A Polanyian Deconstruction of Kojève’s Vision of Justice and Globalization

This essay appears in the Winter–Fall 2012 issue of Modern Age. To subscribe now, go here.

As our Western values of efficiency, certainty, and objectivity permeate every region of the planet, one of the main challenges confronting political life today involves the powerfully uprooting forces posed by this phenomenon now called globalization. Communities all over the world are relentlessly being asked to espouse a global perspective and adjust their historically evolved local ways of life to conform to supposedly more rational, less arbitrary, in short, more modern standards of living. While some accept these standards and view them as liberating, others perceive the processes of globalization as harmfully disorienting and wonder whether the uncompromising attempt to impose a universal pattern on human practices does not inevitably place a strain on healthy human development. Now, though it may at first seem unlikely, those who form part of this latter group can discover valuable insight in support of their position in the diverse writings of Michael Polanyi.

Michael Polanyi is not generally regarded as a major political thinker. He never produced a political meditation or treatise. He never developed an elaborate theory of government or law. His essays and books never confront, in any structured fashion, the central themes of what we today call political science. Yet despite the fact that on an explicit level his writings are concerned with the question of the natural sciences and do not conform to any one of the scholarly fields associated with the study of politics, Polanyi is nonetheless deserving of careful consideration by students of political inquiry.

Having generated works that were out of step with the intellectual currents of our time, Polanyi offers a real and significant opportunity for an alternative reading of the criteria by which evidence regarding political reality is judged to be relevant. His attack upon standard philosophy of science raises several important issues involving the commonly accepted categories of interpretation that inform our modern understanding of human historical existence and, as such, can prove helpful to anyone interested in discerning the character and condition of contemporary Western societies.

Simply put, Polanyi addresses a series of concerns in a way that potentially supplies the political scientist with an unconventional yet pertinent framework from which he can evaluate the philosophical and methodological conjectures that have come to dominate our present-day political judgments and beliefs. In an effort to draw out the political relevance of Polanyi’s approach to the natural sciences, I will, in what follows, turn to the thought of Hegelian intellectual and French civil servant Alexander Kojève, whose early views on globalization and its corresponding theory of a Rights-based form of justice provide a useful contrast to the line of reasoning set forth by Polanyi.

Kojève and the Evolution of Justice

Kojève’s thought is rooted in the axiom that ours is a posthistorical age of great enlightenment. For approximately the past two centuries, or ever since the declaration of the absolute principles of justice in the French Revolution, the world has gradually experienced the appearance of a constantly growing number of stable social orders whose integrity is supported by an ever developing technological-legal-bureaucratic superstructure and whose purpose is to ensure the satisfaction of every citizen’s desire for freedom, equality, and dignity.

Of course, there are still troubles that besiege certain volatile corners of the globe, but these are, according to Kojève, of a superficial, reactionary, and temporary nature; they are merely the last predictable gasps of a dying age characterized by ignorance and confusion. Indeed, at the present moment, with the rapid emergence and increasing openness of formerly hopelessly backward countries like China, Brazil, and India, and with the recent eruption of demands for an authentic experience of fairness put forth by the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa—which have successfully caused the overthrow of several oppressive, unjust regimes in the region—all appears to be in accord with Kojève’s analysis. There thus seems to be nothing of any lasting significance that can impede humanity’s movement toward a universal form of justice that would guarantee the gratification of its most profound desires.

Intimately connected to this general feeling of progress is the phenomenon of globalization, which is the current way of expressing the Kojèvian idea of a universal and homogeneous state. That is to say, according to Kojève, globalization is inextricably linked to the idea of justice, for, at its core, globalization is but an effort to endorse and disseminate a unique vision of justice throughout the planet. The global processes besetting the world exhibit many distinguishing features (e.g., the growing interpenetration of markets, technologies, and communications; the transnational flow of investment, information, and people), but the defining impetus behind them all is the notion of a world governed by a single and shared interpretation of justice. True globalization, in other words, is achieved through the “globalizing” of a particular reading of justice, for thus do people begin to think and act, or rather are compelled to think and act, in a common, that is, global, fashion.

Now, although one can effectively argue that Kojève’s account of justice is reductionist and that human Rights were originally never intended to be interpreted in the manner he interprets them—that is, in a manner that, as we will see, unavoidably leads to the creation of a global, universal, and homogeneous state¹—it is, nevertheless, the case that Kojève’s account has, in large part, become the accredited and prevailing one. The tenets of Kojève’s political philosophy, which are most comprehensively elaborated in the Outline of a Phenomenology of Right, are thus worthy of close scrutiny, for they seem to be representative of the way most of today’s bureaucrats and intellectuals approach the topics of globalization, justice, and Rights.

