 1956 (typed):
p. 102, par. 2, penultimate line: lecture lectures [Vorlesungen]
Letter dated Sept. 7, 1964 (typed in English):
p. 105, par. 2,1. 1: least last
should appear as italicized:
Letter dated 24.11.42, p. 6, par. 2, 1. 20: directly; critique; p. 7, par. 1, 1. 2: myth; 1. 3: science
Letter dated December 9, 1942, p. 9, par. 1, 1. 1: Datum; par. 2, 1. 11: universal
Letter dated 20.12.1942, p. 11, 1. 1: intention
Letter dated 13.2.43, p. 12, 1. 9: existing; 1. 11: opposition
Letter dated 9 May 1943, p. 16, par. 2, 1. 6: incomparably; 1. 7: political; 1. 9: expressly; own; p. 17, par. 2, 1. 9: breadth; 1. 10: or; 1. 12: presupposes; p. 18, 1. 6: subsequently
Letter dated 21.1.49, p. 57, par. 1, 1. 3: one
Letter dated April 15, 1949, p. 61, par. 2, 1. 2: Calvinism; 1. 6 (second instance): rationalism; p. 62, par. 2, 1. 4: use
Letter dated 17.12.49, p. 62, last line: reason; p. 63, par. 1, 1. 12: all; 11. 16–17: turns away
Letter dated 14.3.50, p. 65, par. 2, 1. 13: source ; par. 3, 1. 5: not
Letter dated 8.8.50, p. 70, 1. 3: after
Letter dated 25.8.50, p. 71, par. 1, 1. 8: believe;par. 2, antepenultimate line: principle; p. 72, 1. 11: ruthless
Letter dated 10.12.50, p. 75, 1. 8: within philosophy; 1. 18: within 1. 22 (last instance): the; 1. 23 (first instance): the; penultimate line: both; last line: reaction; p. 76, par. 3, 1. 2: faith
Letter dated 25.2.51, p. 78, par. 2, penultimate line: or; 1. 31: problem; p. 79, par. 2, 1. 3: noticed
Letter dated April 22, 1951, p. 84, par. 3, antepenultimate line: one
Letter dated June 4, 1951, p. 88, 1. 9: really; p. 89, par. 1, 1. 4: tradition; 1. 5: scripture; par. 4, 1. 10: within; par. 4, 1. 9: seriousness; p. 90, par. 5, 1. 9: what; p. 91, 1. 5: criticizing
Letter dated April 15, 1953, p. 94, par. 2, 1. 1: When; par. 4, penultimate line: formula
Letter dated April 29, 1953, p. 97, par. 2, 1. 2: natural-; 1. 3: difference; 1. 4 (last instance): modern; natural right; 1. 10: therefore
Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
. I thank Joseph Cropsey for his permission to consult the Leo Strauss Papers. The relevant material is to be found in the Special Collection Research Center of the University of Chicago Library (Leo Strauss Papers, Box 3, Folder 16; Box 4, Folder 18; Box 16, Folder 11) and in the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford (Eric Voegelin Papers, Box 37, Folder 1; Box 61, Folder 17; Box 62, Folders 19, 26, and 29).
. Two original German letters from Strauss (25.2.51 and June 4, 1951) and one from Voegelin (April 22, 1951) have been published in Eric Vögelin, Alfred Schütz, Leo Strauss und Aron Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel über “Die Neue Wissenschaft der Politik,“ ed. Peter J. Opitz (Freiburg-im-Breisgau/Munich: Karl Alber, 1993), pp. 29–52. However, this edition contains too many flaws (most of them identical to those listed below in “Corrections to the Strauss-Voegelin Correspondence”) to be usable. It is superseded by an edition of the complete series of the remaining letters in their original language: Glauben und Wissen. Der Briefwechsel zwischen Eric Voegelin und Leo Strauss von 1934 bis 1964, ed. Peter J. Opitz with the collaboration of Emmanuel Patard (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2010).
. After 1953, the epistolary exchanges between Strauss and Voegelin became scarce (this might be related to Strauss’s unfavorable judgment on The New Science of Politics as it appears from his notes on this book: see “Leo Strauss’ Anmerkungen zu Eric Voegelins The New Science of Politics,” in Glauben und Wissen, op. cit., 129–47). In 1958, Voegelin left the United States for an academic position in his native country (Strauss heard of this plan by chance: cf. Willmoore Kendall’s letter to Strauss dated 9 January 1957, with Strauss’s letter to Kendall dated January 21, 1957 in “The Willmoore Kendall—Leo Strauss Correspondence,” in Willmoore Kendall: Maverick of American Conservatives, ed. John Alvis and John A. Murley (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 199 and 200. Strauss declined the proposal of contributing to the Voegelin festschrift: his name appears on a typed list of the scholars who were to be asked to contribute; this list was attached to a letter from Peter Weber-Schäfer (Voegelin’s assistant at the Institute for Political Science of the University of Munich) to Hannah Arendt, dated July 8, 1960 (The Hannah Arendt Papers at the Library of Congress, Box 60). On another list (with a letter from the same to Arendt dated August 3, 1960), the name of Strauss appears on a list below the mention “abgeschrieben haben” [“have written off”] (loc. cit.); it does not appear on the list of the contributors (loc. cit.).
. Strauss’s sketch of a letter dated June 2, 1951 has been filed with a manuscript of the lecture on “Reason and Revelation” and material on Spinoza’s criticism of Revelation.
. The two pages of the letter have been crossed out. They have been used later for notes on John Stuart Mill’s series of articles, “The Spirit of the Age.”
. The review, as it appears in handwritten and typed versions in the same folder as the letter (loc. cit.), has been published in its entirety in Social Research 11 (1944), 389–97; repr. in Eric Voegelin, Selected Book Reviews, vol. 13, Collected Works, ed. Jodi Cockerill and Barry Cooper (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 126–29. A letter from Alvin Johnson’s secretary, dated September 13, 1943, with the printed heading of Social Research (Eric Voegelin Papers, Box 61, Folder 17), informed Voegelin that Farber’s book was sent to him “at Dr. Strauss’ request,” and gave material instructions regarding the review. In a letter dated January 10, 1944 (Eric Voegelin Papers, Box 61, Folder 17), Marvin Farber replied to Voegelin: “I wish to thank you for the courtesy you extended to me in showing me a copy of your review of my book. It is truly gratifying to have so friendly and kind a reception, and I know that your review will lead new readers to give the subject a trial, which is all that we ask. The extent of our agreement c
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