Human Rights and the Birth of a Global Order

Kojève’s account begins with the argument that justice exists when an “impartial and disinterested third” (whom Kojève names C) intervenes and mediates a conflict between two subjects of Right (named A and B). The result of the third’s, C’s, intervention is the negation of an act by one subject, B, that challenges the rightful act of another, A. For instance, if A has the Right to private property and implements that Right by purchasing a stretch of land, B must accept A’s Right. If B dissents and trespasses, C will suppress B’s defiance.

It is, however, important to emphasis C’s impartiality and indifference to either A’s or B’s personal plight, for if the roles were reversed, C would intervene in the same manner. If B has the Right to private property, and A violates that Right, C will move to annul A’s transgression. The impartiality and disinterest of the third is hence vital to an effective application of justice.² In Kojève’s words, C is said to be impartial “if he neither loves nor hates them (A and B), if he refers to their acts and not their persons, and . . . if his intervention in their interaction will not and could not be altered by the sole fact of interchanging A and B, A playing the role of B, and B that of A.”³

Additionally, because the third is indifferent to A’s or B’s private situation, he is also said to be disinterested. C is not concerned with A’s social status. C is not seduced by how much wealth B wields. C does not take into consideration the subject of Right’s creed or color. C’s deed of intervention leaves him unaffected and he privately neither gains nor loses anything by resolving a conflict of Rights. However, to say that the third’s involvement is disinterested is not to say it is without purpose. We should not mistake C’s intervention as being capricious or void of meaning. As Kojève explains, “The expression ‘disinterested’ must not be taken in too broad a sense . . . (for) if one acts in a certain way, it is because one has an ‘interest’ in so acting. . . . But the big question is knowing if the interest which prompts C to act is or not . . . a ‘judicial interest.’ If so, we will say that his intervention is disinterested in the narrow sense of the word.”⁴ C’s loyalty resides with neither A nor B but with a certain notion of justice as expressed through a set of Rights. Hence, only a threat to a person’s Rights can provoke the third’s intrusion.⁵

Kojève further maintains that all those whose sole concern is the realization of justice, that is, the thirds, form what he calls the exclusive judicial group. This group is labeled judicial because it is inspired by a given conception of justice. Moreover, Kojève explains that this group is exclusive, first because, internally, within each nation-state, every citizen will at some point enjoy the experience of being a possessor of Right (A) as well as a violator of Right (B), yet not every citizen will have the opportunity of playing the role of a protector and enforcer of Right (C). As a result, not every citizen is part of the judicial group. Second, this group is said to be exclusive because, externally, each nation-state promotes judicial principles that are defended by a judicial group that is distinct and independent from the judicial group of other nation-states.

Kojève offers an additional clarification when he states that although the exclusive judicial groups’ task is to mould human behavior in accordance with a given notion of justice, it can only perform this task successfully if its mediation is forceful and unavoidable. If the exclusive judicial group is to alter humanity’s unwarranted behavior, if it is successively to amend how people relate to one another, it must not only preach the dictates of justice; it must also, when required, physically impose them. By employing all means necessary, the exclusive judicial group ensures that all actions that do not conform to a given notion of justice communicated through a given set of Rights are strictly forbidden. And so on each occasion these circumstances appear, each time a person suppresses the rightful act of another and causes the intervention of an impartial and disinterested third who is motivated by a particular judicial principle and whose intervention is forceful and unavoidable, justice, according to Kojève, has occurred.

Yet in a world governed by political principles, in a world divided into numerous nation-states each of which carries an exclusive judicial group with the authority to formulate its own distinct interpretation of justice and Rights, any given exclusive judicial group’s actions can be avoided and justice be violated. A person can infringe on another’s Right and evade the mediation of the exclusive judicial group entrusted with defending that Right by immigrating to a state where the jurisdiction of that particular exclusive judicial group is not respected. It then follows that, from Kojève’s perspective, as long as political boundaries remain a dynamic and active force in managing human affairs, Rights will never be universal and justice will never achieve its most comprehensive form. The justice of Rights is factual only inasmuch as the third, C, is able to annul unjust acts in an unqualified manner. Therefore, only when they are accorded absolute and not conditional value by being acknowledged and embodied by everybody, do Rights attain universality and, by extension, the status of truth.

This demand for perfect justice requires that a commonly acknowledged judicial group be awarded the power to arbitrate disputes and regulate human life according to the stipulations of an enunciated set of universal Rights, which then forcibly direct the course of human interaction. Stated differently, from the standpoint of Kojève’s scheme, justice can be guaranteed only if there is a single judicial group that administers, with total authority and throughout the world, a common vision of justice as conveyed by a set of universal Rights. It should be mentioned that such a judicial group would no longer be exclusive, in the external sense, but universal, that is, global. Once governed by a single set of Rights, which are imposed by a judicial group that is cooperatively acknowledged, the world then effectively becomes a single collective entity, an End State, a Final Regime. And so humanity’s historic pursuit of perfect justice necessarily results, according to Kojève, in the birth of a universal and homogeneous state.⁶

Now the substance of this Kojèvian form of justice is shaped by its goal, which, briefly stated, strives toward the realization of universal recognition. That is, the basic aim of Kojève’s Rights-based form of justice is to produce civil peace and order by extending recognition to all. Inspired by Hegel, Kojève argues that human historical existence is driven by an acute desire for an existential sense of wholeness. This desire, he further contends, finds its satisfaction with the procurement of other people’s recognition—in the sense that “I recognize your beliefs and mode of life as appropriate and legitimate.” One will therefore never experience the satisfaction of what it is to be fully human until one’s existence is received and recognized by others as a valid instance of human existence.

This, however, further implies that an unrecognized individual is an unsatisfied individual, and that to be unsatisfied is to be restless and unpredictable. It is to be a potential menace to society. For if a person believes he is not being recognized, if he feels his needs are not being addressed and that he is being discriminated against, he will act in an unruly manner. He will protest, strike, and disrupt the orderly functioning of the state in an attempt to gain the affirmation he craves. Perfect social accord, in line with this view of things, therefore requires that there not be one standard of judgment for one group of individuals and another standard for another group. Instead, it demands one single form of justice that equitably attends to every person’s need to be recognized as free and independent. And so, when all enjoy equal entitlements and bear equivalent burdens,⁷ when there will be simply one idea of justice and set of Rights that pertains to all citizens of the world, the boundaries between people disappear, universal recognition flourishes, the need for wholeness is satisfied, and peace reigns.

Although the details that fill the Outline are sometimes tangled, the basic argument is easy to discern. Our existence as happy human beings demands the actualization of universal recognition through the mechanism of an international set of Rights that once realized transform the world into a thoroughly integrated legal entity that promotes a single set of beliefs⁸ regarding the proper conduct of men. Rights are, in other words, the channel through which principles of human thought and action become universalized and, as an inescapable consequence, the world becomes more homogenized. The character a person possesses is the result of what that person believes. If all believe in the same principles (universalization), all have, in a sense, the same character (homogenization).

From this point of view, the uniformity that results from globalization is perceived as essential to the progress of justice and the improvement of our quality of life. Such an imposition of unvarying ethical norms and expectations can only be achieved through the universal regulation of human experience, which is a task fulfilled by Kojève’s Rights. Rights are thus essential to one’s understanding of globalization, for Rights produce the changes in human behavior that in turn create the necessary conditions for its appearance. A global order is progressively enveloping the world, and this, Kojève maintains, has become possible because of the evolution and planetary expansion of individual Rights. They are the means whose purpose has been dictated by a specific goal—namely, universal recognition and the fruition of a Universal Homogeneous State.

Polanyi and Human Historical Existence

In order to grasp Michael Polanyi’s contribution to the debate over globalization, it is necessary first to consider the general contours of his thought. Polanyi, a formally trained physical chemist, is perhaps best known for his stance against the inference that science is an evaluative cognitive process whose principles hold an objective quality that can be expressly conveyed in a straightforward fashion through a declared sequence of procedures. The belief that science provides accurate and reliable knowledge of reality because it depends entirely upon the correct implementation of the scientific method—a method whose persuasive power depends upon the supposition that it eliminates human bias and shortcomings from the operation of discovery—is, according to him, baseless and erroneous.

Rather, Polanyi argues that all knowledge, scientific or otherwise, is acquired through a cognitive operation that relies on the interplay of two types of awareness, the focal and the tacit. The focal relates to things that we know in an immediate manner and that do not form part of our personal identity. It is the dimension of the knowing process that informs us of the characteristics of the various existing entities that we experience as objects standing in opposition to us. In short, the knowledge we are explicitly mindful of and can provide, at least, a partial account of is representative of our focal understanding.

On the other hand, the tacit refers not to the type of awareness we purposefully cultivate, but to one that develops simply by virtue of our existing and participating in the historical world—or, to be more precise, it is an awareness that blossoms gradually through our involvement in the particular social setting that forms our actual surroundings. The idea here is that the personal identity we acquire in the course of our rearing within a community of people is a major factor in our ability to apprehend any given aspect of reality. What a person knows, in other words, is contingent on who that person is, or rather has become, through his upbringing in a specific cultural tradition. Emerging from the cultural idiosyncrasies that help form our personal identity, the tacit, which is unique and bears the attribute of free agency, emerges from generations of communal interaction, the full range of which cannot be entirely comprehended.

Basically, what all this entails is that when we make a decision about the validity of a proposition in any given area of inquiry, be it in politics, morality, or even the sciences, we are making a private evaluative choice. As a result, the establishment of any truth depends on an array of criteria that cannot be explained through the use of an overt pattern such as the scientific method. Because knowledge contains a tacit dimension, personal character and judgment, rather than formal procedure, surface as the decisive elements in our quest to approach truth. It should be noted here that the impact of our tacit awareness in the process of discovery does not suggest that our judgments are bound to, and subsequently distorted by, a limited local perspective and that, consequently, we can only acquire a purely subjective understanding of reality. The element of ambiguity involved in the tacit does not intend to signal the inevitable failure of all objective inquiries.

On the contrary, Polanyi contends that genuine knowledge of reality is possible only on the basis of a well-nurtured, rich, and carefully developed tacit life. Through its traditions, customs, laws, and conventions, our communal environment symbolically articulates insights into the order of a hidden—in the sense of subliminal—timeless reality. As we mature and immerse ourselves in our community, as the enveloping traditions, customs, laws, and conventions begin to foster our habits and influence our distinctive disposition, we subtly and, in a sense, unintentionally form a tacit appreciation for the order of that hidden reality. Forming the basic frame of reference through which we encounter objective reality, the cultural and historical particularities, and even peculiarities, that enclose us must thereby be received without any misgivings in order to assist us tacitly to the end of achieving knowledge.⁹ Acquiring knowledge in any field of endeavour, whether science, fine arts, or morality, therefore requires an initial acceptance of the authority of an already established tradition of being embodied in and by a particular community.

Since we cannot divest ourselves of our individuality, since we cannot willfully lift ourselves above our surroundings, our knowledge of reality will always be affected, and restricted, by the cultural attributes that we carry and that serve as “filters” through which we view reality. But despite the contingent and ambiguous nature of our knowledge, it is nonetheless rightly called knowledge; the “filters” are never confused with reality itself. For this reason, the tacit is not merely a subjective aspect of our knowing, but an integral and primordial link to a greater order of reality, and the more refined and differentiated this link, the deeper and more insightful our understanding.

Polanyi’s theory of knowledge is thus saved from the void of postmodern relativism by his candid devotion to a tradition of thought that affirms the existence of an external independent reality that is permanent, eternal, and, to a degree, knowable. We can subsequently say that Polanyi’s work is a response not only to the behaviorists or relativists who operate in the natural sciences; it is an act of resistance to all ill-directed efforts either to eradicate the human element from the act of deliberation or to overvalue it. Staying clear of these extremes, Polanyi articulates a philosophy that allows for human freedom, discretion, and responsibility within the bounds of an all-encompassing reality.¹⁰ By now, it is not difficult to see how certain tenets of Polanyi’s thought could be employed to criticize Kojève’s modern presentation of a global Rights-based form of justice.

The Universal Homogeneous State: Justice as an Iron Cage

Because they eliminate personal judgments, which reflect prejudices that arise from a community’s particular cultural mode of existence, the judicial procedural methods advocated by Kojève are said to provide citizens with a more secure, efficient, and fulfilling way of life. Implicit is the insinuation that the chaos that at times derails and threatens our well-being is caused by the contradictory opinions of justice that emerged from the eccentric worldviews of the diverse local communities that populate the globe. In Kojève’s eyes, communal traditions, imbued with an assortment of cultural and religious presumptions, reflect a form of irrational, parochial, and tribal existence, one characterized by strict social and political boundaries that often give rise to strife.

Put simply, experience has shown that (a) bloodshed is the result of the clash between humanity’s conflicting views of justice, and that (b) conflicting views of justice arise as a consequence of the cultural boundaries that segregate the world’s communities. In response Kojève proposes to implement the principles of universal recognition through a common idea of justice, thereby conquering the cultural obstacles that have hindered the dénouement of an eternal order of perpetual harmony. From a certain viewpoint, Kojève’s proposal might therefore appear as a remedy for the incessant squabbling and frequent conflicts that tend to ignite between political communities that espouse opposing worldviews and interpretations of justice. Yet, despite its seemingly noble intentions, there is an inconsistency between the idea of promoting the citizen’s need for a sense of well-being, freedom, individuality, and dignity and the measures Kojève employs to enforce that idea.

As we have seen, the radically bureaucratic and intensely secularist vision offered us by Kojève strives to fashion a worldwide order by imposing a rational mechanism of control that produces and maintains social accord by narrowly directing how individuals ought to conduct themselves within human community. It is hence suggested that knowledge of justice can be transmitted and dispersed throughout the globe through the administration of rules and policies that regulate human conduct and that in effect prevent the citizen from perceiving justice as being anything other than procedural. As a result one does not need to call up one’s being, test one’s beliefs, exercise one’s discretion, and ponder the meaning of justice. All one need do to be considered just is confer one’s recognition in the approved manner by honoring the procedures stipulated and by satisfying the given quotas.

And so, as procedural strategies increasingly develop and continue to shrink individual involvement in essential human affairs, we find ourselves in the unenviable situation of being excluded from the domains of resoluteness, acumen, and responsibility—domains where our individuality usually manifests itself. By isolating the individual from the broader judicial process, Kojève’s Rights create a self-contained world, telling us that we, as humans, are inferior to juridical procedures, so that our thoughts and decisions are not genuinely our own but consequences of some systematically mandated outcome. Making personal deliberations unnecessary and even undesirable, Kojève renders citizens incapable of any significant independent thought, thus robbing them of their sense of personal accountability.¹¹

Consequently, when the experience of justice is confined to the firm measures formulated by Kojève’s Rights, the political problem of justice turns into a procedural, technical, and therefore nonpolitical problem. But, of course, Kojève recognizes and embraces this outcome. Political debates about justice are, according to Kojève, simply a means to the end of realizing universal recognition/rights. The moment this end is reached, the means become redundant. The elimination of politics is the purging of a once necessary evil and an indicator that humanity is drawing nearer to its historical aspiration for an all-pervading experience of wholeness. We can, therefore, ultimately characterize the Outline as Kojève’s attempt at justifying his conviction that (a) a universal and homogeneous order is progressively overtaking our world, and that (b) to exist in this politics-free order is man’s blessed destiny.

Yet from Polanyi’s perspective, the process of “hollowing out” politics has the effect of narrowing the scope of authentically free and creative human interaction, which in turn translates into an impoverished and “ant hill” type of existence—to borrow a Dostoevskian term. What is, from a Polanyian standpoint, so very ominous about the Kojèvian scheme presented is that it endeavors to cancel out the ambiguity and perceived inadequacies affiliated with the cultural existence of local communities by destroying the sustentative core of all forms of open human association, which is a type of association that is required for the fostering of our tacitness—which, in turn, is necessary for, among other things, our political and moral deliberations about justice. Thus, viewed from a Polanyian standpoint, what Kojève offers is a promise of fulfillment that leads to the paradoxical idea that the only way we can experience happiness and peace is by destroying the essence of our humanity.

At this point, the political significance of Polanyi’s work or, stated differently, the political significance of the tacit, gains some clarity: if our correct understanding of any given aspect of reality depends on the refinement and astuteness of our tacit awareness, which in effect reflects the quality of our free and creative interactions within a community, it then follows that the tacit also provides us with the understanding necessary to distinguish between justice and injustice, which is precisely the type of understanding that constitutes the bedrock of political debate. Thus the more elaborate and free our interactions and associations, the more intricate our tacit awareness. This in turn leads to more comprehensive political deliberations concerning justice, and thus to a more fulfilling communal and private existence. The free and creative interaction between individuals, which is required for a well-developed tacit, is therefore a necessary requirement for healthy politics; and a vigorous political life is essential to healthy human development.

And so the political relevance of the tacit resides in the fact that sound political judgments regarding justice are never instances of purely theoretical, instrumental, or procedural reasoning. Such judgments are most compelling when they are supported by the founding principles of its surrounding traditional and cultural environment in an effort to oppose threats of despotism that, unimpeded, destroy that environment. What this means is that political understanding, according to Polanyi, is rooted in the tacit; politics necessarily flows from a particular way of viewing and experiencing the world.¹² There is simply no possibility for a universal form of politics. The tendency toward general principles and patterns subverts politics and the tacit dimension that sustains it.

Kojève happily acknowledges this subversion but fails to appreciate the true implications. Kojève argues that discussions about justice are no longer necessary, for we, as human beings, through historical evolution, have uncovered its absolute principles. Our knowledge of justice is now only focal, that is, explicit. But again, this for Polanyi is simply impossible. The rebellion against politics and the tacit is, from a Polanyian perspective, but an attempt to escape all human constraints and is thereby an expression of revolt against human existence as such.

Polanyi would, as a result, aim his most severe critique at the resulting uniformity, depersonalization, and depoliticization of human life; not to mention the dangers that emerge with the complete centralization of supervisory power in the hands of a few “world controllers.”

The designation “world controllers” is not an exaggeration, a fanciful turn of phrase, for in this Kojèvian scheme justice is a man-created value and would for that reason necessarily require a group of intellectuals and bureaucrats—men and women of Kojève’s ilk—charged with the task of devising the tenets of justice. Kojève’s representation of justice, in other words, possesses no moral or ethical content in the traditional sense. In fact, from Kojève’s perspective, which is strangely reminiscent of the ancient Gorgian sophistic view, moral and political truths, like all other truths, are but human creations whose worth rests in the sole fact that they have been acknowledged as truths by a significant number of people. Truth, in other words, is a function of recognition; it is whatever the people recognize it to be.

At this point, the root cause of what might be termed the “shallowness” of Kojève’s thought comes into view: its calculatingly materialistic pitch. Kojève ultimately relies on a materialist concept wherein—except for a very few Kojèvian-styled “creative nihilists”—the individual loses his sense of self and is, in the end, conceived as little more than a “cog in the machine,” a member of the thoughtless herd.

Polanyi’s devotion to the uniqueness and value of human personality thus stands in stark contrast to the canons of Kojèvian philosophy. And although Polanyi would admit that questions regarding the principles of justice, like all questions, are never completely settled and entail heated and often incessant disagreement, this does not signal an intellectual failure or error. Rather, it merely conveys the numerous limitations that result from the contingent nature of human historical life.¹³ Though we move toward a mysterious destiny, we nonetheless proceed within the horizon of an eternal order whose meaning and whose justice call us forth. It is hence appropriate to end this discussion by noting that Polanyi’s account, though it provides a lower degree of certainty and stability, is far more substantive and authentically human than the one provided by Kojève. ♦

1      At this early stage, I would like to make it clear that this essay is not intended as an outright condemnation of human Rights; rather, it is an attempt to put in question and, to a degree, censure the way Rights are construed in the contemporary world; a way that, in my opinion, is extensively detailed in Kojève’s Outline. In other words, though I do not in this essay explore an alternate view of Rights, I would like to stress that Kojève’s modern take is not the only one available. For those interested in an alternative reading, see Clinton Timothy Curle, Humanité: John Humphrey’s Alternative Account of Human Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

2      Alexandre Kojève, Outline of a Phenomenology of Right, ed. Bryan-Paul Frost, trans. Bryan-Paul Frost and Robert Howse (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 38.

3      Ibid., 79.

4      Ibid., 80.

5      Ibid., 81.

6      Ibid., 126, 268, 321–25.

7      Ibid., 263–76.

8      As we will soon see, Rights are for Kojève nothing more than beliefs that have gained widespread approval. However, it must be further explained that Kojève argues that once a belief enjoys universal support, it is then no longer a belief but a fact. A fact, in other words, is not a premise that accurately corresponds to the properties of an external independent reality but one that has gained substantial recognition.

9      Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 60–62.

10     Unwittingly or not, Polanyi seemingly follows the basic Christian theological teaching that the ability to exercise freedom, discretion, and responsibility is crucial to a correct appreciation of reality and humanity’s role within it.

11     Such a removal of responsibility is the dominant mark of the Universal Homogeneous State, and it is something Polanyi warns against: “Objectivism seeks to relieve us from all responsibility for the holding of our beliefs. That is why it can be logically expanded to systems of thought in which the responsibility of the human person is eliminated from the life and society of man. . . . We cast off the limitations of objectivism in order to fulfill our calling, which bids us to make up our minds about the whole range of matters with which man is properly concerned.” Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 323–24.

12     The close relationship between the tacit and the political furthermore implies that politics, on some level, plays a role in our search for meaning. However, this role is admittedly hard to define from a Polanyian perspective.

13      Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 93–95, 143, 169, 173, 314–16.